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ABSTRACT 
 
THE ETHICS OF FUTILITY 
ACROSS THE AGE CONTINUUM 
 
 
 
By 
Katherine D. McCord, MSN, RN, NEA-BC 
May 2017 
 
Dissertation supervised by Professor Gerard Magill 
        Much has been written on the topic of medical futility with reports of its existence dating 
back to the time of Hippocrates.  However, the majority of the research on the topic has been on 
the adult population.  Very little literature addresses the presence of medically futile treatment 
across the age continuum identifying issues that impact neonates, pediatrics, as well as adults.       
        This dissertation addresses the gap in the literature by considering the ethical problem of 
medical futility across the age continuum.  By addressing the common thread of futility, there is 
an imperative for a call to action that encompasses the span of organizational ethics.  This span 
not only includes the clinical and professional ethics, but also the business ethics. 
        A broad review of the literature on both medical futility and moral distress was 
accomplished.  This yielded an integrative approach to the ethics of medical futility at the end-
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of-life across the age continuum as well as its effect on the moral distress of the nurses caring for 
these patients. 
        Findings indicate that medical futility, or inappropriate medical treatments at the end-of-
life, are to be found in all critical care units across the age continuum.  Although there are 
commonalities, each age group contends with ethical dilemmas surrounding the ethics of 
inappropriate medical treatments that are specific to their age group.  The inappropriate medical 
treatments are not only the number one cause of moral distress in nurses, but also create moral 
distress for physicians and other allied health professionals.  
        Increasing the conversation across the age continuum, that begins in nursing and medical 
schools, is needed to increase the awareness of medical futility and develop strategies to confront 
it.  Improving communication, plus the use of advance directives and palliative care for all age 
groups, holds the greatest hope for the future in minimizing futile treatments at the end-of-life. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
     The benefits of medical advances and new technologies can also bring burdens to the 
populations across the age continuum that raise a variety of ethical dilemmas.  These ethical 
dilemmas are most evident with regard to the debate on futile treatment, especially in critical 
care at the end-of-life, which affects all ages across the continuum.  These dilemmas related to 
futile treatment have contributed to increased suffering, escalating costs, and depletion of 
resources, both human and material.   In addition, futile treatment has been identified as one of 
the major contributing factors, or root causes, of moral distress in nurses.  This dissertation 
addresses the ethics of medical futility in the critical care environment, at the end-of-life across 
the age continuum, in order to enhance quality patient care and diminish moral distress.  
Therefore, the thesis for this dissertation is as follows:  medically futile treatment is not ethically 
justified at the end-of-life in critically ill patients along the age continuum because of its impact 
on quality patient care and its contribution to moral distress in nurses.    
       Much has been written on the topic of medically futile treatment with reports of its existence 
dating back to the time of Hippocrates.  The majority of research on the topic of medical futility 
has been on the adult population with little literature addressing the imperative that is present 
when the totality of the issue is engaged along the age continuum.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is to do that.  This dissertation addresses this gap by considering the ethical problem 
of futility in the neonatal, pediatric and adult populations.  By addressing the common thread of 
medical futility across all ages, there is an imperative for a call to action that encompasses the 
span of organizational ethics.  This span not only includes the clinical and professional ethics, 
but the business ethics as well. 
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        Much has been written about the high cost of dying, especially in the last six months of life, 
which is compounded if there is a stay in a critical care unit.  Technology advances, healthy 
lifestyles, and pharmaceutical interventions have contributed to an aging population that is able 
to live longer lives.  When this aging population needs health care, it has created conflicts as 
health care providers struggle to know what interventions will benefit what patients, or what will 
be futile treatment.  In addition, there is pressure from families to do heroics at the end-of-life, 
when these, too, may be futile.  In applying these concerns to pediatric patients, it is clear that 
congenital and chronic debilitating diseases, that used to claim children’s lives, are now being 
managed so that lives go on longer.  In addition, lives are being saved in the neonates at smaller 
weights and younger gestational ages with questionable concern or knowledge of the potential 
disabilities the neonates may face in later years or throughout a lifetime.  These lives are lived in 
all stages of capacities making futile decisions for these populations more difficult than ever.   
No longer can the concerns regarding futile treatment at the end-of-life be focused on adults, 
especially the elderly, since the presence of such treatments also pertains to the neonatal and 
pediatric populations.  This has prompted more aggressive action for improved care for all three 
of these populations and increased awareness of the benefit versus burden of medical treatments.  
In other words, more awareness of the ethics of futility across the age continuum can enhance 
quality patient care. 
       The thesis for this dissertation will be explored in a tiered fashion as the chapters develop.  
Chapter 1 serves as a general overview of the debate.  Chapter 2 will examine the history and 
evolution of the ethical debate on futility across the age continuum, focusing on neonates, 
pediatrics, and adults.  The ethical analysis will be integrated with theory as well as evidence 
based practice that looks at the most current issues related to futility in order to enhance quality 
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patient care in each age group (Chapters 3, 4, and 5).  Medically futile treatments in critical care 
are most acutely felt by the nursing population and often are evidenced as moral distress.  
Chapter 6 analyzes moral distress and considers a critical care nursing specialty where moral 
distress is most prevalent.   Following is a summary of the analysis for this dissertation which 
provides an overview of the argument. 
 
1.I.  Overview of the Argument 
        Chapter 2 focuses on the ethical debate of medical futility beginning with its history and the 
establishment of a definition that could serve as a standard for all, however, the concept defies a 
specific, standardized definition.  From focusing on the definition of futility, the evolution moves 
to an emphasis on organizational ethics and the utilization of policies and regulations with a 
concentration on the value of negotiation and communication at the bedside.  There is a 
consensus that a different approach to the topic is needed whether that be using a different 
dialogue, better utilization of nurses, enhanced communication or more timely consultation with 
palliative care. 
       The neonatal population has increased its ethical debate as neonatal intensive care units 
(NICUs) have been established allowing for the treatment of extremely low birth weight 
neonates (Chapter 3).  However, these NICUs have presented ethical dilemmas related to when 
to begin treatment or when to withhold and withdraw treatment.  Debate regarding the moral 
status of the neonates continues, however, the best interest standard is at play when the parents or 
surrogate decision makers are called to make decision regarding the treatment of the neonate 
either in the delivery room at birth or later in the NICU. 
        Chapter 4 addresses the ethical debates for those between 1-18 years of age which presents 
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with a diverse range of illnesses and conditions.  The children who died years ago from their 
illnesses are now living due to the advances of medical science.  When death does occur, it is 
most often due to the withholding or withdrawing of treatment.  With the broad range of 
development levels that occur between 1-18 years of age, the ability to consent or assent to 
treatments is often an issue in this age group.  Although legally a child cannot consent until 18 
years of age, children can often assent and express their wishes long before that age and need to 
be considered.  End-of-life in children takes such an emotional toll, not only on the family, but 
on the health care providers as well, that the topic of futile treatment and end-of-life decisions 
are often avoided which only makes this process more painful for all involved with the child.   
       A major concern in the care of the adult at the end-of-life is the issue of autonomy (Chapter 
5).  The majority of these adults are elderly and due to age, plus the effects of the illness, they 
may not be competent or have capacity to make their own autonomous decisions regarding 
treatment.  In addition, these patients may not have participated in any advance care planning 
that yielded an advance directive leaving the decisions up to the family, surrogates, and health 
care providers, as they attempt to make decisions for the patient.  The prominent decisions center 
on withholding and withdrawing treatment in the critical care unit.  Palliative care has been 
helpful with this population in not only managing symptoms but also providing for end-of-life 
care and a death with dignity. 
       Medical futility has a profound effect in the clinical world on the patients, families, and 
those who care for them.  However, futile treatment has no place in the compassionate and 
merciful care of the patient who is dying.  Medical futility is costly in terms of finances, but also 
in terms of its effect on the largest group of employees, the nurses.  This effect is often evidenced 
by signs and symptoms of moral distress in nurses who provide care and futile treatment to 
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critically ill patients along life’s continuum (Chapter 6).  Although there are numerous root 
causes and contributing factors leading to moral distress, two top factors are the nurse/physician 
relationship and medical futility at the end-of-life.  Moral distress is receiving more attention 
because of the detrimental effect to the integrity of those who experience it as well as the long 
term harm it does to the profession. 
       Action is imperative as medical futile treatments at the end-of-life are not ethically justified 
because of the impact on quality patient care contributing to moral distress in the caregivers.  
This dissertation will present the ethics of medical futility found in end-of-life treatment in the 
care of the critically ill neonatal, pediatric, and adult patients.  An analysis of each chapter is 
explained in further detail in the following sections.   
 
1.II.  Detailed Analysis of Chapters       
      Medical futility is not a new concept as it has been around since medicine’s beginning having 
its origin with the time of Hippocrates.  It gained more attention beginning in the 1980’s and 
1990’s sparking the ethical debate.  Yet, today in the 21st century medical futility defies an 
accepted or standard definition with its application varying from patient to patient and situation 
to situation.  The approach to medical futility and the many questions that result have never been 
more prominent in the American health care system than they are today.  This prominence has 
been enhanced by the explosion of advanced technology and critical care procedures. The first 
part of Chapter 2 explores the ethical debate on futility beginning with its history to include its 
definition, origin, and rationale for the dilemma facing health care providers today.  The second 
part of the chapter describes quantitative and qualitative futility taking a closer look at  
organizational ethics and the topic of rationing as compared to futility, ending with a discussion  
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on hope for the future. 
        From Hippocrates, the ethical debate focused on autonomy to establish the rationale that 
undergirds the concept of futility.   The first step began with futility’s definition.   Defining 
medical futility may be elusive, yet, health care providers say they know it when they see it.  For 
those who attempt to define it, medical futility is treatment which is characterized as useless, 
pointless, or having no purpose.1 To understand the meaning of such uselessness, there needs to 
be confidence that this treatment is of no benefit to this particular patient.2  Futility is treatment 
that either does not improve quality of life, does not improve the outcome, or prolongs 
suffering.3   A treatment that has as its sole purpose the physiological extension or prolonging of 
life is also considered futile.4     
        Moving into the Middle Ages, the Hippocratic view was replaced with religion and the 
 supernatural with touches of superstition.5  This continued until the modern era, from the 17th to 
19th centuries, when the view of modern medicine expanded with the scientific revolution and 
the focus on disease became something to be conquered.6  Progressing into the 20th century, 
science and religion became more integrated so that the ever-expanding technology, plus the 
sacredness of life, translated into doing whatever was possible to preserve life at all costs.   Up to 
this point, the role of physicians was a paternalistic one where they made the decisions, which 
was accepted by the patient and family.  However, this changed in the 1980’s when 
patients/families began to demand life prolonging treatments which health care providers often 
saw as inappropriate.  There emerged a tension between patients seeking protection from the 
imposition of unwanted treatment by a physician (the Quinlan case in 1976) to patients 
demanding futile treatments from physicians (the Wangle case in 1989).7  These demands were  
all in the name of autonomy and the debate regarding futility (that continues today) had officially 
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begun.8 
        The principle of autonomy is seen on the spectrum where physician overtreatment is on one 
end and the patient/family demand for overtreatment is on the other.9  The futility concept 
unfolded as a result of the patient/family driven demands.  A contest then ensued between the 
patient/family autonomy and the integrity or autonomy of the physician/provider.  The 
autonomous patient can refuse any treatment, however, this does not translate to receiving any 
and all treatments.  There is no duty for health care professionals to provide treatment that is 
deemed futile.10 Physicians can easily determine treatment that has no effect which can stand up  
to peer review, whereas, the challenge is determining which treatment is of no benefit to the  
patient as this is subjective and value-laden.11 
     The debate over who should make the decision, or have the last say in withholding or  
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, has gone on for generations and continues today.       
There are driving forces, or rationales, that strongly influence whether the believed futile 
treatment is considered.  One of the rationales for futile treatment continuing to be an issue is 
fear.  Physicians as well as patients/families are fearful of approaching the subject of death.12 
Because of this fear, it can appear that “everything” is done in order to avoid the inevitable end-
of-life discussion.  This fear can be far-reaching and not only be regarding the patient, but it also 
brings one’s own mortality to the surface for both the family and physician.13  The physician also 
fears litigation if everything is not done for the patient. 
      A second rationale for futile treatment to continue is the focus on the physical disease which 
ignores the patient’s subjective experience of the disease.14  With a preoccupation on the disease, 
it is easy to equate survival with success, discounting the feelings the patient/family may be 
experiencing. 
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      A third rationale is that providing the futile treatment is the “path of least resistance”.15 It 
takes less time in a busy schedule to do what has always been done and it is less controversial.    
Providing futile treatment is doing something, while withholding or withdrawing treatment could 
be perceived as doing nothing.   
        A final rationale is that the discontinuation of medically futile treatment is an  
acknowledgment that medicine is unable to master the disease process.16  To continue with the 
treatment is holding out hope that this might be the one case in 100 that beats the odds.17  
Unfortunately, this approach gives false hope to the family as well as denies them the comfort 
that comes from accepting and preparing for death.     
       In addition to the rationales for the futile treatments at the end-of-life, there are additional 
reasons for continuing or initiating these treatments, which can create ethical conflicts in the 
providers.  These reasons fall into three categories:  personal, which is the largest concern, 
institutional obstacles, and the wishes of the patient or the family (most often the case).18 
      When examining the concept of futility and its historical evolution, there are further attempts 
to break down the concept into understandable terms.  Utilizing the definitive terms of 
quantitative and qualitative is one such attempt to clarify the understanding, as well as establish 
meaning to the concept of futility.   Quantitative futility is often used synonymously with 
physiological futility, but not with all authors.  Quantitative futility is based on scientific data to 
determine the success of the treatment.19  This scientific data includes the physician’s 
experience, empirical data, expert opinion, and prognostic scoring systems that support a 
treatment that has been futile or unsuccessful in the last 100 attempts.20  For those who 
differentiate physiological futility from quantitative futility, physiological futility measures the 
outcome that is obtained by the effect on the patient’s physiological response.21 An example 
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would be that CPR has an effect on restoring a heart rhythm.  Whereas, quantitative futility 
relates to the remote possibility that the treatment will benefit the patient.22  The CPR may 
restore a heart rhythm, but the patient is still dying from metastatic liver cancer so there is no 
benefit to the patient’s overall outcome.   
       Qualitative futility is any treatment that does not lead to a patient’s discharge from a critical 
care unit along with discharge from a hospital to an independent state or at least to the state 
where the patient was on admission.23  In other words, qualitative futility is when the benefit a 
treatment offers is extremely meager.24   
        The debate and ethical dilemmas that arise from providing what is believed to be medically 
futile treatment is focused at the bedside in the world of patient care or clinical ethics.  Whether 
it is in the realm of quantitative or qualitative is irrelevant if the physician believes the treatment 
to be futile.  The patient’s autonomous right to self-determination has limits as physicians are not 
obligated to perform treatment that they view as ineffective or inappropriate.25 An important 
point is that individual physicians rarely make futility treatment decisions on their own.  Instead  
there is an inclination to solicit support from the population of physicians, the professional  
organizations, or the medical standard of care, all of which compose the professional ethics.26  
       Professional ethics is the varied roles that are filled or provided in a health care organization 
that work together to fulfill the organization’s mission, which is the care of the patient.27    
Nurses, as part of the professional ethics, do the actual care at the bedside.  Studies indicate that 
when nurses are compared with physicians in terms of qualitative futility, nurses are more 
frequently concerned with the patient’s quality of life and are more pessimistic in terms of the 
outcomes of treatment.28   
        Clinical ethics, or patient care ethics, professional ethics, and business ethics form the 
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concept of organizational ethics.  Organizational ethics integrates these three components to 
communicate, apply, and evaluate its mission and values by which it is defined in the serving of 
the patient.29  Both clinical and professional ethics play a role in medical futility.  Business ethics 
refers to the obligations of the health care organization to its stakeholders which include 
employees, patients, payers, the community, society, and contractual relationships.30  In 
confronting the ethical debates associated with futility, health care organizations need to balance 
the positons of opposing factions.  Through this balancing, the organization’s leaders are “co-
fiduciaries” with the professionals in assuring that the mission and values of the organization are 
upheld.31  Approaches organizations have used to manage medical futility include giving 
additional authority to ethics committees, establishing policies, and supporting legislation.32  
Failure to act can impact patient care, the reputation of the professionals, as well as the financial 
viability of the organization.   
        When attempting to limit treatments, rationing and futility are often used as terms to better 
explain their inappropriateness.   Both terms, rationing and futility, have negative connotations to 
the general public.  Steps have been taken by medical and nursing associations, both in the 
United States and Europe, through a policy statement to use the term “potentially inappropriate” 
treatment instead of futility.33  The use of futility is saved for rare occasions when treatments are 
requested but cannot be fulfilled.   In spite of this recommendation to change the terminology, 
the terms rationing and futility are often confused by both the medical profession and the general 
public.  Part of this confusion is that the terms came into being in history at the same time and 
they are often found occurring at the same time with the same patient.34 
      In considering medical futility in the care of the patient, there can be an inclination to 
disguise the uselessness of the treatment with rationing.  This disguise can be presented as 
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prohibitive cost, limited number of critical care beds, or a lack of insurance coverage as a way to 
make treatment decisions.35  To pose a futile question in a limited resource manner, or scarcity, 
makes it easier for the physician to discuss with the patient and family as it is less controversial, 
making the issue easier to comprehend than inappropriate medical treatment.36   
        Futility looks at one patient at one point in time in a “cause and effect” relationship, while 
rationing looks at a problem of scarce resources, which is distributed over many patients with the 
same condition and situation.37   Rationing implies a scarcity of health care resources that must 
apply to everyone without discrimination.38   Futility deals with treatment that offers no benefit 
but can be provided, whereas rationing deals with treatment that offers a benefit but is not 
provided for a variety of reasons.   
      Just as rationing may be used to cover for futility, so can futility be used to cover for 
rationing.  This can be seen in organizations where there is cost-containment pressures 
that call for withholding and withdrawing futile treatments as a financial strategy.39  Regardless 
of how these terms get used and abused, the one known is that they are here to stay in today’s 
ethical debate on appropriate treatments in health care.  
       There are alternative approaches to the issue of medical futility.  Some are helpful while 
others show promise.  The key to all approaches or resolutions begins with honest 
communication and effective discourse.40  As with health care in general, prevention is often the 
best treatment and this approach is true with medical futility.  Prevention strategies include 
advance care planning, early utilization of ethics committees, and timely consultation from 
palliative care.41  Nurses can also serve a more prominent role in assisting with health care 
decisions as they are the ones who spend the most time with the patients and their families.42 
      Medical futility knows no boundaries as it is found in all ages of the population.  The medical 
12 
 
advances in technology and pharmacology have increased the survival rate of the extremely low 
birth weight neonates.43  However, an improved survival rate has come at a cost by increasing 
the incidence of disabilities and comorbidities in the neonates.44   The parents, or surrogate 
decision makers of these new members of society, are ill prepared to respond to medical futility 
questions without feeling guilt, confusion and intense suffering.  The first part of Chapter 3 
addresses the history and theoretical framework for futility in the neonate taking into account the 
topic of moral status and the best interest principle.  The second part of Chapter 3 describes  
ethical dilemmas found in neonatology, the role both parents and professionals play as well as 
evidence based ethics applied to neonates.  
        During 19th century America, approximately 15-20% of all newborns died in their first year 
of life from infections, starvation, or hypothermia.45  Despite this harrowing data, the beginning 
of NICU’s is thought to have not officially started in the United States until the 1960’s with the 
development of the infant ventilator.46  In the United States, the first hospital to have a separate 
nursery to care for premature infants was in Chicago, in 1927.47  However, through the following 
years progress was slow with major changes occurring in 1950-1970 with advances in 
technology and the introduction of antibiotics.48    
       Infants in a NICU can be classified in terms of body weight or gestational weight.  Those 
who are classified with body weight are low birthweight at less than 2500 grams (5.5 pounds); 
very low birthweight at less than 1500 grams (3.3 pounds); and extremely low birthweight at less 
than 1000 grams (2.2 pounds).49  In determining maturity based on gestational age, an infant is 
considered premature if less than 37 weeks gestation, with 40 weeks considered normal or full 
term pregnancy.50    
       The “Baby Doe” rules or regulations became a major part of neonatology’s history 
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beginning in the 1980’s.  Baby Doe was born in Indiana, in 1982, with Down’s syndrome and  
esophageal atresia with a tracheal esophageal fistula which, through a mutual agreement between 
the parents and physicians, was not treated.51  The infant was not fed, was given sedation, as well 
as pain medication, and died six days later.52  As a result of all the outpouring of disbelief as well 
as outrage in this case and others, Congress, during the Reagan administration, passed the “Baby 
Doe” regulations.53  These were amendments to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act 
of 1984 which made it a violation to withhold treatment based on disability or a potential 
disability.54   
      The act, or Baby Doe rules, allowed for treatment to be withheld if, 1) the neonate was 
irreversibly comatose; 2) the treatment was classified as “futile” and prolonged the dying 
process; and 3) the treatment would be both futile for survival and would be seen as 
“inhumane”.55  Much controversy has surrounded these rules/regulations.  The concerns are that, 
although well intentioned, the rules have been misunderstood on top of misinterpreted to the 
point of increasing the suffering for the neonates as well as the parents and caregivers.  
        The theoretical framework for the end-of-life ethics in neonates begins with the moral status 
of neonates.  Much has been written, debated, and theorized as to the moral status of the embryo, 
fetus and newborn.   Through all this debate, these is still no one universal agreed upon 
determination of when moral status is conferred.  In spite of that, it is at the moment of birth that  
the neonate is considered a member of society.56   However, moral status reaches beyond society 
membership. 
       To have moral status requires more than the mere act of birth or coming into the world.  It 
delves into what is required to qualify one as having moral status, protected by moral norms, 
with moral rights on the same level as all humans.57  One can speculate if the moral status debate 
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is necessary or significant.  What it comes down to and why the discussion continues is based on  
two points.  One is based on the embryos’, fetuses’, or newborn’s potential to become a person, 
and the other is as a potential person it is symbolic with life which gives it “moral value”.58  
      Theories that have been proposed regarding what confers moral status with no agreed upon 
decision.    If the newborn is seen to have moral status, regardless of what theory one recognizes, 
then the newborn has rights which need to be acknowledged and safeguarded as an independent 
agent.59  The alternative is to view neonates as having potential for moral status while being 
dependent on their parent’s decisions under the best interest principle.60 
       Prior to employing the best interest principle, the decision making regarding newborns had 
been the paternalistic model.61  From the delivery room to the NICU, decisions regarding 
whether to begin or continue resuscitative efforts are best made from the best interest viewpoint 
of the neonate in collaboration between the parents and physician.  This can best be viewed on a 
continuum.  On one end is evidence based criteria that the newborn would survive with 
resuscitation.  Therefore resuscitation is done, even if the parents decide otherwise as the 
newborns right to life surpasses the parents decision.62  At the other end of the continuum is 
“unreasonable care” where the burdens are greater than the benefits and could be considered 
“abusive” if resuscitation was initiated.63  The middle, where it is uncertain as to the outcome, is  
where the parents and the physician collaborate, assuring that the parents are aware of the facts, 
so informed decisions can be made in the best interests of the neonate.64   
        There are many ethical dilemmas that present themselves in the care of the neonate.  First, 
in the 1960’s a baby born weighing less than 1000 grams had a 95% chance of death, today that 
baby has a 95% chance of survival.65  However, 30-50% of those weighing less than 750 grams  
have a disability which is considered moderate to severe, such as deafness, blindness, or cerebral  
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palsy.66  Of the approximately 4 million births each year, approximately 450,000, or 1 in  
9, are born premature, which is defined as less than 37 weeks gestation, and 12-14% are admitted 
to NICUs.67  
       Second, it is difficult to discern when treatment is futile.  Discussion and debate occurs and 
varies between countries and hospitals within the United States regarding the variation in 
treatment of neonates born at the margin of viability and whether further treatment is futile or 
not.  Outcomes of studies indicate that prenatal counseling and guidelines assist in the difficult 
decisions needed at birth.68  The guidelines are based on the following:  if a birth occurs at 22-23 
weeks gestational age, then comfort care only is recommended; 24 weeks gestational age is the 
parents’ choice; and NICU for those greater than 25 weeks gestational age.69     
       Third, a great deal of speculation has been discussed and written regarding unbearable 
suffering of the newborn.  Two identified problems come from these discussions.  The first is 
that suffering is abstract, subjective and personal which makes it difficult to identify in the  
neonate.70  The second is the concern with identifying future suffering for the neonate, which can 
range from chronic pain to the inability to participate in self-care.71 
       Fourth, care given to NICU patients that do not survive or survive with many disabilities, is 
often believed to add to the cost of health care.  A study of 1800 neonates in over 100,000 bed 
days indicate that only 6% of the costs were spent on futile care.72  NICU care has been shown to 
target survivors, however, some care is still perceived as inappropriate and futile due to three 
major reasons.  The first is the fear of litigation which is high in obstetrical medicine, so to error 
on the side of care is more the norm; the second is the high use of assisted reproductive 
technology with an effort to save neonates that are born from this intervention no matter the cost  
or condition; and the last is the mentality that still exists from the “Baby Doe” laws to treat 
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unless treatment is seen as futile.73  Unfortunately, the NICU costs are only the beginning.  Costs  
can extend for a lifetime if there are devastating disabilities with special education costs 
associated with low birth weight, in 2015 dollars, estimated at $7-$9 million annually.74   
       Finally, regardless of the high cost of NICU treatment with its advanced technology, there 
are times when the high tech care needs to be replaced with palliative and comfort care.75  This 
palliative care is appropriate after a determination of futility is based on diagnosis and prognosis 
as it provides compassionate care in order to minimize suffering for the patient, family and staff.     
        Coming to terms with futile treatment is difficult in any situation, but poses more challenges 
at the beginning of life.  These challenges are seen as new parents serve as surrogate decision 
makers while recovering from the loss of the expectations of parenthood in an environment of 
the NICU, which is foreign and frightening.  Likewise, the physicians and healthcare providers 
involved in the care of the newborns are challenged as they are restricted in their communication.  
This restriction is due to the lack of certainty in forecasting an outcome for both the short term as  
well as the long term survival including the probability of disabilities.76  Evidence based practice  
indicates that in applying the best interest principle, it is best done through a shared decision  
making model which identifies the roles of the parents and professionals.77         
      The parental role requires the parents to openly share their values, which may include 
religious and cultural views; to provide input into discussion regarding the newborn care; to 
communicate what they believe is the best interest of the child; and to honestly consider the 
recommendations of the physicians.78  The physician role requires that information be provided 
to the parents regarding the medical details of the newborn; that all questions be answered; and 
that a recommendation be made based on experience, knowledge and expertise.79  Parents ask of  
physicians in the process that they receive honest information and evidence when there is a poor 
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prognosis delivered in a supportive manner so an informed decision can be made.80  
        Parents are often faced with life and death decisions regarding the treatment of their 
newborn, however, physicians are not immune from difficult decisions in the NICU setting.  
Physicians have indicated that the strongest influences on their decision making process does not  
include fear of litigation, which is often assumed.   The biggest influences are the expectations 
they believe others have, especially the parents, of saving lives, the inability to accurately  
determine the gestational age, and the parents request for aggressive treatment.81   
       Many have believed that nurses and physicians, not only had different roles, but also were 
different in their ethical analysis and reasoning which could be seen at play in a NICU. On closer 
look, the differences were not that great with both nurses and physicians having the same moral 
duty to “do the right thing” and minimize suffering with both experiencing end-of-life decisions 
as the top ethical concern.82   
       The environment in most NICUs is one where communication and compassion surround the 
the infant and parents in a team approach where conflict is rare.83  However, each unit should 
have processes in place to recognize signs of conflict with training in conflict resolution. There is 
never a way to be sure of what situation or which staff, physician or parent interaction will lead 
to conflict, therefore, being prepared and alert for signs of impending conflict is necessary. 
       Evidence based ethics requires communication as the first step emphasizing its importance 
as the link to all ethical decisions.  Communication is not just about what is said, but how it is 
said as well.  For parents who are struggling with making life and death decisions regarding their 
newborn, the language used in that communication matters and affects how they respond to the 
information.  In all communications, the health care professionals should do the following:  1)  
use the baby’s name when referring to the neonate; 2) provide adequate time for discussing  
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difficult topics; 3) tolerate silence as information is being processed; 4) ask pertinent questions  
such as, “what do you want to know?” or “what is your biggest fear?”; and 5) know that 
conversations will need to be repeated multiple times.84 
      The shared decision making process surrounding the care of the premature newborn and the 
question of futile treatment is usually a two-step decision process.  The first step is a decision on 
whether to treat or not and is usually made in the delivery room, whereas, the second step guides 
the parents through the withdrawal of treatment and the dying process.85  Whether to treat or not 
requires an immediate decision with little time for discussion or questions and answers.  In 
organizations that have established guidelines based on gestational age and birth weight, this 
decision is easier.  However, gestational age is difficult to determine as the mother’s menstrual 
history is not always reliable.86   The second step of withdrawing treatment is usually more 
prolonged as parents debate the process.  This step is often surrounded with guilt, not only for 
withdrawing treatment but also for what the parents did to cause the infant’s prematurity.87  
       Evidence based ethics, unlike evidence based medicine which focuses on intuition, clinical 
experience, and expert opinion, considers values as well as best interests and preferences of 
parents/surrogates in contemplating treatment decisions.88  Three fundamental questions that 
need to be asked in the immediate post birth time period relate to whether to resuscitate or not, 
whether the best interest standard should be applicable only to the neonate, and to what extent 
should pain be treated in the neonate.89 
          In the NICU environment, death is an all too frequent visitor.  The parents’ response to the 
death and the associated grief is individually based.  However, the caring and compassionate 
concern of the health care providers determines the response of the parents more than any other  
single element.90  To assist parents to detach trough the grieving process, they must first attach 
19 
 
to the infant.  Attachment is done through touching, holding, bathing, picture taking, and naming  
the newborn.91   There is an additional opportunity to be found in neonatal palliative care 
programs. 
       Adult palliative care programs appeared in the United States in the 1980’s, but fetal 
palliative care did not begin until the mid-2000’s.92  An opportunity that presents itself revolves 
around the “uniqueness” of neonatal palliative care.  Palliative care is not meant to only be about 
the end-of-life, but in the NICU that is when it usually happens.93  Another opportunity is related 
to communication as well as conflict among providers, especially nurses and physicians.  
Physicians struggle to make the final decision that it is an end-of-life situation so they may 
postpone the decision while nurses see it earlier and become frustrated with the physician.94  This 
can lead to a delay in getting palliative care initiated.  The benefits of palliative care to the 
neonatal population is becoming more known and offers hope for the future in caring for 
neonates.        
        Children are not just little adults, as they were once thought to be.95  The pediatric 
population, ranging from 1-18 years of age, present with diseases and conditions that make them 
unique.  Much work has been done to eliminate childhood diseases through immunizations, 
disease prevention, and cancer therapies.  However, this special population continues to be  
plagued by accidents, congenital anomalies, child abuse, AIDS, and malignancies providing 
immense challenges and a daunting reminder of healthcare’s limitations.96   
      The first part of Chapter 4 will address the historical perspective and theoretical framework 
for discussing futility in the pediatric population.  This discussion will take into consideration the 
moral status of children versus adults and the influence of the family as a unit.  The second part 
of Chapter 4 will describe the role of the consent process for children as well as discuss evidence 
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based practices at the end-of-life to include pain control, bereavement support for the parents, 
and palliative care. 
       The infants and children that would have died years ago, especially in developed countries, 
 from childbirth complications, prematurity, and congenital anomalies, or birth defects, are now 
surviving.97  Because of improved sanitation, vaccines, and antibiotics the childhood infections 
have been eliminated, in some cases, or minimized in others.98   Another reason for the 
improvement in the infant age group is better education regarding sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS) which was a major contributor to mortality in the first year of life and remains so due to 
continued factors found in the environment.  Some of these environmental factors include 
cigarette smoking in pregnancy and after; bed sharing for infants especially in mothers who 
smoke; and thermal stress that is especially evident when the infant is placed in a prone position 
and heat cannot be reduced from the face if exposed to heat stress.99  Despite these improved 
rates, children still die with approximately 3% of the deaths in the United States each year being 
children.100  A child’s death leaves behind a life-altering experience for all who have been 
involved to include every member of the family as well as the health care providers. 
       In developed countries, the majority of children’s deaths occur in a hospital and almost three 
quarters of these deaths occur in a critical care unit.101  Of those children who die in critical care 
units, most occur after decisions are made to either withhold or withdraw treatment.102  
Therefore, these deaths are not unexpected and usually follow lengthy courses of treatment 
before an end-of-life decision is made regarding the initiation or continuation of treatment.103 
       Many of the end-of-life decisions to withhold or withdraw care are made when further 
treatment is not seen as providing benefit to the child, or futile treatment, and in some cases it 
may actually be providing a burden or prolonging the death process.  The futility challenges that 
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are present in the pediatric population are compounded by two distinct qualities.  These are the 
high level of uncertainty in treating children’s diseases, especially those with neurological 
disease or neurodevelopmental concerns, and the emotional response that ill and dying children 
create in the health care provider.104 
       As with the newborns, the theoretical framework for examining futility in the pediatric 
population is based on the moral status of the child and the significance that holds at the various 
ages.  The majority of the moral status of children, as well as adults, comes from the fact that 
they are persons or human beings which is accompanied by the rights of humans such as “life, 
liberty, pursuit of happiness, etc.”105  The remaining sources of moral status can be found in 
roles, such as teacher or laborer etc., reflected duties to others, and political power which can 
affect moral status via different levels in that power.106  Of these remaining sources of moral 
status, children due to their lack of maturity, are unable to achieve them until adulthood.107  Not 
only can children not achieve them, but also children at the beginning of life are unable to meet 
their basic needs or negotiate barriers in society to get their needs met.108  Parents are responsible 
to feed children, bathe them, keep them safe which progresses to making them attend school, 
behave appropriately toward others and help them to grow up to be independent members of 
society.109 
       Parental authority comes with rights and is based on the fact that the parent is the sole agent 
of the child.110  The rights of parents have been described as “stewardship rights”, versus owner 
rights, which adds to the complexity of the moral status of parents.111  This additional moral 
status of parents translates into the children’s right to be sure they are protected as well as have 
their needs met, such as being nurtured, educated, and developed.112  Along with the rights of 
parents, comes the duties to not violate the child’s rights, to be sure no one else violates these 
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rights and to protect the interests of the child.113  Failure to do any of these duties can lead to a 
limited and eventual loss of parental rights.   
       While examining the moral status as the theoretical framework, it is necessary to frame the 
child within the context of the family unit.   Unlike the newborn, where a relationship has not yet 
been established, there has been time for various relationships to develop within the family for 
the child along the age continuum.    How the family functions can affect the decision making 
process which is key in the critically ill child. 
       For treatment to be initiated, withdrawn or discontinued, the consent of the patient or 
patient’s surrogate is required.  A person cannot legally consent before the age of 18.  However, 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has been instrumental in expressing views on the 
concept of informed consent in pediatric patients to ensure that the child is a part of the decision 
making process, whenever possible.   
        Prior to the establishment of the concept of informed consent, the physician made all the  
treatment decisions.  Now it is believed that the patient surrogate has the right to make treatment  
decisions in collaboration with the physicians in an understandable language that includes 
treatment options, rights, benefits, and alternatives.114  In applying informed consent to  
pediatrics, the child’s parents or surrogates/proxy decision makers are usually the ones who give 
the consent, or permission as one person cannot consent for another.115 
       One approach to the decision capabilities of children uses the “rules of seven” where 
children less than seven years are considered unable to make major decisions but can be given 
choices in simple matters; those 8-14 years of age are unlikely to have the ability to make major 
decisions, but children vary; and those older than 14 have the ability to make decisions.116  When 
children less than seven years of age are being cared for, the premise is that they cannot make 
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decisions and therefore, the best interest standard applies.  The best interest standard is that the 
parent/surrogate will do what is right for the child maximizing benefits and minimizing risks.117   
       The second age group, 8-14 years, is usually able to reason, plus use logic, but may be very 
rule oriented and less flexible when looking at choices, however, they are usually able to assent 
to treatment.118   
       The adolescent group, those greater than 14 years of age, are usually able to consent.   They 
do not pass the minimum age of consent, but can do complex reasoning, discern multiple 
options, anticipate outcomes, all of which is influenced by emotional maturity.119   
       The parent child relationship involves the parents’ understanding of their identity as parents, 
the associated role expectations and obligations, plus the responsibilities to their children.120  
However, these identities, roles, as well as responsibilities get blurred and confused as their 
expert knowledge regarding their child is put to the test when making medical futility decisions.  
In making these decisions, and because of all the emotionalism associated with ill children, 
health care providers must focus on building relationships with both the parents and children.121  
Futility decisions are best made as a collaborative effort between parents and health care 
providers, as well as children in some cases, depending on age.122    
        The health care providers have the responsibility to maintain the integrity of the parent child 
relationship.  This is done in the three following ways:  1) recognizing that parental authority 
does exist which may include a strong use of persuasion and at times “coercion” to get the child 
to respond appropriately, as long as the means are not abusive or harmful to the child; 2) 
observing that parents use a certain amount of discretion in performing their duties without 
outside interference, as long as there is no neglect or abuse; and 3) acknowledging the parents 
duty to advocate for their children and safeguard their rights.123  It is through this parent child 
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relationship that the parents have not only assumed the responsibility for their child but also to 
the community at large to develop a member worthy of it. 
        Medical futility at end-of-life in pediatric patients differs from adults in two basic ways. 
 First the psychological or emotional impact that impending death of a child can have on 
caregivers is so great that there is a tendency to forgo discussions regarding futile treatments.124   
A concentrated effort is needed to begin the discussions early.  The second difference is in 
reference to the determination of brain death in children.  The brain death criteria cannot be used 
with the same certainty in pediatric patients as it can in adults.125  The difference is not explained 
by empirical data, but is thought to be due to a child’s brain being more resistant to injury.126   
       Problems that have been identified by parents at the end-of-life in the pediatric population 
include a need for improved focus on the child’s symptoms and associated suffering that is 
commonly seen.127  Other problems are related to communication at all levels and relationships 
with the health care providers.128  The parents tend to focus on the child’s pain, quality of life, 
and chance for improvement when making these end-of-life decisions.129    
       Priorities have been identified for interventions in end-of-life care for both the parents and 
children.  These include:  1) open, honest communication with accurate and timely information; 
2) easy access to health care providers; 3) emotional support by staff; 4) maintenance of the 
integrity of the parent child relationship, and 5) faith support.130    
       Since pain has been identified as one of the top areas of concern for parents of critically ill 
children, health care providers must first and foremost ensure that the children’s pain needs are 
addressed, then their role expands to parental support in the grief process. 
       Pain is the most common symptom at end-of-life, as well as the most feared.131  However, 
there are many approaches to deal with pain which can address its prevalence, but there needs to  
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be adjustments to align with the various ages along the continuum of the pediatric patient.  
Assessment of pain in a child is different from an adult and the interventions, though similar, 
have unique differences in both pharmacological and non-pharmacological methods.132  Even 
though there have been advances in pediatric pain management, there remain challenges.   
These challenges are due to a lack of a theoretical framework specific for pediatric pain; the 
uncertainty in interpreting children’s behavior; difficulties in measuring and applying  
methodologies; and biases brought to the table by both nurses’ and children’s past experiences, 
values and personal beliefs.133    
       The care of children at the end-of-life, to include their death, does not end there.  As 
recommended by the Institute of Medicine, the care continues through the grieving process for 
the parents to include bereavement support.134    Despite all the scientific approaches to grief, the 
one prevailing theme that seems to make the biggest difference is the support of the clinical 
staff.135  This support begins in the critical care unit and continues through the grieving process. 
       An area that has been identified with importance is the recognition of spiritual needs of the 
grieving parents.136  The best way to address these needs is through a “caring presence”, which 
allows the parents to be at the bedside and care for the child through the dying process, as well as 
help establish memories for the future.137 
        The low number of children’s deaths has lessened the urgency for the palliative care 
movement in the pediatric population resulting in a slower start than in the adult population.138  
However, palliative care’s value and importance has been recognized along with its challenges  
and barriers.  As a result there is a movement to increase the availability of palliative care and  
address the obstacles that are preventing its success.   
        Only 20% of the pediatric hospice programs have palliative programs, which is not 
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sufficient to meet the demands.139  Identified challenges in establishing palliative care programs 
for the pediatric population including the following:  1) a lack of a definition of pediatric 
palliative care; 2) a lack of data to determine the needs of a palliative care program; 3) an 
inability to decrease the suffering while maintaining hope; 4) a need to address the health care  
provider’s needs when caring for dying children; 5) an urgency for providing education and 
training programs; and 6) a commitment to include spirituality as a part of palliative care.140 
       Adult palliative care programs can serve as a guide for pediatric palliative programs, 
however, pediatric programs are unique and distinct from adult programs.141  Both adult and 
pediatric programs are composed of symptom management, advance care planning, psychosocial 
concerns and spirituality.142  However, pediatric palliative programs must consider the 
developmental level of the child, as well as the needs of the parents.  Advance care planning is 
an additional challenge as discussing children’s death is still a subject that is considered “taboo” 
by many and against numerous cultures in developing countries.143  Therefore, it is no surprise 
that the focus is on the curative versus the palliative with childhood illnesses.  For those 
palliative programs that have grown and flourished, the results are rewarding with involvement 
of all staff members and the support of palliative care physicians.144   
        More research in palliative care in the population of children is needed.  However, this is 
not without its challenges and problems.145  Even with these challenges, it is recognized that 
research must be attempted in order to establish a base of knowledge to further define the 
benefits of palliative care for children.   
        When referring to medical futility, the population that is most often the focus is adults.  Of 
the adult population, it is usually the elderly that are more apt to receive futile treatment at the 
end-of-life.  In the United States, those over 65 years of age account for over 50% of critical care 
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patients, however, only comprise less than 15% of the overall population, although this is 
growing at a rapid rate.146  These elderly have a longer length of stay, higher mortality rate, and 
higher cost of care than those younger with the 70-79 year olds having the highest admission 
rate.147  Chapter 5 examines futility and the adult population.  The first part of the chapter 
addresses a theoretical framework based on competency versus capacity and the role autonomy 
plays not only for the patient but also for the family, health care providers, and community. The 
cost of end-of-life care is also examined as a problem that cannot be ignored.  The second part of 
Chapter 5 describes evidence based practices for the adult by addressing overtreatment, 
contradictions in treatment, and the nuances of withholding and withdrawing treatment with the 
presentation of palliative care as a viable option. 
        The theoretical framework that embodies medical futility in adults, which ends up focusing 
on the elderly, is the ability to make independent and fully informed decisions about the 
treatments they receive or do not receive.   This decision making ability puts the focus on the 
principle of autonomy.  To fully employ the principle of autonomy, the conditions of competence 
or capacity must be present.  Competence is defined as being able to complete a task or duty.148  
Only judges, or the court, can determine whether a person is competent or incompetent.   
Therefore, the term capacity is used in the medical arena which refers to whether the person  
has the capacity to understand the information and make appropriate decisions.149     
       Determining one’s competence or capacity is not simple.  One can appear to have the 
capacity to make simple decisions, yet, not have the capacity to make life and death decisions or 
those that involve life-sustaining treatment.150  Competence or capacity is seen as a process 
rather than an outcome and relates to the particular decision that has to be made.151  Some  
bioethicists see the issue of capacity needing greater evidence as the risk involved with the  
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decision to be made becomes greater.152   
          Respect for autonomy is at the core of bioethics and is identified as one of the basic ethical 
principles.153  This principle emerged partly due to the atrocities performed in Nazi concentration 
camps that led to the Nuremberg Code.154  Furthermore, the ethical debate that surrounded both  
Karen Quinlan (1970’s) and Nancy Cruzan (1990’s) were key in establishing autonomy as the 
primary ethical principle in medicine.155  
       When an individual is unable to exercise their autonomy, especially when no advance care     
planning has been completed, a surrogate decision maker is called upon to make treatment 
decisions.  There are several processes that are used ranging from substituted judgment to best 
interest that employs past conversations, the surrogates own beliefs, as well as values, and 
seeking input from other family members or friends.156 
        It has been determined that one of the major concepts that is primary in the end-of-life care 
of the adult patient is autonomy.  This autonomy is not only for the patient but is also concerned 
with the autonomy of the patient’s family, the health care providers and the community.   
Autonomy is defined as the right to determine for oneself, without undue “interference” from   
others, one’s own decisions, objectives, and values.157   In healthcare, being autonomous allows a 
patient to decide what treatment to receive and not to receive.  The autonomy of the patient is 
often equated to liberty, free will, and independence with it being a characteristic that is 
beneficial for all to have.158  An autonomous decision occurs when the individual acts with 
understanding and intention without undue influence from others.159  The term “respect for 
autonomy” is used because for true autonomy to occur in healthcare there is a dual respect.   
This dual respect includes the patients’ “right” to make their own choices and the healthcare 
providers “obligation” to allow the patients to make them.160  
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       The autonomy of the patient’s family is complex.  The family feels a responsibility to and 
for the patient which translates into duties and obligations to the patient who is critically ill and 
near the end-of-life.  However, there are limitations.  At the end-of-life and, especially when 
decisions are having to be made regarding futility, the family is burdened which takes their time, 
energy and can cost not only dollars, but create physical, spiritual, plus psychological trauma.161       
If family autonomy is to be maintained in the stress producing environment that is present in 
critical care, two things must occur.  First of all, the family must maintain some ability to control 
their lives.162  Secondly, healthcare providers may be torn between respecting the autonomy of 
the patient while supporting the family, so a high index of awareness is needed to allow for both 
group’s needs to be addressed.163 
       While healthcare providers are supporting patient and family autonomy, the subject of the 
providers’ autonomy can be viewed as an obstacle to this support.  Healthcare providers’ 
autonomy applies to all providers, however, it is physician autonomy that gets the attention.  
Physician autonomy emerges when physicians refuse to provide treatment that they do not 
believe would be beneficial to the patient or that would be appropriate.164  There are some who 
speculate that medical futility is used as an “ethical trump card” by physicians which is used to 
deny treatment and overrule choices made via patient autonomy.165  In the few cases where legal 
action has been taken by the patient’s family, after a physician refused to provide specific 
treatments, the courts have decided in favor of the patient/family.166   
       Community autonomy has a role in futility as the cost of providing treatments, which are 
perceived to have no benefit to the patient, affects the available funds for the greater good of the  
health of the community.167  This places the healthcare providers in the middle of balancing 
patient autonomy with the autonomy of the community.168   In addition, there is the realization  
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that the professional’s autonomy may impact the decision to treat or not to treat. 
        Whenever the end-of-life care, with the treatments that go with it is discussed, the cost 
problem is usually a part of this discussion.  At no time does this discussion become more 
controversial than when cost and medical futility are discussed at the same time.  The major 
issues focus on differentiating costs versus expenditures; the relationship of the costs to health 
care reform; and the ethics of cost control.169  If health care is to be affordable providing the 
resources to patients as needed, both consumers and providers need to realize that cost control is 
a factor for end-of-life treatment.    
       A process that helps to support patient autonomy as well as lessen some of the end-of-life 
conflicts is for patients to participate with their providers in advance care planning with the end 
result being completion of an advance directive.  Currently all 50 states have some type of 
legislation on advance directives.170  Data indicates that, although more than 60% of the 
population want their end-of-life wishes to be observed, only approximately 25-33% actually 
take steps to put them in writing as an advance directive.171  The reason for these low numbers 
are threefold.  These are: 1) it is difficult to discuss end-of-life issues; 2) patients change their 
minds often due to a lack of knowledge on medical treatments as well as their consequences; and 
3) patients wait for the physician to initiate the conversation.172 
       There are basically two types of advance directives.  The treatment directive, or living will, 
and the proxy directive, or medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA).  The treatment  
directive identifies the kind of treatment patients would want if unable to communicate their 
desires with some being more explicit than others.173   Whereas, the proxy directive involves  
identifying a surrogate to make healthcare decisions when the patient is no longer able to do 
so.174  Despite perceived advantages to completing advance directives, there are barriers to their 
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completion.  These barriers include racial disparities, discomfort of physicians in talking about 
the subject, and the fear that the directives will not be honored.175  
       In attempting to address medical futility, different processes have been employed.  One 
process has been accomplished through policy and legislation, such as has been done in Texas  
with the Texas Advance Directive Act of 1999.176    This act makes it legal for hospitals and 
physicians to nullify any patient or family request for treatments that are believed to be futile  
without fear of legal repercussion.177  Other states have attempted similar policies with data from 
both Texas and other states being mixed as to the policy’s effectiveness.178 
        In order to confront medical futility in the adult, two major occurrences need to be 
considered and addressed.  These are overtreatment and contradictions.  The perception is that 
the United States has an immense problem with overtreatment which carries a negative 
connotation regardless of its source.179  When considering medical futility, overtreatment can be 
viewed as physician driven overtreatment or patient driven overtreatment.  Historically 
physicians acted in a paternalistic manner making health care decisions for patients.180  The 
physicians were granted this decision making power because of their education, training, as well 
as expertise, plus the “doctor knows best” was believed to be true.181   This view changed when 
patients became more autonomous wanting a say in their own care. 
       A process that has helped to control physician driven overtreatment is informed consent.  As 
informed consent was in place by the 1970’s, the requirements were for patients to give consent 
for any treatment.182  After being informed, the patient can then decide whether to proceed with 
treatment or not.   
       Patient driven overtreatment, or family driven, is often seen in the critical care unit at the 
end-of-life.  The concept of medical futility surfaced as a way for the physician to respond to this 
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patient/family overtreatment.183  Medical futility is associated with patients at the end-of-life  
where new or continued treatments are not perceived by the healthcare providers as being of  
benefit to the patient or as providing the expected outcome.184  
        Contradictions are defined as perspectives on an issue, such as those surrounding end-of-
life, which are opposing, although one view assumes the possibility of the other such as ‘benefit  
versus burden”.185  These contradictions, often seen in critical care, provide an opportunity 
for dialogue regarding decisions related to future action. 
       One contradiction that presents itself frequently at the end-of-life is honoring the patient’s 
wishes versus following the family’s wishes.  At the end stage of a critical illness, the majority of 
patients require mechanical ventilation which limits the ability to communicate adequately or 
their disease, plus medications, leave them in an altered state of consciousness.186  Therefore, the 
family, proxy, or surrogate becomes the primary decision maker for the patient.  It has been 
reported that surrogates make up to 75% of patient’s decisions in critical care using “substituted 
judgment”.187  This substituted judgment tends to be based on three things:  1) the surrogate’s 
own best interests; 2) mutual interests of the surrogate and the patient; or 3) on documents of 
which the surrogate has little knowledge.188  Strategies to assist with this contradiction consist of 
including surrogates in physician/patient discussions regarding advance care planning before the 
healthcare crisis occurs; honoring patient’s wishes whenever they are known or are in a formal 
written format; and including other family members in discussions to assist the surrogates with 
focusing on what patients would want if they could voice their wishes.189   
       A second contradiction is killing or allowing to die.  The contradiction has been debated in 
the ethical world for a long time.  The controversy centers on whether there is an ethical/moral 
difference between actions that lead to ending the patient’s life versus failing to act which leads  
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to the patient’s death.190  Two theories look at this contradiction in different ways.  The 
utilitarian view looks at the consequences of an act as to whether it is the commission or 
omission of the act that brings about good or bad for the greater number.191  The human rights 
theory sees an omission as illicit if there was a right to that which was omitted.192    
        Within the contradiction of killing versus allowing to die, a discussion often ensues 
regarding withholding versus withdrawing treatment and whether either or both fit as part of this 
contradiction.  Beginning in the 1950’s and 1960’s, CPR was found to save lives, especially 
those who had suffered from untoward effects of medications, surgery or had a significant blood 
loss.193  Soon CPR became the standard of care for all hospitalized patients if they had a cardiac 
or respiratory arrest.  However, by the late 1970’s its limitations were known and CPR had 
become one more option for patients on the choice continuum to overrule the paternalistic health 
care providers.194  Today discussions occur with patients and families regarding whether they  
want to be resuscitated (“full code”) or a DNR (“no code”) as the first step in withholding further 
treatment or withdrawing present treatment.195   
       Between 35-90% of the deaths in critical care are due to withholding or withdrawing 
treatments, with withholding being defined as a decision to not begin or expand a present 
treatment and withdrawing as purposefully terminating a life-sustaining treatment.196  When 
referring to withholding and withdrawing treatments this can mean any and all treatments, such 
as artificial nutrition/hydration, CPR, and medications, but most often refers to mechanical 
ventilation.   
       There is a general consensus among ethicists that there is no ethical/moral difference 
between withholding and withdrawing treatment.197  However, some patients, families, as well as  
providers struggle more with withdrawing than withholding treatment.  This struggle is due to 
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the fact that it is easier to not start a treatment than to discontinue one and withdrawal is active so 
may invoke guilt, while withholding is passive and involves doing nothing.198  Nevertheless, 
withdrawing has merit over withholding for the following reasons:  1) physicians take on the 
patient as a responsibility or duty once treatment has begun; 2) a “trial” of treatment gives the  
patient a better chance for improvement instead of never even trying; and 3) it is acceptable, as is 
withholding, by most major religions.199 
       The topic of withholding and withdrawing treatment is not without its opportunities.  One 
opportunity is to increase the collaboration with the nurse members of the health care team.200  A 
second opportunity is to improve communication with families.201  A third opportunity relates to 
withholding and withdrawing life support in the emergency department (ED).  Emergency 
physicians are usually faced with a lack of information on the patients they treat which leads to  
inappropriate intubation providing an opportunity for improved end-of-life decisions in the ED 
and an increased focus on palliative care.202  A fourth and final opportunity is to ensure that  
withdrawing treatment does not equate to withdrawal of care.203   All patients deserve to be cared 
for, even if they are receiving futile treatment, to include providing a death with dignity. 
       One approach that can assist with not only symptom management, but also maximize the 
potential for quality of life during the remainder of time for those suffering from a life-limiting 
illness, is the utilization of a palliative care program.204  Much progress has been made in the 
acceptance and prevalence of these programs across the nation.  However, action is still needed 
to enhance the benefits and address the opportunities, as well as ethical concerns that are present, 
such as those related to palliative sedation, euthanasia or “physician assisted dying”,205  
        Chapter 6 addresses moral distress and moral residue focusing on the nursing profession.   
The first part of Chapter 6 defines moral distress and its historical development plus a conceptual 
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framework that includes professional and personal identification.  The last part of Chapter 6  
focuses on the root causes of moral distress which impacts not only the nurse, but also the  
nursing profession, along with strategies to confront moral distress. 
        Much has been written about moral distress over the years, especially as it pertains to 
nursing, and this nursing is most often in the critical care arena.206   Moral distress was first 
defined by Jameton in the 1980’s as something nurses feel, along with guilt, when they engage in 
treatment that they believe to be wrong but are unable to avoid.207  Today’s current definition 
depicts moral distress as what occurs when a person perceives a moral problem, accepts moral 
responsibility, then makes a moral judgment regarding the appropriate moral action.  However,  
because of real or perceived limitations, the individual then engages in moral “wrongdoing” by 
either an act of omission or commission that is seen as morally wrong.208     
       Jameton further explains moral distress as an “initial” distress leading to a “reactive”      
distress.  This initial distress occurs after limitations and value conflicts are perceived within the 
organization leading to anxiety, anger, and overall dissatisfaction.209 Reactive distress is the 
negativity that results when the initial distress is not dealt with and may be caused by the 
individual’s personal obstacles which present no recourse.210 
        Moral residue, although not as widely studied as moral distress, is nevertheless, believed to 
exist.  Moral residue is defined as that which is left when moral distress is not resolved leading to 
a crescendo effect.211  Other authors characterize moral residue as the leftover feelings that 
individual’s carry with them from times when facing moral distress that the individual either 
severely “compromised” themselves or allowed themselves to be “compromised”.212 
        Between 33-80% of nurses state they have experienced moral distress with those who have 
left their jobs doing so because of moral distress 15-26% of the time.213  Both critical care nurses 
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and physicians care for patients who are receiving treatment that they do not agree with which  
they fine in violation of their moral conscience.  This occurs in 50% of critical care nurses, 30%  
of attending physicians, and 70% of house physicians.214 
       There has been a lack of a conceptual framework for moral distress, which is believed to 
have hindered further research and formulation of directed education or policies.215  In 
examining the conceptual framework for moral distress, professional and personal identification 
are significantly integrated.  To separate the professional identification, it is necessary to 
examine the professional and inter-professional relationships, as well as all the challenging 
dynamics associated with these relationships.216  Nursing is perceived as a highly moral 
profession with goals that provide care to patients by protecting them from harm, preventing 
complications, and sustaining a healing environment.217  When any of these goals cannot be 
realized, for various reasons, moral distress can result.   
       One of the most important inter-professional relationships that is affected by, and contributes 
to, moral distress is the nurse-physician relationship.  Some critical care units have a history of 
tension between nurses and physicians that, when unresolved, can lead to moral distress.218   
       Other contributing factors in the professional realm that can contribute to moral distress 
include shift work; staffing issues; lack of trained colleagues; leadership concerns; heavy 
workloads; and the emotional toll of caring.219  Nursing, like many other professions, has a code 
of ethics.  Nursing’s code addresses both the profession’s and individual’s responsibility to 
address moral distress, taking action to prevent it, whenever possible.220 
       The personal identification found in moral distress in nurses starts from the beginning during 
the education process to become a nurse.  It starts when nurses are indoctrinated with the  
sentiment that they have a “sacred” duty to those in their care, i.e. “the patient always comes 
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first”, so that there is a preconceived idea regarding the care of the sick and injured.221     
       Two factors have been identified that affect the individual nurses and their level of moral    
distress.  The first is moral sensitivity.  This is the realization the nurse has of the moral essence 
that comes after the interaction with another, such as a critically ill patient who is vulnerable.222   
This sensitivity brings together moral knowledge and “moral behavior” in such a way that there 
is a perceived benevolent responsibility to do what is right for the patient.223 
       The second factor is the moral or ethical climate.  Ethical climate is defined as the  
organization’s “variable” that can be altered to facilitate open dialogue regarding patient care 
issues and ethical concerns.224  This open dialogue leads to the organization’s culture which 
includes attitudes, norms, expectations, and values.225     
       The professional and personal identification lays the framework for moral distress.  
However, not all nurses suffer from moral distress, yet, work in the same environment with 
similar characteristics.  This variance has led to many studies to determine the reasons why some 
nurses are affected and others are not. 
       Moral distress has received much attention because it is so compelling as well as detrimental 
to the integrity of those affected by it.226  Continued exposure to moral distress, leading to moral 
residue, can affect one’s core values and sense of duty which are integral to integrity.227   With a 
loss of integrity, in the presence of moral distress, there is a fear that it will lead to a subsequent 
loss of one’s personal and professional identity, which can be devastating.228 
       The frequency and intensity of moral distress varies between nurses in the same as well as 
between separate nursing units.  In addition, when the United States is compared with both  
developed and developing countries, the United States reports a higher frequency and intensity of  
moral distress, especially when associated with futile treatment at end-of-life.229 
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       The intensity studies indicate the situation when moral distress is most apt to occur.  
Inherent in these situations are sources or root causes of the moral distress.  The top five 
identified root causes were identified by both nurses and physicians as indicators leading to 
moral distress.  These include the following:  1)  patient care that is affected by a lack of 
continuity; 2) acquiescing to the family’s wishes for treatment when the patient’s best interests 
are not considered; 3) poor communication on all levels; 4) prolonging death through “life- 
saving” actions; and 5) unsafe staffing conditions.230  These top five causes are similar with both  
the adult and the pediatric population, with the exception that following the family wishes is the  
number one root cause for moral distress in the neonatal/pediatric areas.231  The majority of these 
top root causes deal with end-of-life topics and the decision making process when the patient is 
receiving futile treatments.  Medical futility is a major contributing cause to moral distress in 
nurses.232 
        The nurse who experiences moral distress has usually suffered through a process of ethical 
decision making.  This decision making has exposed moral conflicts and moral judgments on the 
way to moral action.  An instance where over 50% of critical care nurses report experiencing 
conflict and moral distress is in the area of organ donation.  Organ donation becomes conflicted 
when viewed as helping others, yet, distorting and prolonging the dying process for patient, 
families, and nurses before the organs can be harvested.233  These conflicts have increased as the 
source of organ donation has expanded from brain dead patients to donation after cardiac 
death.234 
       There is one contributing factor that has been identified as the underlying root cause, source, 
or contributing factor for the nurses’ moral distress.  This is the nature of the nurse and physician 
relationship.  In the critical care environment, nurses and physicians must have a close 
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relationship in order to provide quality patient care.  In an ideal world, this relationship would be 
both cooperative and collaborative where differences are confronted and openly discussed.235  
However, this is not always the case and as a result, due to several factors, this lack of 
collaboration sets the stage for moral distress and dissatisfaction from both the nurse’s and 
physician’s perspective.236 
        The consequences of moral distress on the individual nurse can be profound, both in the 
short term and in the long term.  Immediate effects are related to physical symptoms, 
psychological responses, feelings of a lack of support, job dissatisfaction, and attitude changes 
toward patients.237  As moral distress continues there is more negativity as it relates to patients, 
other staff, physicians, and the organization, especially where there is perceived medical futility 
in the treatment of the critically ill patients.238  As moral distress persists leading to moral residue  
long term effects become evident such as loss of self-image, the presence of more or a loss of 
spirituality, and health related decisions such as completing one’s own advance directives or 
removing self from organ donor list.239  The unresolved moral distress can then proceed to burn 
out, early retirement, and leaving critical care and/or nursing to seek another profession.240 
       Moral distress is reported in all areas of nursing, however, it takes a major toll on neonatal 
nurses.  The reasons for neonatal nurses experiencing more moral distress are believed to be 
related to uncertainty after resuscitation and whether the long term outcomes for the premature 
infants justify the resuscitation.241   
       Moral distress can lead to nurses leaving their jobs or the profession.  Historically, 
healthcare executives have not always given nurse turnover the attention it needs ranking it 7th in  
importance of top issues facing executives today.242  Nursing turnover is costly at an expense of 
approximately $300,000 for every 1% increase in turnover.243   However, there are other costs  
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associated with turnover, such as decreasing quality of care, which affects reimbursement, 
leading to an immense resource expenditure that often never addresses the root cause of the 
problem.244 
       The nursing profession has been delayed in addressing moral distress in research, education,  
and policy.245  In the past, nurses reported a lack of support from nursing management to the 
point of being reprimanded when seeking help or being “scapegoated”.246  However, all that is 
changing.  Now moral distress has been recognized not only in the United States but 
internationally and the nursing profession has begun to take action.  Work has begun to target 
nurses who work in high risk areas where the patient’s needs are uncertain with intense needs 
and prolonged suffering that often leads to death.247  
         Research shows that creating an ethical work environment helps to minimize moral distress 
and if it occurs there are processes in place for moral distress to be resolved.  For an ethical 
environment to occur, there is a role for the organization, the unit and the individual.  From the 
organization’s perspective, a place to begin in creating such an environment is through policy, 
ethics education and practices.248  Other efforts that come from the organization to the individual 
include daily ethics rounds, workshops on the topic, and an emphasis on nurse/physician 
collaboration that begins in schools and continues to the workplace.249 
       The leadership of critical care units is key in recognizing the moral distress and confronting 
it in a kind and compassionate manner.  Nurse leaders can take the lead in addressing moral 
distress in many ways.  Examples include:  1) utilize facilitators to explore symptoms and 
behaviors of moral distress; 2) monitor data, using root cause analysis, to help establish needed 
programs and monitor progress; and 3) enlist staff to develop healthy work spaces focusing on 
self-care renewal.250 
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       The individual responsibility for the ethical work environment is to encourage open 
communication with colleagues, to utilize ethical principles in practice and to enhance skills in 
“ethical reasoning”.251  As numerous studies support, a nurse’s ethical beliefs are influenced 
more by past experiences, values and religious beliefs than by the professional code of ethics.252          
       Ethical work environments occur when moral distress gets resolved through moral action.  
However, moral action does not always occur due to various constraints, whether real or 
perceived, that can be found within the nurse or throughout the workplace.  Constraints to moral 
distress can be described as either internal or external.  Internal constraints include such things as 
a lack of knowledge, skills, and abilities to understand what are the appropriate actions to take 
and then to take them.253  External constraints are broader and can include a lack of adequate 
staffing; high nurse to patient ratios; high consumer expectations for care; fiscal pressures; 
inadequate communication; and the influence of technology.254  These constraints are not unique 
to nursing and are experienced by all members of the health care team.  The fact that nurses see 
them as major constraints rendering them powerless may help perpetuate the nurses’ image as 
“powerless victims” of the healthcare system.255  
       Another area of constraints is the lack of knowledge regarding avenues that are available for  
moral distress resolution.  This includes ethics committees and ethics consultations.256  Included 
in this umbrella of lack of knowledge is education and training in ethics which can help 
individuals increase their confidence in making ethical decisions and taking moral action.257   
       A major concern in the constraints to moral action is that some nurses may have lived with 
moral distress for so long that they have “normalized” it.258  Because of this normalization and  
the failure to see any progress or change in the ethical environment, the nurses accept the 
situation and do not push for action.   
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       Although moral distress, for the most part, has negative connotations, it can also have 
beneficial effects.  These benefits include a call to action to better understand one’s personal  
moral values and how that translates to professional obligations for both personal and 
professional growth which leads to improved compassionate care to patients.259  
        Chapter 7 provides an abbreviated conclusion to the dissertation on medical futility found in 
end-of-life treatment in the care of the critically ill neonatal, pediatric, and adult patients.  
Futility has been around since medicine’s beginning and continues today for a myriad of reasons 
of which a major one being that death is still not accepted as a natural process of life.  It is also 
often seen as a failure by the medical profession.  In the neonatal population smaller babies are 
being resuscitated because of advances in technology at a price that has not been fully realized.  
The pediatric population is living with congenital anomalies and genetic defects that would have 
died years ago, which presents its own ethical dilemmas when these children require critical care.  
The adult population is plagued with an ever-growing elderly population that has no advance 
directives and when they do, too often, they want “everything” done which leads to prolonging 
the dying versus prolonging the living.  Each of these different age populations has looked at the 
issue of futility within their own boundaries with little concern for those of other age groups.  It 
is time for all health care providers from every age group to join efforts in an attempt to address 
the ethics of futility as a health care dilemma that crosses all boundaries.  Such an approach is 
more apt to lead to improved strategies that places the patient first minimizing suffering and 
enhancing end-of-life care.   
       The persistence of this medical futility, along the age continuum, has gotten media attention 
as resources are consumed and ethical dilemmas are made visible in the social, legal, as well as 
ethical realms.  Limited awareness has been in relation to the human effect of futility.  This is 
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changing as there is an increasing incidence of moral conflict and moral distress along with 
powerlessness, and a lack of autonomy in the workplace making them vulnerable to the ravages 
of moral distress.  This contribution to moral distress, in addition to the impact on quality patient 
care, has contributed to medical futility not being ethically justified at the end-of-life in critically 
ill patients of all ages. 
       However, there is hope for the future.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) have 
proposed reimbursing health care providers for having discussions with older patients regarding 
end-of-life issues.260  Hopefully this will increase advance care planning and impact the 
uncertainty surrounding the present end-of-life decisions.  Palliative care, historically absent in 
the neonatal/pediatric population, is now finding its way there.   Palliative care is also making an  
impact in the adult care arena, but there is still much room for improvement before this care can 
be seen to make a difference for those with a life-limiting illness.   
       There is no easy answer to the on-going concerns that medical futility presents at the end-of-
life in critical care.  The goal still needs to be to minimize medical futility treatments as they 
have no place in the compassionate care at the end-of-life.  Removing the futile attempts to 
prolong life at the end, can free both caregivers and families up to focus on preparing for the 
patient’s death in a more humane and caring manner.  This is certainly what all of humanity 
would wish to experience at the end-of-life.  
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Chapter 2:  The Ethical Debate on Futility 
 
2.I.  Introduction 
        With the invention of mechanical ventilation in the 1960’s, came the ability to save lives, 
rescue patients, and prolong life in ways never before imagined.  At times this life saving 
procedure, and all the treatments associated with it, can turn into prolonging the dying process.  
Some patients reach a point where they have had enough with treatments that offer no perceived 
benefit, and prefer to die with dignity or to experience a “good death”.  Meanwhile, other 
patients are unable to respond at this critical point in life so are left in the hands of surrogate 
decision makers, who may or may not know the patient’s end-of-life wishes and may or may not  
choose to follow them.  All this often leaves health care providers trying to meet the patient’s 
needs, yet, not provide treatments which the providers see as “futile” or of no benefit to the 
patient and, in some cases, prolonging suffering and the dying process.  When all of these 
contending sources come together, this can place medical futility center stage in the critical care 
environment, producing conflict, as well as an impasse, in making decisions regarding the 
patient’s future treatment. 
        Medical futility is not a new concept as it has been around since medicine’s beginning, 
having its origin with the time of Hippocrates.  It gained more attention beginning in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s sparking the ethical debate.1  Yet, today in the 21st century, medical futility defies an 
accepted or standard definition with its application varying from patient to patient and situation 
to situation.  The approach to medical futility and the many questions that result have never been 
more prominent in the American health care system than they are today.  This prominence has 
been enhanced by the explosion of advanced technology and critical care procedures.  
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         The first part of Chapter 2 explores the ethical debate on futility beginning with its history 
to include its definition, origin, and rationale for the dilemma facing health care providers today.  
The second part of the chapter describes quantitative and qualitative futility taking a closer look 
at organizational ethics and the topic of rationing as compared to futility ending with a 
discussion on hope for the future. 
 
2.II.  History of the Ethical Debate 
        Although the concept of medical futility has been around for a long time, dating back to 
Hippocrates, it was in the 1980’s that it began to be a focus of attention.  As it has evolved to the 
present day, there have been three major phases.  The first phase was concerned with being able 
to define “medical futility”, “futile treatment”, “futile care” or whatever “it” was to be called.2  
The second phase utilized a procedural approach, such as policies, procedures, and state laws to 
resolve ethical dilemmas concerned with futility.3  The final phase has been more focused on 
communication and negotiation between health care providers, patients, and families so that the 
goal at end-of-life is for decisions to be made collaboratively.4 
       As these phases were evolving there were other major events occurring in health care.  One 
that was to have a major influence on decision making processes was the shift from the 
paternalistic physician model to the patient/family autonomy model.  This section will address 
medical futility from the historical perspective to include the struggle to define it and how the 
move to autonomy from paternalism changed the decision making process at end-of-life.  Two 
historical cases will be presented to illustrate these changes. 
2.II.A.  Medical Futility---Historical Perspective 
        In the beginning of medicine, in ancient Greece and Rome, the role of the physician was 
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made clear by Hippocrates as that of assisting nature to restore health.5  This was to be done by 
relieving suffering, decreasing the force of the disease, and refusing to treat those who were 
“overmastered” by their disease.6  To attempt to do more was a sure sign of madness.7  Plato,  
likewise, echoed Hippocrates’ thoughts in that physicians should not treat those who showed no 
promise to benefit from the treatment, even if the patient had as much gold as “Midas”.8 
       Moving into the Middle Ages, the Hippocratic view was replaced with religion and the 
 supernatural with touches of superstition.9  This continued until the modern era, from the 17th to 
19th centuries, when the view of modern medicine expanded with the scientific revolution and 
the focus on disease became something to be conquered.10  Progressing into the 20th century, 
science and religion became more integrated so that the ever-expanding technology, plus the 
sacredness of life, translated into doing whatever was possible to preserve life at all costs.  Two 
other factors occurred in the 1960’s that would impact the practice of medicine.  These were, 
first, the third party payment system, especially Medicare and Medicaid, which yielded to a 
“nothing is impossible” mentality as insurance would pay for it.11   The second factor is the 
revolt against authority which was never more evident than what was seen surrounding the war 
in Vietnam.12 This translated in medicine to patients/families requesting the providers to do what 
they asked or litigation would follow.  With all these activities occurring in medicine, the ability 
to define futility was elusive, yet, health care providers said they knew it when they saw it.   
        2.II.A.1.  Definition---Use and Abuse of Terms 
        For those who attempt to define it, medical futility is treatment which is characterized as 
useless, pointless, or having no purpose.13 To understand the meaning of such uselessness, there 
needs to be confidence that this treatment is of no benefit to this particular patient.14  Futility is 
treatment that either does not improve quality of life, does not improve the outcome, or prolongs 
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suffering.15   A treatment that has as its sole purpose the physiological extension or prolonging of 
life is also considered futile.16  The following have also been used to describe futile treatments, 
1) those that do not produce a physiologic effect; 2) those that produce more of a burden than 
benefit; 3) those treatments that are experimental with unproven results as a “last ditch” effort; 4)  
those treatments the physicians cannot implement for various reasons; and 5) those treatments  
that are likely to produce a small insignificant outcome or difference to the patient.17 
        Futile is derived from the Latin word futilis, which has meaning in both religious and Greek 
mythology.18  Futilis refers to an urn that is narrow at the bottom and wide at the top used only in 
religious and mythical ceremonies with its use in everyday life limited because it tips over when 
filled.19  Useless in everyday life but having a role in mythology that has been compared to futile 
treatments, where they appear useless or pointless to some, such as the physician, but have an 
almost mythical or unrealistic expectation for the family.20    
        In Greek mythology, it is seen to represent objects that are of no value or “useless”.  
According to legend, the daughters of Danaus, the king of Argos, a city in Greece, killed their 
husbands on the night of their wedding which resulted in them being sentenced to carrying water 
in “leaky” (futilis) containers which was doomed to failure.21  From this word for leaky comes 
futile which translates to useless.  Examples of medical treatments that translate to useless are 
giving antibiotics for a viral infection, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) for a dying patient, 
or organ transplants for those with terminal cancer.22 
        There is no argument that the term medical futility is subjective and open to interpretation 
by all those involved.  Some families have expressed concern that futility becomes the 
physicians “trump card” when they no longer wish to continue treatment.23  However, there is 
agreement among the majority of health care providers on the definition of medical futility if the 
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following occur:  1) a mutual goal has been agreed upon by patient, family and providers; 2) a 
treatment plan has been agreed upon with steps to achieve the goal; and 3) there is “medical 
certainty” that it is impossible that the agreed upon plan will achieve the goal.24  It is imperative 
that patient/family and provider goals are aligned so that there are not separate patient/family 
goals and separate medical goals.  If the family wants all life sustaining treatment continued and 
the physician disagrees, this does not always mean the treatment is futile, but it does mean the 
goals are not aligned.25  Therefore, open, honest communication between family and providers is 
essential in order to come to an agreement that meets the patient’s needs. 
        Using the term “futility” has been controversial.  This is due to the difficulty in 
standardizing a definition, as well as interpreting that definition.26  Some authors even believe 
that there is no need for a definition of futility and that the use of such terms as “useless”, 
“meaningless”, or “pointless” etc. are also not needed.27  Instead dialogue is to occur between the 
health care providers and patient/family that stipulates the “conditions” and “consequences” that 
are present in the health care decisions to be made in the patient’s best interest.28 
        Given the vagueness of the term “medical futility”, there is the understanding that it usually 
means that a successful outcome is impossible, there is a minimal chance of survival to discharge 
or a small probability of returning to a quality of life that is of value to the patient.29  Therefore, 
suggested terminology includes “non-beneficial”, “medically inappropriate”, having a low 
probability of success, and ineffective.30         
        While medical futility was elusive to definition and physicians were making most of the  
health care decisions, this gave them more control over what treatments were provided to the 
patient.  This paternalistic model worked up until the latter part of the 20th century.  Then it  
changed in the 1980’s when patients/families began to demand life prolonging treatments which 
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health care providers often saw as inappropriate.  This change, from the paternalistic model to  
one of autonomy, made the concerns about futile treatments more onerous and challenging. 
Following is a discussion on this change. 
       2.II.A.2.  Paternalism Model to Autonomy 
        Paternalism is defined in the medical world, as a denial of or interference with the freedom 
of another.31  Paternalism can also be viewed as the denial of autonomy where an individual’s 
judgment is superseded by another’s judgment, as with a health care provider over a patient or 
family member.32  
        The premise of paternalism, where the health care provider is the decision maker for the 
patient/family in matters of health care and further treatment, is based on the principle of 
beneficence.33  It is through the principle of beneficence that the health care providers want to do 
what they think is best for the patient, even if it may go against the patient’s/family’s desires.34  
Patients and families were willing to acquiesce to the expertise of the physicians that is until the 
20th century when patient autonomy became the predominant principle in decision making.35   
        The word autonomy is derived from autos (self) and nomos (rule or law) meaning that 
persons who are autonomous make their own decisions.36  In simple terms, autonomy is defined 
as “independent uniqueness”.37  This independent uniqueness allows for self-determination that 
is absolute and cannot be taken away by others.38   
        Autonomy from the patient’s or family’s perspective gives them the right to refuse medical 
treatment.  This medical treatment may be life-sustaining or not, which is a right to privacy and 
liberty that comes from the constitution as well as a common law right to be left alone.39  In 
comparison, there are no laws, in addition to expressed or implied rights, that give the patient the 
authority to receive any and all treatments as desired.40  In fact, there is a more compelling 
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argument for the health care provider to refuse to order treatments for patients that are deemed to 
be medically inappropriate, or not of any benefit to the patient.41  Without this right of refusal, it 
is feasible that patients/families could demand any treatment with the physician becoming a 
“slave” or “puppet” of the patient.42  Health care providers must refuse based on the standards of 
practice, expert opinions, clinical judgments, laws, and professional practice guidelines.43 
        When health care providers have conversations with patients/families these can take 
different forms.  The first is the autonomy conversation which is related to treatment options, 
including no treatment, the potential consequences of each option, including the likelihood of 
their occurrence.44  This conversation gives the patient/family the information in a neutral 
manner so they can make the decision.  The health care provider can give an opinion or advice, if 
requested.   
        The second conversation is the futility conversation.  With the futility conversation, the 
health care provider acknowledges to the patient/family that even though they have made a 
choice or decision, the provider has a problem with that choice or decision.  This problem might 
be because it ventures into “bad medical practice”, does not align with previously agreed upon 
goals, or provides no benefit to the patient.45  The health care provider can explain in detail the 
reasoning behind the conversation to include getting a second opinion. 
        Further discussions related to the autonomy versus futility conversations have resulted in 
two observations.  The first is that if a true autonomy conversation took place, there is questions 
as to whether a futility conversation would even be necessary.46  This is resting on the premise 
that the patient/family would come to the conclusion, on their own, that the treatment is futile.  
However, such an approach would bring integrity issues to the surface.  The second is that if true  
futility conversations occurred, that are open and honest, it could help to lessen the fear that 
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health care providers are doing things or not doing things without discussing them with 
patients/families.47 
        There have been ethical medical cases that have occurred in the United States over the 
years.  Some of these cases reflect the struggle of families exerting autonomy on behalf of 
patients in making end-of-life decisions.  Other cases reflect health care providers exerting their 
autonomy in expressing what they believe is accepted medical practice in providing futile 
treatment for the dying patient.  The next section describes two such cases. 
2.II.B.  Historical Cases 
        For over 30 years, concerns related to medical futility, have put end-of-life decisions into 
the hands of the legal system.  For the most part, the courts have favored competent individuals 
making their own decisions regarding their medical care.48  However, it has been a balancing act 
between giving an individual the right to make decisions versus the state’s concern with the 
sanctity of life.  This becomes complicated when the individual is unable to make their own 
decisions, so they are made through a surrogate decision maker.  Legislation has been passed to 
require health care organizations to ask patients questions regarding advance directives so the 
conversation can begin before the end-of-life moment arrives.  However, the compliance with 
completing such a directive is low. 
        The past 30 years have witnessed numerous cases that have made national headlines 
regarding end-of-life decisions, often resulting in court decisions.  One case, Karen Quinlan, saw 
the family wanting to withdraw life-sustaining treatment but the provider and institution were in 
opposition.  Another case, Helga Wanglie, was where the family wanted to continue life-
sustaining treatment but the providers and institution argued for the patient’s right to die.49  A 
presentation and discussion of these cases follow. 
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        2.II.B.1.  Karen Ann Quinlan---1976 
        Karen Ann Quinlan, was 21 years old in 1975, when she consumed alcohol, combined with 
the benzodiazepine, Valium, which left her unconscious and not breathing when found by 
friends.50  Karen had shared with many of her friends her premonition regarding an early death, 
as well as how she was going to “go down in history”, both of which came to be true.51  Karen 
was resuscitated and placed on mechanical ventilation in a critical care unit and, although she 
opened and closed her eyes in the beginning, that ended after a few days.52  She was transferred 
to a facility with more advanced testing capabilities where extensive brain damage was 
confirmed.53  Karen continued to deteriorate with her weight going from 120 pounds to 70 
pounds, despite being fed with a gastric feeding tube, plus her extremities became contracted into 
a rigid fetal-like position.54 
        Karen was given a diagnosis of persistent vegetative state (PVS) by her physician.  PVS 
cannot be confirmed by any study and is only diagnosed through prolonged observation.  This 
observation, ranging from 3 to 12 months where the patient has permanently lost the function of 
their cerebral cortex, all behavioral responses, such as pain and suffering, and all voluntary 
reactions.55  Others have described PVS as “eyes-opened unconsciousness” where there is 
separation between alertness and wakefulness.56  The upper brain or cerebrum does not 
communicate with the mid brain or brain stem, however the brain stem is usually left to direct 
the so-called “vegetative” functions, such as heart rate and wakefulness.57 
        The Quinlan’s discussed Karen’s future care with their parish priest and were reassured that 
the Roman Catholic doctrines did not require extraordinary treatment to continue when the 
treatment was of no benefit.58  Therefore, five months after Karen Quinlan’s unfortunate 
incident, her parents requested that mechanical ventilation be withdrawn.  Although the 
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physicians initially agreed, the following morning they stated their opposition to discontinuing 
life support and could not participate stating they believed it was equal to murder.59  Legal 
proceedings were than begun by the family. 
        The New Jersey Superior Court denied the Quinlan’s request to withdraw the ventilator for 
Karen so an appeal was taken to the New Jersey Supreme Court.60  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court invoked Karen’s right of privacy as the right to be removed from the ventilator.61  This 
was a landmark case in that patients or surrogates have the right to refuse life-sustaining 
treatment, as well as being the first state supreme court ruling on end-of-life decisions.62  
Another significant outcome of the Quinlan case was that the judges made a statement that these 
cases do not belong in the court system and need to be dealt with in the institution by 
committees, such as today’s ethics committee.63  Karen was removed from the ventilator but did 
not stop breathing as her brain stem still functioned in the PVS.  She lived 10 more years, as 
artificial nutrition and hydration were continued, dying in 1985 from pneumonia.64 
        The Quinlan case served as a guide for other courts to address these difficult patient issues 
and was significant for several reasons.  First, it paved the way for decisions regarding death and 
dying giving competent patients, or their surrogates, a wide array of decisions at end-of-life.  
These decisions ranged from how much one was willing to suffer, be helpless, or to endure 
indignity giving the option of refusing life-sustaining treatment, even if it precipitates death.65  
Second, some viewed the Quinlan case as a gain for patients’ rights.  However, others saw the 
value to the medical profession giving them the freedom from criminal liability when removing 
life-sustaining treatment, especially with those in a PVS.66  Although in the Quinlan case only 
the mechanical ventilator was removed, there is argument that the artificial nutrition and 
hydration might have also been removed as extraordinary treatments.67  Finally, the Quinlan case 
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set in motion the need for ethics committees, the Patient Self Determination Act with its advance 
directives, and brain death statutes at the state level.68  Even though Karen was not brain dead, it 
brought the condition and diagnosis to light. 
        A second case occurred over 10 years after the Quinlan case.  It is an example of a surrogate 
decision maker making end-of-life decisions to continue treatment while health care providers 
believed the treatment was futile. 
        2.II.B.2.  Helga Wanglie---1989 
        In 1989, Helga Wanglie, an 86 year old woman was treated for a broken hip, discharged to a 
nursing home, then readmitted to the hospital due to respiratory failure.69  Despite attempts to 
wean her from the ventilator, it was not possible.  After five months she was transferred to a long 
term ventilator facility where she soon experienced a cardiopulmonary arrest with resulting 
severe brain damage.70   After a period of time, Mrs. Wanglie was given a diagnosis of PVS and,  
although her husband agreed to a do not resuscitate (DNR) order, he wanted all other treatments   
to continue despite the health care providers’ recommendations to withdraw treatment.71   
        The hospital and its physicians took its case through the legal system.  There is argument as 
to whether the reason for the legal action was misplaced.  The institution asked for the court to 
appoint a third party as Mrs. Wanglie’s guardian versus addressing the key concern in this case, 
which was prolonged futile treatment.72  The court acted in Mr. Wanglie’s favor, as there was no 
reason to do otherwise, since he was a competent attorney capable of representing his wife.73  
Helga Wanglie died three days after the court decision, on July 4, 1991, with the diagnosis of 
sepsis.74 
        Mrs. Wanglie had no advance directive, so the health care providers relied on Mr. Wanglie 
who first said that she had never expressed her wishes, then changing it to how she did not want  
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anything done to shorten her life.75   This was based on a strong belief that God, and not man,   
could only take a life.76  Lawrence Schneiderman, physician and ethicist, has stated that at one  
time patients and families turned to God and their faith for miracles, then they started coming to 
hospitals and demanded these miracles from the health care providers.77 
        The Wanglie case resembled the Quinlan case in that it concerned whether to continue life-
sustaining treatment in the presence of PVS, however, Mrs. Wanglie could not sustain 
respirations without assisted ventilation.  The difference between Helga Wanglie and Karen 
Quinlin was that the family’s and health care provider’s role were reversed.  In the Quinlan case, 
the family wanted to discontinue treatment and the providers wanted to continue; in the Wanglie 
case the family wanted to continue treatment and the providers wanted to discontinue.78 
        There are several lessons learned from the Wanglie case.  First, it emphasized the role of 
patient autonomy, placing it over provider autonomy, with the physician abiding by the decision 
of the patient/family, which had started with the Quinlan case.79  Second, the Wanglie case 
caused the medical community, as well as families, to ‘embrace” the concept of medical futility, 
even if there was no clear definition.80  Even if the health care providers saw continued 
treatment, such as mechanical ventilation, as futile for Mrs. Wanglie, the family did not, seeing it 
as life-saving.  Third, the ethics consultant was a physician who stepped out of his role as a 
facilitator to organize the institution in steps to terminate treatment.81  Had the consultant stayed 
true to the role, there might have not been a Wanglie case as the best advice may have been 
supporting the family’s wishes.82  Finally, the Wanglie case emphasized that the particular 
decision is less important than the “who” should be making it.83  This stresses the need for  
patients to have written their preferences via advance directives so that they can be followed  
when end-of-life nears. 
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        The debate over who should make the decision, or have the last say in withholding or  
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, has gone on for generations and continues today.  Some 
ethicists, philosophers and authors speculate that too much time and energy has been spent on 
attempting to define futility, claiming it defies definition.84  There are different rationale for what 
keeps medical futility such a prominent issue.  These rationale range from ethical obligations and 
include moral arguments that are for and against the debate that keeps it continuing.    
 
2.III.  Rationale for the Ethical Debate  
              When considering medical futility and whether to provide what, in the health care 
provider’s best professional judgment, is considered futile treatments, there is the initial question 
of whether there is a duty to treat or a duty not to treat.  This duty can be supported by a weak to 
a strong viewpoint emphasizing a range from where the treatment can be provided or not to one 
where it is morally and ethically wrong to do so.85   
        The rationale for the continued ethical debate surrounding medical futility is complex. 
First, it is based on the on-going struggle between patient/family autonomy and provider 
autonomy.  Second, it is due to individual personal reasons of patients/families and providers.  
Third, there are institutional and professional reasons that influence the extent treatments are 
offered and continued.  Finally, there are religious boundaries that frame the ethical response to 
the debate influencing the actions or lack of actions that are taken. 
        All of these factors come together in the critical care environment that cares for the sickest 
of the population ranging from the neonates to the elderly.  It is here that the patients, nurses, and 
physicians agree on a treatment plan to support identified goals that can be supported and  
worked on collaboratively.  Whenever there is disagreement among nurses and physicians on 
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the treatment goals and plan, conflict ensues creating ethical dilemmas. 
        This section will address the rationale for the ethical debate of futility by describing the 
ethical obligation to provide futile treatments, as well as the moral arguments for and against 
stopping such treatment.  The perspectives of the nurses and physicians will also be addressed. 
2.III.A.  Ethical Obligation 
        As the physician paternalistic model evolved into the patient autonomy model, it became 
accepted practice to acknowledge the patients’ right to refuse treatment.  The right to refuse 
treatment, along with the informed consent doctrine, gave the patient the ultimate decision power 
related to treatment.86  In theory, when providers believed the treatment to be provided or that 
was being provided was ineffective, that treatment ought not to be provided.  However, in many 
cases it had been easier to concede to treatment than to try to dissuade the patients/families 
differently.87  As a result, the demand for inappropriate and ineffective treatments intensified into 
more inappropriate and ineffective treatments to the point that ethical principles became 
subordinated to the demands of patients.88   It is not only the demands of the patients that led to 
the ineffective treatments continuing, but also a multiplicity of other factors that contributed to 
their endurance.  Following is a discussion of these reasons. 
        2.III.A.1.  Reasons for Providing Futile Treatment--Providers 
        When identifying reasons why futile treatments continue from the providers’ perspective, 
the majority fall into the category of personal reasons.  For the providers, first is the subject of 
fear.  The fear relates to the subject of approaching death which is difficult not only for the 
providers, but also for the patient and family.89  Because of this fear, it can appear that 
“everything” is done in order to avoid the inevitable end-of-life discussion.  This fear can be far-
reaching and not only be regarding the patient, but it also brings one’s own mortality to the  
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surface.90   The physician also fears litigation if everything is not done for the patient.  Diseases 
are still viewed as enemies to be fought with death being the ultimate failure.91  Therefore, all too 
often “everything” is done to keep the fear of litigation at bay.  
        The second personal reason for providers continuing futile treatment relates to emotions 
such as grief, guilt, helplessness, and misplaced ego.92  These emotions can not only influence 
the decision making process but can paralyze it to the point where no discussions can occur 
regarding a decision.  Also on the emotional level, providers have a hard time “letting go” of a 
patient who they may have saved from death numerous times, so to do nothing in the moment of 
death seems unthinkable.93 
        The third reason for the futile treatment to continue is the focus on the physical condition 
which ignores the patient’s subjective experience of the disease.94  With a preoccupation on the 
disease, it is easy to equate survival with success, discounting the feelings the patient/family may 
be experiencing.  As providers have less autonomy, they tend to focus more on the technical and 
medical aspects of the disease process.95  What this leads to is less trust from the patient and 
family with an avoidance of candid conversations related to values, goals, and relationships, 
which are all necessary in making end of life decisions.96 
        For providers, the fourth reason for continuing futile treatments is that providing the futile 
treatment is the “path of least resistance”.97 It takes less time in a busy schedule to do what has 
always been done and it is less controversial.  In some instances, there is so much public 
awareness and media scrutiny that the pressure to continue futile treatment may come from 
outside religious, political or social sources.98   Providing futile treatment is doing something, 
while withholding or withdrawing treatment could be perceived as doing nothing.  In other  
words, it can be perceived as an avoidance of making difficult decisions when treatments  
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continue beyond the point of benefit.99 
        A final personal reason for providers to continue futile treatment is that the discontinuation 
of medical futile treatment is an acknowledgment that medicine is unable to master the disease 
process.100  To continue with the treatment is holding out hope that this might be the one case in 
100 that beats the odds.101  Unfortunately, this approach gives false hope to the family as well as 
denies them the comfort that comes from accepting and preparing for death.     
        Other reasons that influence the providers for continuing futile treatments are institutional 
based and, although intended to provide assistance, they can be perceived as barriers to both 
providers as well as patients/families.  These interventions include the following:  1) policies that 
provide guidance for decisions regarding medical futility; 2) integration of palliative care into all 
critical care units; 3) education and training of medical and nursing staff on communication skills 
regarding end-of-life; 4) expectations regarding frequent proactive family discussions regarding 
the patient’s progress and plan of care; and 5) utilization of ethics consultations.102  Some 
institutions have established a process if a provider determines further treatment to be futile, that 
instead of one individual making treatment decisions, there needs to be an institutional or 
professional consensus.103  This consensus can be in the form of all patients with less than a 
month to live will no longer receive CPR to more detailed options based on individual patients 
and individual situations.104  For some families, this process gives the burdens to the institution 
relieving them of the angst and guilt that often accompanies such difficult end-of-life decisions. 
        Just as providers have reasons for continuing futile treatments, so do patients/families.   
Following is a discussion on these reasons. 
        2.III.A.2.  Reasons for Continuing Futile Treatments—Patients/Families 
        In the patient/family and provider relationship when the provider no longer believes that 
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ethically the treatment is benefiting the patient, yet, the family wishes to continue the treatment, 
the provider can refuse to continue the relationship.  Under the law of abandonment, once there 
is a patient:provider relationship, there is an obligation to continue to provide treatment as long 
as that treatment is required.105    However, the law of abandonment does not require that a 
provider continue to offer treatment that is medically inappropriate or does not meet the standard 
of care.  The law does require that the family be given reasonable notice that the provider can no 
longer be responsible for offering the treatment, deemed as inappropriate, in order to find another 
provider and/or seek another facility, if necessary.106   
        Even when there is an impasse in the patient/family and provider relationship in the area of 
futile or inappropriate treatment, a more appropriate approach is to understand the basis for the 
family wanting to continue or to begin futile treatment.  As patients/families act under the 
principle of autonomy, futile treatments requested to be continued or begun are done so for 
various reasons.  These reasons include flawed thinking, assumptions not based on reality, lack 
of confidence that health care providers are acting in the best interest of the patient, financial 
concerns, and a belief that the treatments are the patient’s right or entitlement.107  Additional 
reasons include unrealistic expectations, feelings of helplessness, belief of inaccurate diagnosis 
or prognosis, a fear if futile treatments are stopped, non-futile treatments would also be 
discontinued.108   Identifying the reasons can help to address them and bring them to resolution. 
        The more challenging and difficult reasons families want to continue inappropriate or 
ineffective treatments falls into the category of deep emotional conflicts.  These conflicts can be 
so deep that family members are unable to identify them.  They may involve feelings of guilt as 
well as animosity; postponing the inevitability of loss; employing the use of “heroic” measures  
as a way to show love plus compassion; and using the futile treatments as a symbolistic ritual of  
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a long faithful spouse.109  The best response to these emotional reasons is an ethic of care which  
has been stronger in the nursing community than the medical community, but it is being  
re-emphasized so that there is increased communication skills and emotional awareness.110 
        A final area that is the reason for families to continue inappropriate or futile treatment is 
based on cultural and religious beliefs.  From a cultural perspective, the view in Western 
medicine has been to be open and honest with a full disclosure of truth telling regarding 
prognosis at the end of life.111  Whereas, those from the Asian and Hispanic cultural traditions 
have the need to have autonomy balanced with the values and traditions of the family which may 
not wish to be fully informed.112  Still, another culture, such as on the island of Vanatinai 
southeast of Papua New Guinea, the people are considered dead for what the Western world 
considers unconscious which leads to the potential of more than one death in a lifetime.113  
Therefore, the approach to futility and end of life would be varied depending if the patient was 
from the West, Asia, Spain, or Vanatinai Island. 
        Just as the cultural influence can determine the reasons futile treatments are continued, so 
can religious beliefs.  For example, in the Islam faith, God alone determines when death occurs 
so everything must be done to prevent early death and save life.114  However, even the scholars 
of the Islam faith argue that this belief was not intended to be without limits and that futile 
treatment can be withdrawn allowing a natural death to occur.115 
        Another religion, Judaism, is strongly committed to the sacredness of life.  Orthodox Jewish 
patients do not accept the definition of brain death and believe that the concept of autonomy has 
no meaning so that all treatments must be continued until the moment of death is imminent.116  
As with the majority of the ancient religions, many of the teachings were established before 
modern medicine with its many advances and technologies that are present today. 
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        A Christian religion that is often discussed when end-of-life topics are presented is the 
Roman Catholic religion.  The Catholic religion, like Judaism, shares a commitment to the 
sacredness of life.117   The Catholic faith has as its basic premise that if a medical treatment is  
judged to be ordinary, that is it offers hope or benefit to the patient, then it is mandatory, but if it 
does not offer reasonable hope or benefit, or is a burden, then it is extraordinary and it is 
optional.118  Although suffering can be seen by members of the faith as redemptive, it is not 
obligatory to suffer so that seeking pain and other symptom relief is within the faith’s 
teachings.119   Therefore, from a perspective of the teachings of the Catholic Church, when a 
treatment is determined to be futile or ineffective, there is no moral obligation for it to be 
initiated or continued.   
        At times providing what is perceived as medically futile treatments seems ethically prudent.   
However, this does not stop the moral arguments that often ensue before, during, and after such  
treatment is provided.   
2.III.B.  Moral Arguments 
        Much time and energy has been spent on the topic of medical futility starting with its 
definition, which has not been standardized.  The latest appeals are being focused on deleting the 
terminology of “futile” and using “ineffective”, “non-beneficial”, or “medically inappropriate” 
with a low likelihood of success.120  There have been arguments posed, both pros and con for the 
continuing debate over futility treatments.  Following is a discussion on the pros and cons in the 
debate, as well as a look at the view from the nurses’ and physicians’ perspective. 
        2.III.B.1.  Pro-Futility and Anti-Futility Arguments 
        The concept of futility, even though identified in theory to the time of Hippocrates, got its 
name and significance in the 1980’s when providers attempted to limit treatments that were 
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demanded by patients/families.121  The pro-futility arguments went so far as to withholding or 
withdrawing treatments without patient approval based on three justifications.  These are 
professional integrity, experience plus expertise, and stewardship of limited resources.122 
       The first pro-futility argument of professional integrity stresses that providers should never 
be asked to act in a way that is contrary to the integrity of their professional code and values.123  
However, the realm of professional integrity does not give providers justification to unilaterally 
override patients’/families’ decisions regarding inappropriate treatment.124 
        The second pro-futility argument illustrates how patients and families depend on the 
provider’s experience, as well as expertise, to assess and diagnose the patient’s condition making 
appropriate recommendations for treatment.125  Along with this experience and expertise comes 
the obligation for the providers to refrain from offering treatments that are not of benefit or are 
considered futile.126  In an ideal world, futile treatments are not offered and if the patient/family 
requests them, they are not carried out, following an open honest dialog between patient/family 
and providers. 
        The third pro-futility argument maintains that providers have a role in the stewardship of 
human, financial and material resources.127  To begin or continue to provide futile treatment can 
be wasteful and misuse of precious resources indicating a lack of moral responsibility.128  
Although in the United States, patients/families and providers have balked at financial reasons 
for limiting treatments, this is not the case in other countries.  In many other countries, the 
principles of stewardship and justice are more explicitly applied to treatment decisions for the 
good of society.129  
        Just as there are pro-futility arguments, there are also anti-futility arguments.  These 
arguments relate to patient autonomy, inability to make prognostic predictions, and the lack of a 
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standardized consensus on the definition of futility.  The first argument relates to patient 
autonomy.  The providers are tasked with sustaining life and relieving suffering when caring for 
patients/families and if these two responsibilities conflict, then the patient/family has the final 
say.130  The provider and institution can then decide whether they can continue to provide the 
treatment to the patient or whether an alternate provider/institution must be sought. 
        The second argument applies to the difficulty in making precise prognostic predictions.  
Even though there are various predictive scoring systems that can be used to help predict 
mortality in critically ill patients, there is still a great deal of unknowns regarding the effect futile 
treatments may have on death.131  The best known scoring system is the Acute Physiology and 
Chronic Health Evaluation (APACHE) System which is the most predictive system in critical 
care.132   This system can make assumptions representing groups of diagnoses but it is not able to  
benefit one patient in one situation regarding treatment that may be considered medically      
futile.133  
        The final anti-futility argument illustrates the discussion of a consensus on the definition 
and criteria for futility. 134 There continues to be a plethora of literature pertaining to futile 
treatment and medical futility which has not clarified the topic over the years.  The more recent 
literature has demonstrated a trend that futility as a concept needs to be eliminated. 
        The moral argument today for eliminating the concept of futility starts with the language 
used.  For decades, medical futility has often been called “futile care” instead of “futile 
treatment” which gets written in policies as “care” and discussed with patients/families in the 
same way.135  Care is never futile.  This must be conveyed to patients/families and all providers.  
Even when treatments are withdrawn, palliative care to include symptom management with 
preservation of dignity, will be provided.136 
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        Medical futility is still one of the major reasons for an ethics consult when there is a 
deadlock in the decision making process between patient/family and providers.137  Even if the 
futile treatment was done in response to the over-arching use of life-sustaining treatment at the 
end-of-life, when the treatment was no longer serving the patient’s goals, it does not grant 
providers the freedom to unilaterally decide to control the treatments.138 
        As the moral arguments are exposed and more dialog plus debate occurs, the struggle 
between the two main patient caregivers are exposed.  These are the nurses and physicians.  
Optimum patient care occurs when there is collaboration between these two professions, yet, on 
the topic of futility a lack of collaboration can be significant which affects the patient. 
        2.III.B.2.  Nurse and Physician Perspectives 
        Being a patient advocate is one of the core principles of professional nursing which puts 
them front and center in the end-of-life discussions and decisions.139  Nurses spend the most time 
at the bedside with the patient and family so they are in a good position to know their wishes in 
order to advocate for them, as well as support the agreed upon treatment plan.  This only works if 
nurses are at the table when these areas are discussed between the patient/family and physician 
providers.  It has been documented that nurses suffer a high incidence of moral distress when 
they are forced to provide care they see as inappropriate or futile, especially when they have no 
input into the decision process.140  Moral distress is when the nurse knows the right thing to do 
but is unable to do it because of various barriers.141 
        As nurses are looked at as one of the top most trusted professions, patients and families look 
to them for help in making choices that are reflections of their values, yet maintain their 
dignity.142  Research indicates that critical care nurses are often the first to identify the shift from 
the curative model, with hope for recovery, to the appreciation that futile treatment would be 
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medically inappropriate.143  This is often before the patient’s physician comes to the same 
realization.144  This leaves nurses often caught in the middle where they attempt to follow 
medical orders while advocating for the patient/family. 
        When physicians and nurses are compared in terms of their definition of medical futility and 
how it applies in practice there is often disagreement.  Nurses tend to be more negative in regard 
to the patient’s prognosis than the physicians but are more accurate in their assessment of the 
patients.145  In determining the future quality of life for patients, both physicians and nurses were 
unreliable in their predictions.146  One study revealed that 40% of nurses, but only 25% of 
physicians, believed the critical care unit frequently cared for patients who were receiving 
inappropriate and excessive treatment.147 
        Nurses have a role to work with their physician colleagues in helping build better 
relationships.  First, it starts with a self-assessment in determining whether the perceived 
suffering in the patient belongs to the patient or whether it is the suffering the nurse is personally 
experiencing.148  Second, to develop collaborative relationships between nurses and physicians 
which can have a symbiotic effect that improves patient care in a more compassionate way.  
Finally, the nurse can be instrumental in bringing together an interdisciplinary team.  For those 
patients who place value on their religious beliefs, having a religious leader as a part of the team 
can provide additional insight.149 
        When examining the concept of futility beginning with its historical evolution progressing 
to the rationale for the continuing debate, there was an attempt to define and more accurately 
explain the concept using different terminology.  Utilizing the definitive terms of quantitative 
and qualitative is one such attempt to clarify the understanding as well as establish meaning to 
the concept of futility.   
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2.IV.  Quantitative and Qualitative Futility 
        In general terms, quantitative futility translates to the likelihood that an action or treatment 
will produce the desired physiological effect.150  Qualitative futility refers to whether the 
physiological effect will be of benefit to the patient.151  This section takes an in-depth look at 
both quantitative and qualitative, as well as other categories and characteristics of medical 
futility.  The role organization ethics plays in medical futility will also be discussed. 
2.IV.A.  Definition and Differentiation 
        In the process of defining futility, the two main categories of quantitative and qualitative 
have been describes as differentiators.  However there are three additional categories that get 
described along with quantitative and qualitative, these are physiological futility, imminent 
demise futility, and lethal condition futility.  Along with these categories are the characteristics 
that are present, regardless of what categories the perceived futility is placed.  Following is a 
discussion regarding these categories and characteristics. 
        2.IV.A.1.  Categories of Medical Futility 
        The first category is physiological futility.  The majority of ethicists and authors equate 
physiologic futility with quantitative futility, but some do differentiate between the two.  For 
those who do consider them separately, physiological futility is described as treatment which 
does not provide any physical or medical benefit to the patient.152  An example is when 
antibiotics are prescribed to treat viral infections which are not effective against viruses.153  
Although this type of futility appears easy to scrutinize in practice, it is fraught with two 
obstacles.  The first obstacle is that the treatment can be maintaining a physiological function, 
yet, the patient can be in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or imminently dying.154  Second, the 
provider cannot always determine if a treatment is providing physiological benefit.  Case law has 
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supported providers in that they no longer have to provide treatments that do not provide a 
physiologic benefit, even if the patient/family is requesting it.155 
        The second category is quantitative futility.  Quantitative futility is said to be present if a 
 treatment has been found in the previous 100 consecutive cases to be futile, then it can be 
declared futile in the present case.156  In other words, the treatment will not work because it has 
not been effective in the past 100 times, which says it has less than one chance in 100 of being 
any benefit.157  This determination can be concluded based on empirical data, personal 
experience, and expert opinion.158 
        In determining quantitative futility, a statistical approach can be used to estimate the 
probability of success of a particular treatment.  A concern with this type of futility is that the 
uncertainty could lead to inertia.159  Absolute certainty of the success or failure of a specific 
treatment is never able to be determined.  Even though by definition quantitative futility states 
the treatment was not successful in the last 100 cases, there is data that reflect this is difficult to 
follow or document stressing the absurdity of the futility concept.160 
        The third category is qualitative futility.  Qualitative futility also known as evaluative 
futility, refers to treatment that would not benefit patients to the extent that they could leave the 
critical care unit or be discharged home.161  This type of futility is seen as the most controversial 
as it places a value judgment on the treatment, which the provider is not prepared to complete 
unilaterally.162  If the patient’s condition is such that there is an inability to appreciate the benefit 
of the treatment, as with PVS, or if the treatment does not release the patient from being 
dependent on critical care, then it is considered qualitative futility.163  Qualitative futility is also 
viewed from the perspective of the patients’ values and goals. An example is if the mechanical  
ventilator is continuing until a relative arrives from a military assignment overseas, then its   
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continuing until that time is not futile but in line with the patient’s goals.164 
        The fourth category is imminent demise futility.  This category of futility refers to the 
treatment that is given to a patient who is expected to die in the very near future.165  An example 
of imminent demise futility is renal dialysis for a patient in multi-organ failure.  Although the 
dialysis may help the kidney function on a temporary basis, the remaining organs are failing and 
the patient will die soon.166 
        The final category of futility is lethal condition futility.  This category is when the patient 
has a lethal condition, such as pancreatic cancer, and although treatment, such as CPR, will not 
affect that condition, the patient will die in the “not too distant future” even if the treatment is 
done and is successful.167 
        Whatever the categories of futility, it is more about the “benefit” than the “effect”.168  It is 
about whether the patient benefits from the treatment.  A more contemporary definition 
incorporates the patient’s goals, the probability of prolonging life, and the ability to achieve a 
physiological response to the treatment.169 
        Whatever name or category of futility is described, futile treatment has characteristics in 
common.  Following is a presentation of these characteristics. 
        2.IV.A.2  Characteristics of Medical Futility 
        One of the characteristics employs three thoughts.  These are common cause, failure and 
repetition.170  In terms of futility, this means that there is “repeated failure” for the treatment to 
result in the expected or intended effect.171  This expected or intended effect relates back to the 
patient’/family’s goals for the treatment.  This can be that the treatment, such as the mechanical 
ventilator, can be futile if the goal is for the patient to breathe independently, despite end stage  
lung disease, yet not be futile if the use of the ventilator is just to keep living until a relative   
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arrives.  
        Another characteristic of all futile or inappropriate treatments is that they tend to be value 
ridden.172  These value ridden treatments and the accompanying decisions affect both the 
patient/family and the providers.  To keep them at a minimum, providers ought not to make 
unilateral decisions regarding futility.173   The concept of futility holds many uncertainties 
making its validity and reliability for decision making for treatment limitation unreliable.174 
        A final characteristic of futile or inappropriate treatment is that the determination of 
whether a treatment is futile or not varies based on the individual’s expectations.  A treatment is 
more apt to be considered futile the higher one’s expectations.175  An example of this is based on 
a family’s versus the physician’s expectation of a specific treatment.  The family may be content 
if the treatment extended the patient’s life, whereas, the physician would consider the treatment 
futile if it did not lead to consciousness and discharge from critical care.176 
        Whatever the category of futility or treatment that is inappropriate, which is provided in the 
critical care units, its effects extend beyond those walls and involves the entire organization.  
Likewise, the reverse is true in so much as what occurs within the organization also affects the 
critical care units.  The next section examines how futility, or inappropriate treatment, can affect 
organization ethics and how ethics committees play a role in the ethics of the organization. 
2.IV.B.  Organization Ethics 
        By definition, organization ethics is a series of actions that focus on ethical issues 
associated with the financial, professional, clinical, and management of the healthcare 
organization.177  Organization ethics has three basic components.  These are clinical ethics, 
which deal with the patient care, professional ethics, which refers to those professionals who 
work in the organization, and business ethics, which has a focus on the management of the 
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organization.178  Each of these three components play a role in medical futility.  Ethics 
committees, which are a part of clinical ethics, are often used to assist when there is conflict or a 
dilemma involving such topics as futility. 
        Several end-of-life futility treatment cases have made the headlines as a result of a media 
frenzy focusing on patient autonomy versus provider authority, the definition of futility, and 
futility as a cost containment issue.179  These cases have led to much debate placing clinical, 
professional, and business ethics under scrutiny where ethicists debate futility being in the 
physicians’ realm, versus a more broad perspective of belonging to the community or society at 
large.180  Following is a discussion on these arguments. 
        2.IV.B.1.  Futility and Organization Ethics 
        Prior to managed care, which reached its peak in the late 1990’s, the clinical side of patient 
care and the business side were kept separate.181  Providers, especially physicians, were 
independent practitioners who cared for patients and organizations kept the business solvent 
which allowed these two to be separate.  However, after managed care, this changed and 
organizations started being seen as the business they were with many physicians being made 
employees of the organization so that what happened in one arena affected the other.182 
       The first component of organization ethics is clinical ethics.  Clinical ethics is concerned 
with all aspects of patient care and the ethical issues or dilemmas that ensue from that care.183  
The four ethical principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice 
are the moral guidelines for providers in their care of patients.184  Whether that care is in the 
realm of quantitative or qualitative futility is irrelevant if the provider believes the treatment is 
futile. 
        It is in the clinical ethics that most all concerns regarding medical futility, or inappropriate 
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 treatment, begin and can usually be resolved.  However, the ability to resolve futility debates 
may require both implicit as well as explicit involvement of the organization’s top level 
leaders.185  Ethical decisions, such as those surrounding medical futility, involve more than the 
patient and providers having a far-reaching effect into the organization’s stakeholders.  
Therefore, it is prudent that whenever medically futile treatment is perceived and there is an 
impasse between patient/family and providers, that not only administrators be made aware, but 
also risk management, legal counsel, community relations, and internal communications.186  
Early involvement of the stakeholders, which include employees, patients, payers, the 
community and contractual relationships, allows the organization to develop a strategy in 
approaching the futility dispute.187 A strategic plan is important because the reputation of the 
organization, the integrity of the providers, and the respect of the patient/family plus the 
community is at stake.188  Strategies may include taking a case through the legal system, 
knowing that history has not favored providers or organizations, so they need to be prepared to 
lose and deal with the publicity that will follow. 
        When looking at clinical ethics in relation to organization ethics, there are three 
observations.  These include:  1) the majority of clinical ethics issues have “implications” for the 
organization.  For example:  this can be a lack of staffing or policy compliance; 2) many issues 
in clinical ethics have corresponding issues in the organization.  For example:  where a possible 
HIV positive patient refuses to have a HIV test after a nurse is exposed to the patient’s blood---
the organization has a conflict between the patient’s rights and those of the employee: and 3) 
many clinical issues are created by the organizations.  For example:  policy changes made by the 
organization that affect the clinical areas, especially when there is no input.189  
        The second component of organization ethics is professional ethics.  This ethics focuses on 
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the professions of nursing and medicine, although it also applies to all professions.  Nurses and 
physicians are trained to advocate for their patients best interest.  This is difficult at times and 
can cause conflict when they are juggling multiple patients’ needs and the organization’s 
demands, all while attempting to have a personal life.190  Both the nursing and medical 
professions are plagued with burnout, moral distress, and job dissatisfaction when confronted 
with the care of patients who are receiving futile, or inappropriate, treatments.191  Both 
professions are guided by codes of ethics and professional standards.  The most current 
American Medical Association Code of Ethics, 2017, Chapter 5, addresses end of life, as well as 
medical futility by alleging that futility defies definition and that “medically ineffective 
treatment” is the preferred terminology.192   It is yet to be known whether having this in writing 
for the physicians will change behavior or not. 
        The third and final component of organization ethics is business ethics.  Business ethics 
relates to the business management of the organization to include policies, compliance with rules 
and regulations, employees’ rights plus benefits, and being innovative while maintaining 
financial solvency.193  How effective the business ethics is depends on the climate and culture of 
the organization.  The climate is defined as a composite of three things.  These are:  1) shared 
values; 2) the mission and vision of the organization with direct expectations for staff and 
physicians; and 3) an environment where all individuals are free to discuss and debate ethically 
significant issues.194  Whereas, culture is the beliefs, traditions, practices, and “ways of thinking” 
that is shared by members of the organization.195  It is easy to change climate but culture is deep 
seated and takes years to change, if it is able to be changed. 
          In confronting the ethical debates associated with futility, health care organizations need to 
balance the positons of opposing factions.  Through this balancing, the organization’s leaders are 
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“co-fiduciaries” with the professionals in assuring that the mission and values of the organization 
are upheld.196  Approaches organizations have used to manage medical futility include giving 
additional authority to ethics committees, establishing policies, and supporting legislation.197  
Failure to act can impact patient care, the reputation of the professionals, as well as the financial 
viability of the organization.   
        Futile treatment and cost have been discussed together and although they fit with business 
ethics, they also are a consideration in both clinical and professional ethics.  Cost is an ethical 
issue for those who run the system (business ethics), those who work in it (professional ethics) 
and those who use it (clinical ethics).198  The primary message regarding futile treatment is that 
there is not “unlimited choice” for patients regardless of where they are on the life cycle because 
there needs to be an equitable distribution of the benefits and costs across individuals.199 
        Almost all health care organizations have an ethics committee as it is now a requirement if 
being surveyed by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO).  Part of the activities of an ethics committee is to be responsive to ethics consults in 
the organization.  Following is a discussion on ethics committees and the role they play in 
medical futility. 
        2.IV.B.2.   Role of Ethics Committees   
        Ethics committees appeared in the 1960’s to review abortions before they were performed, 
then kidney dialysis triage in the 1970’s, and regulatory overview to manage compliance with 
Baby Doe regulations in the 1980’s.200  In the 1990’s, the Joint Commission developed 
mandatory standards for ethics committees in health care organizations to address both patient 
care conflicts as well as business conflicts.201   
        The primary functions of an ethics committee are patient care consults, policy review as 
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well as development, and self-education in addition to staff and physician education.202 The most 
common ethical issues in patient care relate to end-of-life to include withholding and  
withdrawing treatment, medical futility, resuscitation status, artificial nutrition and hydration, 
advance directives, and capacity/competency to make end-of-life decisions.203  
        Ethics consults, usually completed by a small team of clinical members of the full ethics 
committee, can be referred by patients, families, health care providers, or other interested 
individuals who have a question concerning patient care.204   The role of the consultant is most 
often not to make the decision.  The role is to facilitate communication, explore the issues, as 
well as the options, and in some instances, offer advice leaving the final resolution to those 
closest to the ethical issue.205  
        The function of the ethics committee varies by organization and it is essential that the 
function be made clear, not only to the committee plus those who do consults, but also to those 
who request a consult.  A committee, or consult, can be established in two major models.  One is 
an optional—optional model, which is the majority of committees, where consultation is optional 
and following the recommendations is, likewise, an optional.206  The second is a mandatory---
optional model where consultation is mandatory but following the recommendations is 
optional.207  This model would be used infrequently and is best utilized when there are no viable 
alternatives.  Theoretically there could be a mandatory---mandatory model when a consult is 
mandatory and following the recommendations are also mandatory.  An example of this would 
be in implementing a new policy where the ethics committee/consultant is used to monitor 
compliance. 
        An ethics consult is often contacted to help in resolving conflicts regarding medical futility.  
This conflict most often is when the providers believe all medical options have been explored 
90 
 
and it is best to withdraw treatment, but the patient’s family or surrogate want all treatments to 
continue.   This is an example of an optional---optional model where the goal of the discussion 
needs to focus on the common interest of all parties which is the “best interest of the patient”.208   
        The Veterans Health Administration has developed an Integrated Ethics (IE) model for a 
comprehensive approach to ethics in all their organizations.209  This system is recognized by the 
Joint Commission as a high quality program.  It is also available for all organizations to transfer 
to their individual systems along with all the tools and forms.  One of its domains pertains to 
Ethical Practices on End-of-Life Care which addresses medical futility as treatment that does not 
benefit the patient, therefore, it needs to be withheld or withdraw.210 
       In defining medical futility using quantitative and qualitative terms, it can be said that 
medical futility is an attempt to provide a treatment to benefit a patient (qualitative) that is in all 
likelihood going to fail (quantitative).211  If this is what futility is, then what it is not, is rationing.   
However, there is an affinity to use one for the other as a way to limit inappropriate treatments.  
The next section looks at rationing versus futility and how they have come to be confused terms.  
In conclusion a discussion will examine what can be done to address ineffective treatments as 
hope for the future. 
 
2.V.  Rationing versus Futility 
        Both terms, rationing and futility, have negative connotations and are often confused by the 
general public, as well as health care providers.   Part of this confusion is that the terms came 
into being in history at the same time and they are often found occurring at the same time with 
the same patient.212  Following is a discussion on rationing and futility, to include their  
differences as well as similarities, plus reasons there is so much attention being paid to both of  
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these topics.  The top categories of reasons for rationing will also be explored.   
2.V.A.  Differences and Similarities  
        In considering medical futility in the care of the patient, there can be an inclination to 
disguise the uselessness of the treatment with rationing.  This disguise can be presented as 
prohibitive cost, limited number of critical care beds, or a lack of insurance coverage as a way to 
make treatment decisions.213  To pose a futile question in a limited resource manner, or scarcity, 
makes it easier for the providers to discuss with the patient and family as it is less controversial, 
making the issue easier to comprehend than inappropriate medical treatment.214   
      Futility looks at one patient, at one point in time in a “cause and effect” relationship, while 
rationing looks at a problem of scarce resources, which is distributed over many patients with the 
same condition and situation.215   Rationing implies a scarcity of health care resources that must 
apply to everyone without discrimination.216   An example proposed by Daniel Callahan uses age 
as a factor for rationing where some treatments would not be available after a certain age.217   
Futility deals with treatment that offers no benefit but can be provided, whereas rationing deals 
with treatment that offers a benefit but is not provided for a variety of reasons.   In essence, 
futility refers to whether an individual patient will benefit from a particular treatment and 
rationing refers to distribution of beneficial treatments among patients.218   
        Just as futility has rationale for ethical debate, so does rationing which are similar.  
Following is an exploration of that rationale. 
        2.V.A.1.  Rationale for Attention to Rationing 
       Rationing has been in effect in three different arenas and accepted by the population as being  
“the way it is”.  Two of these involve resource availability.  The first is organ transplantation, 
where the demand far exceeds the supply with patients dying daily due to the inability to receive  
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a transplant.219  The second is the drug shortage, which began to get attention in 2012, with  
shortages occurring in first line cardiac resuscitation drugs, as well as chemotherapy agents, 
forcing institutions to borrow and substitute or just “make due”.220  The third rationing is in  
Oregon where the health system changed due to inadequate funding, in the 1980’s, limiting  
services based on the ability to pay.221  
       One of the major reasons for greater attention to rationing is related to health care costs.   
Health care expenditures as a percent of the gross domestic product in the United States has been  
increasing dramatically over the past 55 years beginning in the 1960’s when it was 5.3%; in 1970  
it had grown to 7.4%; and by 1985, it had escalated to 10.7%222  The most recent report from 
December 2015, for 2014, indicated it is now 17.4% or $9,523 per person with an increase in  
expenses from hospital care, especially in intense services, such as critical care.223  Both of the  
political parties in the United States have yielded to the belief that eliminating treatments and  
services that are of no benefit would do much to curb escalating costs as the belief is that 30 %  
($800 billion) is for inappropriate treatments.224  This would be done through administrative  
efficiencies, coordination of care, and the elimination of inappropriate treatments.225   Although  
this reduction might help curb the escalating costs, it would only be sustained if there are also  
controls on the use of technology as well as the management of insurers, including Medicare and 
Medicaid.226 
        Rationing does occur and has occurred for cost reasons for some time.  Managed care  
brought rationing to the forefront.  When third party payers will not cover a treatment,  
medication, or procedure, yet, its cost is too high for the majority of the population to pay out of  
the pocket, then rationing has occurred.227  However, health care rationing is not like most  
rationing when supply, demand, and the associated pricing is at play.228  Instead, health care  
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rationing takes a practical perspective with a view on what circumstances and condition  
treatments will be allowed.  The greater issue in health care rationing is who will make rationing  
decisions as there are many interested stakeholders including politicians, pharmaceutical  
representatives and vendors, physicians, hospitals, third party payers, and patient special interest  
groups.229 
        A second reason for the increased attention to rationing is the focus on high-tech medicine.   
Whenever a new treatment, new procedure, or new drug therapy is introduced to the general  
public, there is a natural rationing until its effectiveness and efficacy have been proven.230  
Therefore, its use is limited in the beginning and as its use becomes more extensive, it may 
 continue to be rationed due to cost as well as the realization that it is confined to a particular  
group or diagnosis.231  The problem arises when new technology advances beyond its expected  
use and expectation by many or all patients.  An example is how CPR, which was first  
designated to be used after acute reversible cardiac arrests, has now become an expectation for  
all conditions, whether reversible or not, even if imminently dying, unless specifically ordered to  
do not resuscitate.232  When there have been discussions regarding CPR and how this one 
treatment has become a given expectation, ethicists and philosophers debate that it should be  
withheld if it will not benefit the patient, to the point of doing so without the patient/family  
consent.233  This illustrates the cross over and confusion surrounding rationing versus futility  
where rationing limits resources in treating a group of patients and futility limits resources in  
treating an individual patient.234 
        A third reason for the increased attention being given to rationing is the increased aging in  
America.  The aging of the population has been occurring since 1800 as diseases have been  
eradicated, healthier lifestyles have been practiced, and medical advances have added to  
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longevity.235   The rate of aging has accelerated over the years with those over 85 being the  
fastest growing age group at 21 times greater than in 1900.236   When examining the escalating  
cost of health care for those receiving Medicare, it is staggering.  In 2008, there were  
44,831,390 Medicare recipients, or approximately 45 million, whereas, between 2010 and 2030  
this is estimated to grow to 79 million at a cost increase from $503 billion to $937 billion.237 
        Dan Callahan has long been an advocate of rationing based on age partly because Medicare  
is headed toward a financial catastrophe.238  Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have  
directly rationed the elderly end stage renal disease patients from dialysis and transplantation.239 
The elderly, in all countries, are a target for both futility and rationing because of their growing 
numbers and the cost of health care as they age.  An argument against rationing based on age,  
calls the fairness principle to the discussion by treating elderly as “scapegoats” for the high cost  
of health care stressing that many of the new advances were not available to the elderly at a  
younger age.240  The one point that Callahan does stress is that rationing needs to be  
accomplished by policy versus providers making these decisions at the bedside, opening the  
possibility for discrepancies and bias.241 
        Since rationing is seen to be inevitable and occurs because of limited resources, by avoiding  
the “explicit” discussion, rationing may lead to “implicit” and immoral rationing.242   However,  
the term “rationing” conjures up negativity as much as futility does.  For some rationing brings  
back World War II coupons, for others it reflects limited organs for transplantation but it is  
difficult it make a negative meaning work into anything positive.243  Today’s language is more  
apt to include “value”, which cannot be argued, “cost effectiveness” and “comparative  
effectiveness research (CER).244  To continue to use words, such as futility and rationing, which 
 close people’s minds, will never reach the goal of value driven quality patient care. 
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        The last reason rationing gets so much attention is the limits on the autonomy of the  
patients.  Autonomy once thought to be the principle to override all others, is now being  
challenged.  Many ethicists now debate that patient autonomy does not translate to patients  
getting whatever they want but that choices come from those limited to ones that are “medically  
appropriate” for the patient.245  The ethical role of the providers is to balance justice in resource  
distribution against the responsibility of advocating for their patients’ interests.246  
       Regardless of what rationing is called, there are reasons that put the action into place in a  
critical care environment.  Following is a discussion of these reasons. 
        2.V.A.2.  Rationing Decisions 
        The main reasons for rationing decision in the critical care environment are based on three  
influences which include external constraints, clinical guidelines, and clinical judgment.   
External constraints are often based on administrative decisions or rules and regulations being  
imposed from an external source.247  These external constraints can be sufficiently forcible.   
Examples include drugs that are no longer available on the hospital formulary because of cost,  
but the provider believes the drug would benefit the patient.  The provider can accept this and  
use a substitute drug, try to circumvent the formulary, or transfer the patient to a place where the  
drug is available.248  Another example is a laboratory test that has been outsourced for financial  
gain which contributed to a long turnaround time affecting patient outcome.  In this instance,  
the patient might be transferred to another organization but not every external constraint can be  
resisted or bypassed. 
        A second rationing decision is based on clinical guidelines.  Clinical guidelines have as  
their potential to assist with clinical decisions based on both clinical efficacy and cost  
effectiveness.249  Clinical guideline have often been referred to as “cookbook medicine” and  
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have focused on evidence based practice from outcomes resulting from rigorous clinical  
research.250  The addition of cost into consideration is relatively new and is not consistent in all  
clinical guidelines and, therefore, not followed or sanctioned by all providers.  However, the time  
has come when effectiveness as well as cost must be associated with end-of-life treatment,  
especially when transpiring in an already expensive critical care unit, to include evaluating  
palliative care treatment.251 
        The final rationing decision is based on clinical judgment.  Clinical judgment is required  
when two conditions are present.  One is when clinical guidelines do not exist for the patient’s  
presenting condition and the other is when it is not clear how the guidelines fit a particular  
patient.252  In either of these circumstances, the provider must make the best clinical decision for  
the patient and departure from the guidelines is acceptable.  Other examples of rationing based  
on clinical judgment in critical care is based on triaging patients in critical care units when there  
is a shortage of available beds.  A method of rationing rules out those who are too ill to benefit  
from the scarce resources as well as those who are not ill enough to receive this specialized  
care.253  Other methods to ration, besides illness severity, include age, medical diagnosis, such as  
multiple organ failure or terminal metastatic disease, plus chronic heart or respiratory failure.254 
        One of the ethical discussions in reference to rationing and futility involves whether  
disclosure to the patients is needed.  If the decision is based on clinical judgment, then the patient  
technically does not need to consent or be informed.  However, when rationing is invoked for  
other than what is best for the patient, then most patients/families would want to be aware, to  
question, or even appeal, if possible.255  An open, honest, transparent approach is needed by the  
providers to maintain the trust of patients. 
        Both rationing and futility, or inappropriate treatment, are factors in critical care today and  
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will continue to be in the future.  It has been suggested that a proactive approach could be  
beneficial in reducing some of the debate that surrounds these topics.  Following is a look at  
recommendations for a more proactive approach with a renewed hope for the future. 
2.V.B  Resolving Futility Disputes 
        The debate regarding futility has not been resolved with questions regarding its definition  
Unanswered, plus its prevalence continues to be reported.  In critical care units in the United  
States, approximately 20% of the patients receive at least one day of what providers describe as  
futile treatment.256 Approaches to the topic that have been emerging focus on shifting from a  
concept of essential medical futility to “patient appropriate care” that results from collaborative  
decisions made by patients, families, and providers.257  Along with this focus to a collaborative  
approach, there are recommendations that can help eliminate the need for a debate to occur.   
There are also initiatives and programs in place that can affect the incidence of the futility  
treatment debate. 
        2.V.B.1.  Recommendations  
        In managing, resolving, or preventing futility debates or disputes, there are suggested 
recommendations that can be helpful.  The first recommendation focuses on communication with  
the inclusion of expert consultation when needed.258  Almost all conflicts occur as a result of  
poor or inadequate communication.  Focused communication involves frequent, open, honest  
discussion with developed skills in delivering critical and difficult information in an uncertain 
 environment.259  Key elements in communication at the end-of-life include increasing the  
amount of time spent listening to the family, reassuring the family that the patient will not be  
“abandoned” prior to death, supporting the family’s wishes, and discussing means to minimize  
patient suffering.260  If there is a communication breakdown, requesting expert consultation early 
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 can be beneficial.  This expert consultation can be from an ethics committee, chaplains, social  
workers, skilled mediators, or palliative care consultants.261 
        A second recommendation is the development of policies and legislation to assist in  
providing guidance when a situation presents where a futile treatment is requested or 
continuing.262  Such policies or legislation need to be detailed and specific with input from all  
stakeholders followed by a broad communication plan and frequent assessment, as well as  
evaluation on its effectiveness.263  Such policies or legislation are usually done on a local basis  
and differ by state. 
        A third recommendation stresses the need to change the terminology used from “futile” to  
“potentially inappropriate”.  “Potentially” implies that the decision is not final and  
“inappropriate” is more of a clinical statement than “ineffective” which is more of a value  
statement.264  This decision regarding potentially inappropriate treatment should then be  
communicated to the patient/family.  In the process of communication and decision making, it is  
recommended that the decision making authority not be given unilaterally to the family or  
surrogate.265   
        Even when family and surrogates follow the wishes and values of the patient, the  
decision making process can take an emotional toll.  Critical care providers can better support  
families, as well as surrogate decision makers, by, 1) seeking information regarding  
communication needs, as well as emotional distress exhibited by family/surrogates; 2) reframing  
the decision from the view of respecting the patient’s wishes; 3) encouraging multiple family  
decision makers, even if there is only one designated medical durable power of attorney, to help  
share the burden; 4) soliciting the importance of religion and spirituality in the family/surrogates  
life.  The providers can determine if this is a value and assist in placing God’s role in decisions;  
99 
 
and 5) acknowledging if a family/surrogate is struggling with decisions so extra time can be  
spent listening to their stories, as well as giving deadlines for appropriate decisions, or attempt a  
treatment on a time limited trial basis.266  If these steps do not facilitate the communication and  
decision making, further steps can be taken.  These include seeking an expert consultation;  
putting the expectations in writing; obtaining a second opinion; obtaining review by an  
institutional committee, such as an ethics committee; offering the opportunity to transfer to  
another institution; and offering the family/surrogate the freedom to seek legal review.267 
        These recommendations are proposed in anticipation of minimizing futility disputes at the 
bedside.  An even larger scope looks beyond the bedside at what is available to change the  
debate in a more proactive manner. 
        2.V.B.2.  Look to the Future 
        As the focus is to the future, there are some safeguards that are needed.  First there is the  
problem when the pressure to cut costs and inappropriate treatment are not kept separate.268These  
boundaries are often blurred so safeguards include the implementation of policies and second  
opinions to help minimize them.  A second problem is when patients/families are left out of the  
decision making process.  The safeguards include policies, utilizing a patient advocate, plus  
careful documentation of the decision making process.269  A third problem is to take futility, or  
inappropriate treatment, decisions to the legal system.  Safeguards include utilizing an external  
mediator or negotiator who can help resolve the conflict without engaging the courts, where the  
patient often gets overlooked.270  A final problem is when inappropriate decisions are based on a  
“clinical bias”.  It is easy to focus on the medical aspect of the patient when there is an end- of- 
life issue in the stressful environment of the critical care.  Safeguards to prevent this from  
becoming all-encompassing is to include psychosocial and spiritual factors as part of all  
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inappropriate treatment discussions.271  These discussions need to be documented for future  
reference to reflect the patient’s values and beliefs regarding life, as well as death. 
        In looking to the future, one of the areas that brings hope is advance care planning and  
advance directives.  Discussion between patients and providers prior to end-of-life with  
documentation of these discussions, and frequent follow-up conversations, can serve the patient  
well.  These discussions address values, goals, and treatment preferences so that at the time  
when decisions are critical, there is some direction for providers.272   Even though the completion 
of advance directives has been encouraged since the 1990’s, and the Patient Self Determination 
Act, there has not been much increase in completion over the years.273  An initiative by the 
 federal government and CMS, that took effect on January 1, 2016, reimburses providers for  
having conversations regarding advance care planning.274  This action was done in hopes of  
encouraging the conversations by giving a financial incentive for doing so.  Despite the possible  
benefits, there are opponents who see it as a way to commit billing fraud, a way to limit  
treatment that might benefit a patient, or it will lead to taxing the Medicare program.275  The  
overall success of the incentive program is yet to be determined. 
        Another hope for the future involves increased education to the public as well as providers  
on the topics of death as a normal process of living, the role of palliative care, and advance care  
planning.  Too often the media has portrayed death as an option focusing on miracles that have  
occurred leaving the public to believe that these are available for them.276  The medical advances  
and boom of technology has, thereby, led consumers to believe there is nothing that should not  
be available to them for the asking.  This leaves providers with the daunting task of balancing the  
interventions associated with the technology with a humanistic approach to those who are at the 
end-of-life.277 
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        To assist with this humanistic approach, a final look to the future centers on palliative care.   
What was once interchangeable with hospice care has now moved more “upstream” in the  
progress of the disease.278  The current palliative care programs are no longer just about caring  
for cancer patients but now care for all diagnoses with a focus on symptom management.279   
Palliative care was first offered towards the end-of-life, however, when offered earlier in the  
course of disease, research has found that it can improve the quality of life, as well as provide  
enhanced longevity, especially if offered in conjunction with curative care.280 
 
2.VI.  Conclusion 
        Medical futility is not a new concept, having been referred to since the time of Hippocrates.   
Futility was named and began its present discussion and heated debate beginning in the 1980’s.   
Today’s discussion is stressing a name change to “potentially” or “medically inappropriate”  
treatment because of all the negativity and emotions associated with “futility”.  Regardless of 
what one calls it, the problem of making decisions regarding treatments that are of minimum  
benefit to the critically ill patient at the end-of-life is very present today.  This presence can be  
seen across the age continuum from the neonates to the adults in the critical care units. 
        As the ethical debate continues, it is fueled by the aging population, medical advances and  
technology, plus the continued pressures from the financing of health care to attempt to  
control costs.   Patient versus provider autonomy plays out at the bedside, with some instances of  
the judicial system being involved, usually in favor of the patient/family, leaving no one a  
winner and the patient left in the middle.   
        There is hope for the future with the reimbursement for having conversations regarding  
advance care planning and advance directives with Medicare eligible patients.  These results are  
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yet to be seen.   Palliative care has become more available and is offering symptom management  
and hope for patients and their families not only at the end-of-life but also earlier in life-limiting  
illnesses.         
        Futile treatments serve patients by giving a false sense of hope for continued life, albeit with 
 suffering and life of questionable quality. Futile treatments serve families by “doing everything”  
and giving a limited sense of doing something as a way to show they care.  Futile treatments  
serve health care providers by showing some sense of caring and avoidance of the tough  
conversations.  However, futile treatments do not have a place in the humane and compassionate  
care for the dying patient at the end-of-life.  It is time for patients, families and providers to  
accept death as a part of living so that a focus can be on preparing both the patient and family  
for this journey.  This will be the best way to end the ethical debate on futility, plus the  
associated conflict, so that the patient’s life ends with love, compassion and minimal suffering.  
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Chapter 3:  Futility and Neonates 
 
3.I.  Introduction 
        The birth of a child is usually a time of joy and anticipation.  However, this can be 
dramatically turned upside down when the birth is premature, when there is severe illness, or 
congenital anomalies in the neonate.  Modern medicine has done much to improve the survival 
rate of newborns but the benefit of this is not always clear, plus the cost may be a compromised 
quality of life.  New parents are often faced with a life and death decision regarding their 
newborn in the delivery room where they are reeling from the loss of the expectations of 
parenthood.  Following delivery, the decisions move to the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) 
where the environment is foreign, as well as frightening, plus the decisions become more 
complex and challenging.  The life/death decisions and ethical dilemmas not only affect the 
parents, but also impact the professional caregivers at the bedside in the NICU.  Because of 
medical advances, neonates are surviving at lower birth weights/ages or with illnesses and 
disabilities that did not survive years ago, all of which has led to increasing ethical dilemmas at 
the end-of-life. 
        Chapter 3 addresses futility in the neonatal population and the unique challenges this 
presents.  The first part of the chapter looks at futility and the neonate from a historical 
perspective placing the concerns within a theoretical framework.  The second part of the chapter 
examines the ethical dilemmas in neonatology, the influence the various roles have on the 
neonate’s care, ending with evidence based ethics as applied to the neonates.  
 
3.II.  Historical Perspective 
        To more fully understand the effect of futility in the care of neonates, it is important to  
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grasp the evolution of neonatal care not only in the United States but in Europe as well, as it 
impacted care in America.  Through this evolution there were influences and lessons learned that 
have also had significant impact to the care being delivered to this smallest of the world’s 
population.  Following is a discussion of these historical developments. 
3.II.A.  Evolution of Neonatal Intensive Care Units 
       The evolution of neonatal care was influenced by developments in Europe as well as 
America.  As neonatal intensive care units officially came to be in the 1960’s, in the United 
States, the need was present to be able to categorize neonates based on weight and gestational 
age leading to a standardized classification system.  Following is an explanation of the historical 
influence on neonatal care, as well as the present day classification system used in NICUs.   
        3.II.A.1.  European versus American Influence 
         Up through the 1800’s, the birth and care of infants were done at home, assisted by female 
family members or midwives, with little assistance from physicians.1    In the latter part of the 
18th century and the early 19th century medical advances came about as a result of the industrial 
age.2  With these advances, care was moved from the home to the hospital setting.  Out–of-
hospital births moved from 44% in 1940 to 1% in 1969 with approximately 1.4% births in 2012 
being in the home, which has been rising in the past few years.3  During 19th century America, 
infant deaths were acceptable as a course of life with approximately 15-20% of all newborns 
dying in their first year of life from infections, starvation, or hypothermia.4   The shift of care to 
the hospital setting, where infection control measures and medical treatments could be employed 
led to a decrease in infant mortality.   Even with these improvements, the beginning of NICUs is 
thought to have not officially started in the United States until the 1960’s with the development  
of the infant ventilator.5   However, there had been a perceived need plus an effort to address the 
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requirements of the premature and ill neonate long before the 1960’s. 
        Action to address the needs of the neonate began in France in the latter part of the 1800’s.  
The impetus for action was as much a political one as humanitarian as the birth rate was down, 
especially when compared with the rival country of Germany.6  Action began in the 1880’s with  
E. S. Tarnier, a French obstetrician, who introduced the incubator and gastric gavage decreasing 
infant mortality from 66% to 38% in those infants weighing 1200-2000 grams.7   In retrospect, it  
is believed that even though the emphasis was on the effect that the incubator had on mortality, 
in actuality it may have been the mere act of studying the infant mortality and improving the 
feeding with gastric gavage that made the improvement.8  Adolphe Pinard, picked up the cause 
after Tarnier, promoting more of a prevention focus than treatment, believing that if the 
premature infants were rescued and survived they continued to be “weaklings” the rest of their 
lives.9  Another French leader in the field was Pierre Budin who established the first premature 
nursery in the late 1800’s but is also known for his strong message regarding the value of breast 
feeding, which continues to resonate today.10  With the introduction of the incubator in infant 
care, the incubators along with the infants were brought to world fairs, expositions, and midways 
as a form of “side show” to exhibit the technology, plus instill faith in medical progress.11 
       In the United States, the first hospital to have a separate nursery to care for premature infants 
was located in Chicago, in 1927, in Sarah Morris Hospital.12  However, through the following 
years progress was slow.  The view by the majority of physicians was that saving premature 
babies was going against nature which was a way to expel the world of a defective child or a 
“weakling”.13  The focus on neonatal care was primarily feeding, keeping warm and isolation.14  
Neonatal units were shocked to realize in the 1940’s that providing high levels of oxygen, which  
was believed to be beneficial to neonates, could lead to Retrolental Fibroplasia (RLF), or  
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blindness in the infants.15  This is still being monitored and studied today.   
       Major changes occurred from 1950-1970 as innovation and technology advances were 
prominent.  It was also during this time that antibiotics emerged.  Neonatal care would be 
changed forever as life threatening infections could now be treated and, in some cases,  
ameliorated, yet the antibiotic treatment led, in certain instances, to further devastation to the 
neonate.16   
       Neonatology officially became acknowledged as a medical specialty in the 1960’s with 
focused care for surgical procedures, pharmaceuticals, medical treatments, and breathing 
problems via the ventilator.17  Along with this focused care came the belief that the premature 
infant should be minimally stimulated with little or no contact with the parents.  This isolation 
theory began to change in the 1970’s when research began to be done showing no greater 
infection rates when parents were more actively involved with their infants.18  An additional 
bonus was found with increased neonatal development when parents interacted with the neonate 
in enhanced parenting skills and bonding with the infants. 
       During this same time period, new procedures, medications, and technologies were devoid 
of research trials or exposed to any scientific process.  This changed from 1970 to 2000 when 
research became the norm and regulatory agencies became involved with focusing on problems 
found in NICUs across the nation.19 
       As NICUs progressed and neonatology became more accepted as a specialty, there was a 
need to classify the neonates as well as the level of care being delivered in the various NICUs. 
At first NICUs were regionalized in tertiary care centers, but as the field advanced more 
hospitals wanted to be in the business necessitating the need to differentiate the level of NICU 
care being delivered.  Following is a discussion of the classification of neonates and NICUs.  
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        3.II.A.2.  Neonatal Classifications 
        Infants in a NICU can be classified in terms of body weight.  Those who are classified as 
low birthweight weigh in at less than 2500 grams (5.5 pounds) at birth; very low birthweight is 
less than 1500 grams (3.3 pounds); and extremely low birthweight is less than 1000 grams (2.2 
pounds).20    Another way to determine maturity of an infant examines gestational age.   An 
infant is considered premature if less than 37 weeks gestation, with 40 weeks gestational age 
considered normal or full term pregnancy.21  Gestational age is a better indicator of development 
and maturation, but it is difficult to determine because of menstrual cycle variability so birth 
weight is , even if it is deceiving.22  A newborn is considered a “neonate” for the first 28 days of 
life and an “infant” from the 28th day until the end of the first year. 23 
       Neonates admitted to NICU’s fall into three general categories, each with its own ethical 
dilemmas and considerations.  The first is the full or near term neonate who has a severe illness 
that requires close monitoring.  Ethical concerns are limited as long as diagnoses and treatments 
are completed appropriately with neonates usually responding rapidly or dying quickly.24  The 
second category is for those neonates found with congenital anomalies.  Ethical dilemmas relate 
to whether to treat or provide surgical correction to conditions when the underlying anomaly 
remains untreatable, yet, failing to intervene can lead to death.25  Quality of life concerns are 
most often a focus for this category of neonate.   The third, and final category, is for those 
neonates who are born premature.  The ethical concerns include all those in the other two plus  
the long term uncertainty of the neonate’s progress.  This uncertainty includes survival in the 
immediate future, as well as having mild to severe disabilities in the distant future.26   
       Neonatal intensive care units are classified into levels by the American Academy of 
Pediatrics.  The levels are as follows:  1) Level I cares for well newborns 35 to 37 week 
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gestation.  Infants who become ill are stabilized and shipped to a higher level of care; 2) Level II, 
special care nursery, cares for neonates greater than 32 week gestation, 1500 gram weight and 
greater.  Care in this level of nursery is for the moderately ill and is predicted to be short term.  
Mechanical ventilation is done for short periods; 3) Level III, or NICU care, provides for life 
support on a sustained basis for those less than 32 weeks gestation and 1500 grams.  Access to 
subspecialty is available to include pediatric surgeons, pediatric ophthalmologists, pediatric 
anesthesiologists, neonatologists and various subspecialists.  Medical treatments are advanced 
and can include high frequency ventilation, nitrous oxide inhalation with access to all levels of 
imaging; and 4) Level IV, which is a regional NICU, cares for the most critically ill and complex 
neonates.  This level of care provides for cardiac malformation that may require 
cardiopulmonary bypass with or without extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO).  Level 
IV facilities also perform research, are most often found in a university teaching facility, and 
usually have their own transport vehicle and team.27  Even though the number of NICUs has 
increased over the years, studies show low mortality among the very low birth weight infants in 
NICUs with a higher level of care and a higher volume of these patients.28 
        As care for neonates and the development of neonatal intensive café units have evolved 
over time, there have been lessons learned that have focused on providing or not providing what 
was seen as futile treatment.   The next section addresses these lessons. 
3.II.B.  Significant Lessons 
        As neonatology became a new specialty, significant lessons were learned that are still 
applied today.  These include the first lesson of completing an organizational assessment before 
any changes are made in the care of neonates, since NICUs are part of a system and adjustment 
in one part affects the whole.29 The second lesson, before considering any new treatment, safety 
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should not be presumed until research has been adequately completed, as did not occur with the 
high flow oxygen use in neonates that led to blindness discovered in the 1950’s.30  The third 
lesson is the value of an integrated approach to perinatal care that does not separate neonatal 
health care from maternal care.31  The fourth and final lessor has been the shift from the 
paternalistic physician making all decisions to a focus on the “best interest’ of the neonate.32 
        However, the most difficult lessons center on infants with disabilities and the dilemmas that 
occur when further treatment seems to be futile together with the parents versus provider 
authority in decision making.  Baby Doe and Baby K are two cases that will be examined from 
the ethical challenge they presented in the history of neonatology. 
        3.II.B.1.  Origin, Influence, and Aftermath of Baby Doe Rules 
       The “Baby Doe” rules or regulations became a major part of neonatology’s history 
beginning in the 1980’s.  Baby Doe was born in Indiana, in 1982, with Down’s syndrome and an 
esophageal atresia with a tracheal esophageal fistula which, through a mutual agreement between 
the parents and physicians, was not treated.33  Without surgical treatment, the infant would die as 
anatomically feeding was impossible.  Surgery was denied, feedings were withheld, pain 
medications along with sedation were given to the infant with death occurring in six days.34  In 
coming to this decision, there was disagreement among the physician as some believed the 
anomaly should be repaired while others did not, leaving the final decision to the parents.  Some 
physicians, primarily the obstetrician, and hospital administrators went to the court system to 
overrule the decision, however, the county circuit court and the Indiana Supreme court both ruled 
in favor of the parents.35  An appeal was made to the Supreme Court, but the neonate died before 
the case was heard. 
        What started out as a difficult decision regarding the fate of a disabled neonate soon became 
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a social and political force to be reckoned with.  By this time, neonatology had been recognized 
as its own subspecialty; it had been 10 years since the Roe versus Wade decision which legalized 
abortion; 10 years since the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which addressed the rights of the 
disabled; and 10 years since federal legislation required there be state agencies to ensure that 
children are safe from abuse and neglect.36  The public, after hearing the decision regarding Baby  
Doe, as well as others that were similar, cried out in disbelief prompting Congress, during the 
Reagan administration, to enact the “Baby Doe” regulations.37   
       There were two sets of Baby Doe rules or regulations.  The first used civil rights laws, based 
  on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which stipulates that at least one of the three 
criteria must exist, otherwise, to not treat was discriminatory and in violation of the neonates 
civil rights.38  A test of these rules subsequently went to the Supreme Court where it was 
criticized by the Court as interfering with the parents’ rights to act in the neonate’s best 
interest.39  The second Baby Doe rules were enacted as amendments to child abuse and neglect 
funding requests for states via the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1984, and 
although optional for individual states, most states had adopted them.40  These amendments 
made it unlawful to withhold treatment based on a disability or potential disability.  As part of 
these amendments a toll free “hot line” was to be established where reports could be made 
regarding parents, as well as physicians, who failed to provide life sustaining treatment to 
neonates.41  Although the “hot line” is no longer in existence, the “Baby Doe” rules continue to 
guide behavior as the rules are overseen by the individual states’ child protection agencies.  
When the “hot line” was first active (1982 to 1983), during the first 19 months, 1633 calls were 
received, 49 were investigated with effect on treatment in six of the 49.42 
        The act, or “Baby Doe” rules, allowed for treatment to be withheld if, 1) the neonate was 
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irreversibly comatose; 2) the treatment was classified as medically futile and prolonged the dying 
process; and 3) the treatment would be both futile for survival as well as seen as “inhumane”.43  
As neonatology has evolved with increased use of neonatologist’s expertise at the bedside, there 
is less of a need for rules to guide decision making.  The “Baby Doe” rules were often 
misunderstood and misinterpreted, leading to more confusion than guidance, which has  
given support to the best interest of the child as the ultimate guide on decisions regarding  
withholding and withdrawing treatment.44 
        A greater ethical challenge exists when a very premature infant presents at the border of 
viability when disability is not yet known.  With these infants it is not known if treatment is 
given whether they will survive.  If they do survive, it is not known if there will be physical or 
mental deficiencies.  If there are deficiencies, will they be mild or severe and will they present 
early or later in life.  The prognosis is so uncertain it makes decision making regarding treatment 
for a premature neonate, as well as potentially disabled neonate, very difficult.45   
        3.II.B.2.  A Case for Futility---Baby K 
        The case of Baby K brings to light the discussion on futility and medically futile treatments.  
Baby K was born in Virginia in 1992 with anencephaly, a congenital defect which presents with 
an intact brain stem but the cerebral cortex is primitive or absent.46  Baby K was permanently 
unconscious and lacked a cerebral cortex so she was believed to be unable to see, hear, talk, feel 
pain, or have cognitive function.47  However, because her brain stem was intact, she could 
breathe, feed, to include sucking and swallowing, plus respond to stimuli by “avoidance”.48 
        Although Baby K’s anencephaly was diagnosed before birth, her mother, Ms. H, opted to 
not terminate the pregnancy.  Ms. H had a firm Christian belief that God would work miracles if 
that was His will and that only He could decide the moment of death.49  At birth, Baby K was 
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placed on mechanical ventilation, allowing her mother to recover from the Caesarean section 
delivery and to fully grasp the significance of the diagnosis.  With the passage of time, Ms. H did 
not waiver on her devotion to the sanctity-of-life principle, despite being informed of the quality 
of life that awaited Baby K.  The futility of further treatment for Baby K was explained with the  
exception of supportive care in the form of nutrition, hydration, and warmth.50   Ms. H wanted  
everything done for Baby K. 
        Baby K was weaned from mechanical ventilation, had a gastrostomy tube placed to assure 
adequate nutrition and hydration, and was transferred to a nursing home for continued treatment.  
Six months after birth she had a tracheostomy placed to assist with breathing, which was of some 
help, but she was to make six emergent transfers to the emergency department (ED) when she 
was in respiratory distress, all requiring mechanical ventilation.51 
        The medical providers, including the hospital, believed that each visit to the ED was futile 
treatment, however, the mother would not change her decision for full medical treatment.  So the 
courts were brought into the process.  Historically decisions were made between physicians and 
patients, or surrogates.  By the 1990’s, the complexity of the health care decisions now included 
allied health professionals, hospital administrators, third party payers, ethics committees, in 
addition to the patient and the patient’s family, which only added to the difficulty in making any 
major decision.52 
        The hospital and physicians of Virginia sought assistance from a federal district court to 
withhold or withdraw the ventilator as inappropriate treatment for anencephaly.  In the state of 
Virginia, the Virginia Health Care Decision Act allows a physician to withhold “medically or 
ethically inappropriate” treatment.53  Even with this act in place, the court used the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) and Americans with Disabilities Act as 
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justification for the treatment to continue saying that bringing Baby K to the ED meant that 
emergency treatment must be provided.54  The hospital held that Baby K’s reason for the ED 
visit was because of her anencephaly, whereas the court initially, as well as on appeal, held that it 
was the respiratory distress and not the anencephaly that caused the visits.55  Baby K died on her 
sixth visit to the ED, in April 1995, at the age of two and a half, from cardiac arrest.56 
        The take away lessons from the Baby K case are that this is an example of more than the 
“rights” of the parents to choose or the health care providers’ rights to not offer futile treatment.  
It reaches into the value of life which does not exclude death, a topic too often avoided, as it is 
seen as a failure or too difficult to discuss.57  The health care providers struggled with actions 
that were being done “to” baby K and rarely “for” her. 58  Dialogue must begin early continuing 
to place value on life, with its limits, which means facing one’s own mortality, a daunting task. 
       A theoretical framework is needed to establish the context from which the end-of-life ethics 
in neonates can originate.  The next section describes such a framework beginning with the 
moral status of the neonate and the on-going debate around that topic.  Another part of the 
framework examines the best interest standard which looks at what is needed for the neonate.  A 
final point describes how balancing the values or principles is key in helping keep ethical 
dilemmas at a minimum. 
 
3.III.  Theoretical Framework 
        Theoretical frameworks serve as guides to assist in detailing the support structure for the 
topic being researched or explained.59  The theoretical framework also functions, not only to 
build a foundation, but also as a point of reference as the research is examined.60 
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3.III.A.  Moral Status of Neonates versus Best Interest Standard 
        The theoretical framework for examining futility treatment in neonates is based on several 
theories and concepts.  The first is the moral status of neonates. Although there has been much 
written about the moral status of the embryo, fetus, and newborn, there is not one final agreed 
upon determination as to when moral status is granted.  The second looks at the best interest 
standard and how that plays a role as neonates are unable to make their own decisions.  The final  
framework examines the principles and values that in the end come down to doing the right  
thing. 
        3.III.A.1.  Theories of Moral Status 
        Although there may not be agreement on the theory of moral status, one theory that does 
produce agreement is that at the moment of birth the neonate is a “full-fledged” member of 
society bestowed with the same rights as any other citizen.61  These rights are defined legally at 
birth as there is no valid constitutional statute that imposes any duty on the unborn child as they 
are not considered persons until birth.62  Even with that being said, the Supreme Court has 
stipulated that the individual states can exercise their interest in the fetus based on its potential to 
“become a child” making the woman’s perceived privacy right surrounding her pregnancy not 
absolute.63  In fact, many states have individual laws governing allowable pregnancy activities.  
For example 18 states view substance abuse during pregnancy as child abuse, while three states 
see substance abuse during pregnancy as reason for “civil commitment”.64  
       Moral status does extend beyond society membership.  To possess moral status involves 
more than the birth process.  It examines what it means to have moral status, protected by moral 
norms with the same moral rights as other humans.65  Another reason to examine moral status, 
whether it be of the embryo, fetus, or neonate, is to determine the actual or potential “moral 
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value” that is attached to the moral status.66  As a potential human being, the premature neonate 
is a symbol of human life, no matter how small, giving it moral value which means there are 
moral reasons to treat it a particular way.67 
       Various views have been proposed over the centuries which identify “landmarks” as to when 
moral significance or moral status occurs.  These include when movement, or quickening, is first 
felt in the womb by the pregnant mother signifying that the fetus is alive; when brain waves first 
appear which is approximately eight weeks gestational age; when the fetus separates from the 
mother and can live independently at birth; when the embryo or fetus is defined as genetically 
human with the 23 pair of chromosomes which some say is at conception; or when the fetus 
looks like a human which is at 9 to 12 weeks gestational age.68  Both religious and secular 
frameworks have also postulated that moral status increases with gestational age which gives 
rationale to the timing of abortion and research on embryos and fetuses.69 
       There has been no one theory that has survived to establish moral status or personhood for 
neonates.  A finding in a national survey indicates that when deciding to withhold life prolonging 
treatment from all age groups, children including infants, were given priority over adults for 
treatment, except if the infants were premature, in which case, they were moved to the bottom of 
the list.70  This finding concluded that premature neonates are believed to have less of moral 
status when compared with older adults indicating an ignorance of the capabilities of this 
population.71 
       Even though no one theory prevails related to moral status, there have been five proposed 
theories postulated of which a combination of some form of the theories is seen as a best theory 
on when moral status is conferred.  These five theories are as follows:  1) being a member of the 
human race, which implies that only humans can have moral status; 2) having cognitive abilities 
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such as self-awareness and information processing, which places those who have mental 
disabilities in a questionable state of moral status; 3) being able to make moral judgments which 
is not possible until later in the newborn’s life; 4) experiencing sentience such as feeling pain, 
pleasure and suffering, which is also questionable for some disabilities; and 5) having the 
capacity to develop trusting and caring relationships.72  In any neonate, and especially in 
extremely low weight newborns, it is difficult to predict with any certainty whether there is or 
ever will be the capacity for cognition, rationality, or relationship development.73  Because of 
this uncertainty and a lack of one universal view, the debate on moral status will continue.  
Whether neonates have been declared to have moral status or not, they are believed to have 
rights which some believe is another way of signifying moral status.74 
       The rights of neonates entitle them to be acknowledged and safeguarded as individual 
agents.75  Because neonates are unable to defend their own rights, they are obligated to others to 
do so for them.  In the majority of cases, the neonates’ parents are the guardians of the rights via 
the best interest standard. 
        3.III.A.2.  Evolution of the Best Interest Standard 
        Fifty years ago, premature neonates would have died as “nature took its course, but today 
they survive in NICUs as a result of medical advances.76  Decisions are now made daily by 
parents and health care professionals determining whether the tiniest members of society should 
be resuscitated, or if treatment should be withheld or withdrawn.  Obviously these neonates are 
incompetent or lack capacities to make their own decisions.  The time of the late 19th century and 
early 20th century was known as the “Progressive Era”.  During this era, there was a national 
focus on the health and welfare of children, which included a focus on education, child abuse, 
custody preferences, and child labor issues, all of which were addressed due to injustices.77   
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        As part of the child reform of the time period, and to lessen the premise that those who lack 
lack decision making capability were the property of their surrogates or guardians, the best 
interest standard was first introduced in the 20th century.78  In defining the best interest of the 
neonate, the best interest standard, which is an accepted legal principle, centers on the morally 
justified decision, since it is not possible to determine the interests of the neonate.79  The inability 
to determine the interests is due to the infants’ limited ability to have interest in its future with a 
focus on the immediate interests of food, being touched, and kept warm.  If a neonate is born 
with abnormalities it is difficult to separate the best interest of the neonate from that of the 
family, or surrogate decision maker.  This is due to three reasons which are: 1) there are no 
future interests or if there are any, they cannot be known; 2) because there is no past history, no 
substituted judgment can be used; and 3) the neonate’s life is so interwoven with the family that 
they cannot be separated.80 
       It is a challenge to know when to invoke the best interest standard.  In general, there are 
three ways to consider the best interests of a neonate.  First, if there is any medical benefit to be 
gained from the treatment, then it needs to be considered in the infant’s best interest.81  The 
second way to consider the treatment refers to the perceived quality of life.  This is especially 
true when contemplating futile treatment that provides no long term quality of life benefit.82  The 
final way to consider best interests examines the “burden of life” for the neonate.  The burden 
examines disabilities which will affect the neonate throughout life realizing that it is difficult to 
decide what a benefit versus a burden is, as this varies among individuals.83 
       The best interest standard is not without criticism.  One criticism is that by definition the 
“best” interest standard directs decision making to what is best which could literally translate to 
the top surgical team, top NICU etc. which is not always possible.  The standard was designed to 
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give a voice to those who are incompetent refuting the previous held practice that those who are 
incompetent were the property of their surrogates/guardians.84  Another criticism deals with the 
vagueness and subjectivity of the standard.  Whenever this standard is used, there are moral and 
legal duties to those declared incompetent with an awareness of options that are inappropriate, 
which does decrease its subjectivity in actual practice.85  A final criticism is that the best interest  
standard does not consider the family as an integrated system taking into consideration the  
interest of the neonate, without the broader interest of the family.86 
        For neonatal nursing, the best interest standard is a part of the caring focus.  The ethical 
obligations of a caring ethic includes the parents, as well as the neonate, plus the future of the 
neonate.87  The attributes associated with the caring include compassion as well as empathy.  
Nurses spend a great deal of time with the neonates and their families.  This extended care can 
sometimes lead to an adverse attachment but, for the most part, allows the nurse to make valued 
input to decisions regarding the neonate’s future.88 
       In the process of decision making for the neonate within a theoretical framework, the 
process can focus on the neonate’s moral status, the best interest standard or various other ethical 
principles and values.  What ethical principles and values that are at play is dependent on the 
particular situation regarding the neonate and how the principles as well as values are kept in 
balance.   
3.III.B.  Balancing the Principle and Values 
        Because there are numerous principles and values at play that comprise the framework for 
decision-making for the premature neonate, it does became a balancing act.  Decisions regarding 
medically futile treatment often requires a balance between a physician’s paternalistic role and 
the autonomous role of the parents.  Regardless of whether physicians or parents decide, 
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decisions surrounding the premature neonate are often very difficult with emotions and guilt 
seeming at times unbearable.  Whereas, the ethics of justice and the ethics of care can seem to be 
in conflict, they can also be complimentary.  Following is a discussion of the principles and 
values of paternalism versus autonomy as well as the ethics of justice versus the ethics of care. 
        3.III.B.1.  Paternalism versus Autonomy 
        The NICU is different from other health care situations in that the patient is a newborn who 
cannot make decisions leaving the parents as the surrogate decision makers. The parents have no  
prior relationship with this newborn, except the mother has carried it in her womb with both 
parents having anticipated its arrival, and now they have to make life/death decisions regarding 
its future.  There is no such thing as “parental autonomy” as autonomy means “self-rule” and it is  
impossible to have “self-rule” over another, especially a child.89  It is possible to have “parental 
authority”, but this does not provide as much conclusion as autonomy.90 
       The first decision that most often needs to be made relates to whether to treat the newborn or 
not and is most often made in the delivery room.91  There are definite limitations as to what the 
parents could know at this point, therefore, they must be given facts from the physician to 
consider in order to make a moral judgment decision.  Initial decisions in the delivery room are 
most often weight related.  Babies weighing more than 750 grams with at least 25 weeks 
gestation have an 80% chance of survival.92  Whereas, those less than 400 grams and 22 to 25 
weeks gestation rarely survive with those considered being in a “grey zone”.93 These facts may 
or may not be influenced by the physician’s personal bias.  Physicians may include or exclude 
data in order to support their recommendation.94  Research indicates that parental desire for 
treatment and resuscitation will be followed more readily than the request for limited treatment, 
with only 10% to13% of deaths being initiated by demands of the parents.95 
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        The degree of autonomous decision making by the parents varies with the urgency of the 
 infant’s condition, the physician’s perception of the situation, and the parent’s tolerance, as well 
as their ability to make decisions.96  In any given situation, the parents can have opposite views.  
One being that they were glad to have had the ability to make the decisions.  The other being that 
the physician needs to make these decisions because the parents are too stressed to do so.97  Even  
if parents do not make the final decision, they still wish to be consulted, informed, heard, and 
included in the decision making process concerning their newborn.98 
       After the decision is made to treat or not treat, the second decision involves the withdrawal 
of treatment.  The withdrawal of treatment is most often in cases where continued treatment is 
concerning futility in that it prolongs suffering, as well as the process of dying, with no apparent 
benefit.99  The role of “parental autonomy” in these end-of-life decisions is dependent on how 
much the physician permits the autonomy to exist and play a definite role in the ultimate 
decision.100  It comes down to how the information is presented to the parents, or a “beneficent 
paternalism”, where the physician, in order to do good, takes the responsibility for the difficult 
decision.101   
       In the United States, paternalism has taken on a negative connotation, which is not the case 
in all countries, such as France, where it is expected that physicians will make all the decisions in 
the NICU.102  Even in France with this paternalistic model, the parents are asked for their 
opinions as well as to assent to treatment decisions.103  Physicians in the United States tend to 
limit parent’s choices or decisions even though the model is considered one of autonomy, plus 
parents never have the exclusive authority to refuse treatment for their neonate.104  Therefore, 
decision making in the NICU may not be a true autonomy model.  Regardless of the decision  
maker, ethics is complex in that it is comprised of rules, principles, decisions, and reasoning  
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which depend on best judgment for the given situation. 
        3.III.B.2.  Principles---Ethics of Justice versus Ethics of Care 
        At the center of all values and principles, using a personalist view, is the human dignity of 
the individual which supports respect for autonomy, quality of life, social justice, plus 
beneficence and non-maleficence.105   Human dignity does not diminish with illness or disability  
and cannot be taken from an individual as long as they are living.106  A loss of human dignity can  
never be a reason to withhold or withdraw treatment. 
       Respect for autonomy in the neonate involves decisions based on outcomes or prognosis.   
This is achieved through the best interest standard.  Naysayers believe the best interest standard  
is more representative of the decision maker than the one for whom the decision is being made 
that is influenced by personal, religious, moral and legal domains.107 
       A value that requires balancing and that plays a major role in decision making for the 
neonate is the quality of life.  Often the quality of life value is used when making decisions 
regarding the neonate, whether that be to resuscitate or not resuscitate as well as to withhold or 
withdraw treatment.  It is not the parents’ or physicians’ role to determine a third person’s 
quality of life.  However, it is in their decision making process to determine the extent of 
treatment, whether the treatment is futile, in that it is of no benefit to the neonate, with the 
burdens outweighing the benefits.108 
        The ethical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are ever present in health care 
doing good to minimize pain and suffering, which is balanced by avoiding harm.  Medical 
futility is often present when the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence are at a juncture 
with the use of futility being justification for stopping treatment.109  Instead of using 
futility, as experts agree its use is too vague and violates beneficence, statistically based   
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outcomes is the proposed data of choice.110    
        Justice and care are values that have been identified as alternative approaches to ethical 
problems.111  When examining the ethics of justice, it can seem to conflict with the ethics 
of care.  The ethics of justice makes reference to that which is fair and equal for all where the 
needs of others are considered objectively regardless of the relationships.112  Whereas, ethics of 
care relates to empathy, and compassion by considering a particular patient in a particular 
situation with particular needs.113  Characteristics of the ethics of justice include objectivity, 
fairness, decisions based on rules, equality, autonomy, and positive rationality.114  The defining 
characteristics of the ethics of care are involvement, holistic care, harmonious relationships, and 
trust.115  Although the ethics of justice and the ethics of care can appear as opposites, they can 
also be complementary.116  
        Some authors have posited that justice and care cannot and should not be separated as they 
are always in “tandem” with each other.117   Others hold that they are indeed separate with 
significant differences and, therefore, should be kept separate.  A middle ground describes a 
comprehensive theory that incorporates the wisdom of both ethics of justice and ethics of care 
keeping both of their strengths and identities, plus what they contribute to the whole.118  To 
balance the ethics of justice with the ethics of care is a major challenge in the NICU.  Nowhere is 
the challenge felt greater than with the nurses who want to give the personal and individualized 
care for each infant while maintaining the equal concern for all the infants in the NICU.119   A 
struggle can also occur when treatment becomes futile for the neonate, yet, the nurse has become 
so attached to not only the infant, but also the family, that it becomes difficult to be objective to 
enable a fair (justice) and rational decision process while maintaining a relationship of trust 
(care).  It is a balancing act that challenges all of health care. 
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        To treat or not to treat at the end-of-life in neonates is one of the many ethical decisions that 
faces new parents as well as health care professionals.  The next section addresses the ethical 
dilemma regarding end-of-life in severely premature and critically ill neonates.  Suffering in the 
neonate will be discussed to include pain, euthanasia and the Groningen Protocol.  A description 
of the cost concerns regarding NICU treatment will be presented followed by perspectives on 
medical innovations for the neonatal population. 
 
3.IV.  Ethical Dilemmas in Neonatology 
          Looking back at the 1960’s, a neonate less than 1000 grams had a 95% risk of death, while 
today the same neonate at 1000 grams has a 95% chance of survival.120  This change, some call 
progress, has not been without its costs, not only in dollars but also in pain, suffering and, in 
some cases, long term disability.  These medical advances, or innovations, have also created 
ethical dilemmas that are often far-reaching beyond the immediate effect on the neonate.   
3.IV.A.  Futile Treatment and Suffering 
       Miracles still happen in medicine and nowhere does this seem more evident than in the 
NICU.  Neonates are surviving at smaller weights and gestational ages with each passing 
moment, however, it is not always clear, or is there agreement between neonatologists and 
parents, when continued treatment has become futile.   
        A great deal of speculation has been discussed and written about unbearable suffering of the 
newborn.  Two identified problems come from these discussions.  The first is that suffering is 
abstract, subjective, and personal which makes it difficult to identify in the neonate, yet, it is the 
one greatest human opponent the health care system was developed to “combat”.121  The second 
is the concern with identifying future suffering for the neonate which can range from chronic  
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pain to the inability to participate in self-care.122  Because suffering in the neonate cannot be  
assured or predicted, does not mean that suffering does not exist.  One way that suffering is  
assessed is through pain assessment.  If pain is determined to be present, it is then treated.  There 
are additional approaches to intractable suffering ranging from palliative sedation to euthanasia. 
        3.IV.A.1.  Role of Pain and Its Treatment  
        The issue of medical futility in NICUs closely corresponds to those in adult ICUs.  The one 
exception is that, in the past, physicians, in the NICU, often pushed for treatment of the 
extremely low birth weight neonate appearing impervious to pain and suffering of the neonate.123  
In today’s NICU, with the appearance of the neonatologist as a specialized entity, there is less of 
the aggressive treatment at the expense of the suffering neonate.   
        The outcome of the neonate varies widely between NICUs and is dependent on the health of 
the mother along with prenatal care, the particular health needs of the newborn, medical 
resources available at the institution, and the skill level of the providers.124  When providers or 
parents perceive that further treatment is futile offering no benefit to the neonate prolonging 
suffering, a collaborative discussion with a plan of action usually occurs.125  If providers and 
parents are not in agreement the following can offer a hope for solution: 1) ethics committees are 
consulted to assist with the decision making process; 2) occasionally a legal route is taken which 
most often favors the parents; or 3) as the state of Texas has done, a step-by-step policy is 
invoked to address action to be taken.126    
         When the topic concerns futile treatments, that is treatments that are not benefiting the 
infants and may be harming them, physicians cannot be required to provide treatment that is in 
conflict with their conscience.127  However, physicians find it difficult to set standards and draw  
the line, especially when pressured by parents, court judges, insurance companies, or government 
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regulators.  If physicians do not draw the line, they cannot expect others to do so for them.128   
        Since pain is one of the ways to determine suffering in the neonate, a means to assess its 
 presence is needed.  Pain scales for newborns involve non-verbal cues such as facial expressions 
involving the brow, nose, eyelids, lips, and tongue, plus full body movements.129  Heart rate may 
initially slow then increase with pain.130  Respiratory rate changes are not consistent with some 
studies indicating a slowed rate after a painful stimulus and some revealing an increased rate.131   
Non-verbal or vocal expression, such as crying, is not possible when the neonate is on the 
ventilator.   
        Even with basic assessment tools and an urgency to address neonates’ unmet pain needs, 
there are several disputes that make true pain assessment a challenge.  These include the 
following:  1) over 40 assessment tools are available with not an identified best practice; 2) 
premature neonates are given an average of 2 to 14 painful procedures daily; 3) the 
neurodevelopment of the fetus by the 20th week gestation has the ascending pathway to the brain 
developed to conduct pain, however, the descending pathway that helps to inhibit incoming pain 
does not fully develop until the third trimester (28th to 40th gestational week).  This increases the 
premature neonates’ sensitivity to pain; 4) the best indicator for pain in the premature neonate 
varies by gestational age; and 5) as with full term infants, but moreso with the premature infant, 
it is difficult to differentiate pain from distress, anxiety, agitation, or hunger.132  Hope for the 
future includes electroencephalography and neuroimaging approaches that measure 
somatosensory and frontal cortex activity that occurs with pain.133 
        In the highly technological environment of the NICU, nurses report that it is common to 
have the intense treatment take priority over addressing the neonates’ pain and discomfort.134  
The ”routine” care of a NICU neonate involves such painful procedures as frequent heel sticks 
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for blood samples, chest tube insertions, intubation with mechanical ventilation, peripheral and 
central line insertion, and lumbar punctures.135  It has been documented that premature infants 
show an increased sensitivity to pain when compared with full term infants, however, the 
significance of this has not been determined but studies are in progress.136  Other factors related 
to premature newborns, indicate that since their physiological systems are underdeveloped, this 
may make them more susceptible to negative effects from the following:  1) long term opiates for  
pain control; 2) repetitive painful procedures, such as needle sticks plus routine handling; and 3)  
too little internal steroids, which may adversely affect blood pressure and perfusion, to too much 
being administered, which may disturb brain pathway development.137         
       In deliberating future suffering, disabilities are the major concern.  Professor John Harris, a 
noted bioethicist and philosopher, has taken the position that to prevent a disabled child’s birth is 
to prevent needless suffering which is, therefore, desirable.138  Counter positions have come back 
with the premise that not all disabled individuals are suffering, they may be “harmed” in some 
way, but can lead happy productive lives and may suffer less than the non-disabled individual.139 
       3.IV.A.2.  Approaches to Intractable Suffering 
       For neonates who are experiencing “intractable” suffering, the treatment can be taken from 
four approaches.  These are:  1) to make no decision other than make the neonate as comfortable 
as possible; 2) to withhold treatment which can be hydration, nutrition and medications, such as 
antibiotics.  This approach is supported by the American Academy of Pediatrics but is 
controversial and nurses, in particular, have a difficult time withholding feeding from newborns; 
3) to increase sedation, often in combination with #1 and #2, as a form of “palliative or terminal 
sedation”.  This is also controversial in neonates.  The goal is often ambiguous as to whether it is  
to reduce pain and suffering or hasten death; and 4) to deliberately administer lethal doses or 
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lethal types of medications which is only legal in the Netherlands.140   
       Euthanasia became legal in the Netherlands for adults and those over 12 years of age, in 
2002, but did not become legal for neonates until the Groningen Protocol was introduced in 
2005.141  The Groningen Protocol, developed by Dr. Verhagen, came about after a personal 
experience with an infant who had a rare disease that involved skin sloughing causing intense 
pain and suffering.142  The family begged for an end to their child’s suffering, but fearing legal 
action, Dr. Verhagen sent the child home to die with the realization he had prolonged the  
suffering.143  This incentivized him to become an advocate for neonatal euthanasia and to 
develop the protocol.  
         In order to utilize this protocol, five requirements must be met.  These are:  1) the diagnosis 
and prognosis must be accurate and hopeless; 2) the baby must be experiencing unbearable 
suffering despite medical efforts to relieve the suffering; 3) an individual third party physician 
must agree with the diagnosis and prognosis; 4) informed consent must be given by both parents; 
and 5) euthanasia must be accomplished via appropriate medical standards.144  The deaths using 
this protocol are to be reported through a central reporting process.  The Groningen Protocol is 
mostly used with a spina bifida diagnosis, which can be diagnosed in utero leading to an 
abortion, which is believed to explain the low numbers using the protocol of 20/year.145   
        Even though the United States has no such protocol, medications are often given at the end-
of-life, following withdrawal of treatment, in doses to manage symptoms that also hasten death, 
although this may not be the intent, using the principle of double effect.146  To utilize the double 
effect principle, where there is one action with two possible effects—one good (intended) and 
one bad (unintended) the following parameters must be met:  1) the goal of the action must be 
good; 2) the intended effect is not achieved by the unintended or harmful effect; 3) the  
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unintended effect is only permitted, not intended; 4) there is no alternate means to achieve the 
good effect; 5) there is a proportionately valid reason for tolerating the unintended effect.147   
        Analgesics and anxiolytics are frequently used for medications, but muscle relaxants are 
also used which lend the infant unable to breathe paralyzing the respiratory muscles.148  The 
muscle relaxants stop the infant gasping allowing the parents to hold the infant more easily 
giving the appearance of a “peaceful death”.  Such action is justified as relieving pain and 
suffering for the infant and not to end life.149 
        The majority of deaths in a NICU occur after withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment, especially mechanical ventilation.150  At this time, the neonate’s best interests are key 
with communication and shared decision making being imperative.  The approaches used and 
their differences are “subtle”.  When mechanical ventilation is withdrawn, the palliative or  
terminal sedation often resembles euthanasia.151   Therefore, these decisions should not be taken 
too casually or thoughtlessly as there is a potential to cross the ethical/moral boundary.  
       Studies in the United States indicate that opioids are most often the type of medications used 
in neonates at the end-of-life.  Neonates with congenital anomalies or chromosomal 
abnormalities, as well as those with necrotizing enterocolitis, are more apt to receive the 
analgesics than neonates with other diagnoses.152   A bigger factor in opioid administration in 
neonates is related to the physicians’ experience and attitudes regarding pain and death.153  A 
study in Belgium of the neonatal deaths, over a year’s time, revealed that of the 292 deaths, 30% 
had been given drugs to hasten death of which most were high dose opioids with 30% also being 
given muscle relaxants and 18% received potassium chloride.154  Even with this data, neonatal 
euthanasia is not legal in Belgium and many physicians denied giving medications to hasten 
death, yet, the high dosages indicate otherwise.155 
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        The field of neonatology has seen medical advances with technology and pharmaceuticals 
that have made it possible for this smallest of the human population to survive at smaller weights 
and younger gestational weights.  The next section addresses the medical innovations asking the 
question as to whether they are a miracle or a curse. 
3.IV.B.  Medical Innovations---Miracle or Curse 
        From the 17th century to the med 20th century most of the advances in neonatal care 
centered on nursing care.  These included keeping the infant warm, feeding them sterilized 
formula or breast milk as the science changed, and infection control practices including isolation.  
It was in the 20th century, that actual medical advances came into use which led to great strides in 
neonatal treatment.  Some see these medical innovations as true miracles saving lives that used to 
not be saved.  Others have wondered if the innovations are more of a curse in that it has saved 
lives but at the same time brought misfortune to some of these lives and to their families as well. 
To provide intensive care to a critically ill neonate, especially for one born premature in which 
case that care can go on for months, is costly.  This cost does not even address long term costs, if 
needed, for any morbidities or disabilities that may be present after the infant leaves the NICU 
and, in some cases, the cost burden is for the rest of the infant’s life.  Following is a discussion of 
the medical innovations and the costs of care to the critically ill neonate. 
       3.IV.B.1.  Medical Advances and the “Grey Zone” 
        Since the invention of the mechanical ventilator and discovery of antibiotics, some of the 
major advances in neonatal treatment have been surfactant, extra corporeal membrane 
oxygenation (ECMO), as well as improved antenatal screening with the use of antenatal 
steroids.156  These advances have greatly affected the mortality of premature neonates.  In a 
study of 46 Level III NICUs, the primary causes of death were prematurity (14%), sepsis (12%), 
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bowel disorders (11%), under developed lungs (9.5%), intracranial hemorrhage (9.4%), 
respiratory distress syndrome (8%), with anomalies and genetic defects at 7.6% and 5% plus 
heart defects were only 3.4%.157  In this same study, 86% of the deaths were of infants less than 
37 weeks gestation and 36 % were less than 25 weeks gestation.158 
       In spite of all the advances, the United States still ranks 26th among developed countries in 
infant mortality rates at 6.1 deaths/1000 live births.159  These statistics include a higher percent  
of premature births than any other country, as well as more term birth deaths from SIDS, 
drownings, and birth defects.160  Infant mortality rates are of value because they reflect the health 
of the nation, access to health care, as well as socio-economic conditions and public health 
practices.161 
       With the tools of medicine and the various advances at hand, the physician has to make 
difficult decisions or recommendation to parents to assist them with difficult decisions as to 
whether to treat or not treat premature neonates.  These decisions begin in the delivery room and 
from there progress to the NICU.  The issue has two conflicting ethical perspectives.  The first 
holds that life is a gift from God with its own intrinsic value and anything that would hasten, 
expedite, or allow the neonates’ death would be unethical.162  The second contemplates the 
“quality of life” with its benefits and burdens considering when life lacks particular qualities of 
human life that cannot be possible, then palliative care is the best option.163  Some health care 
facilities have addressed the ambiguity related to treat or not to treat with policies that are well 
known by the staff and are made known to expectant parents.  The policy provides care on a 
continuum based on gestational age.  Such a policy provides comfort care at 22 to 23 weeks 
gestational age, parental choice at 24 weeks, and NICU treatment at greater than 25 weeks.164  
The 22 to 25 week gestational age range is often referred to as the “grey zone” of discretionary 
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resuscitation.165  This “grey zone” has changed over time and can differ between facilities, 
physicians, and countries making it the time for the most difficult ethical dilemmas.166  Spelling 
out the policy and the rationale behind it has demonstrated that the majority of parents select 
palliative care for neonates who are less than 26 weeks gestation.  Having such guidelines, 
although not mandatory, provide frightened and stressed parents with the help they need in 
decision making.  Parents indicate that they do not fear death as much as they do disability in 
their neonates and also fear that overtreatment will lead to increased disability.167  When  
premature births are expected, prenatal consultations can help develop a trusting relationship that  
is conducive to decision making regarding the neonate later after delivery.168 
       Withholding and withdrawing treatment, although ethically considered equal, are still seen 
as different by many parents, some religions, and even some health care providers.169 
Withholding treatment tends to happen in the delivery room where resuscitation and treatment is 
not done.  Withholding is usually considered in the following instances:  1) extremely low birth 
weight or gestational age—less than 22 to 24 weeks gestation; 2) infants with expected shortened 
survival, such as anencephaly; 3) infants with trisomy 13—which have severe intellectual 
disabilities and physical abnormalities; or 4) infants with long term fatal prognosis, such as 
paralysis or intracranial hemorrhage.170  As these categories are considered, so are gender, as 
girls fare better than boys, whether single or multiple births with single births faring better, and if 
the mother had had antenatal steroids, as these infants do better. 171 
       Some physician practices include an approach of intensive care for all where there is at least 
a trial period, unless there is a strong probability of non-survival.172  The trial period involves 
aggressive treatment with frequent evaluations and collaboration between health care providers 
and the parents.  When the care only prolongs the dying, is futile not benefiting the infant, or 
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inhumane, or the infant is irreversibly comatose, then treatment can be withdrawn except 
nutrition, hydration and pain medication must continue.173  Futility as a reason to withdraw care 
is very subjective.  It is better framed within a goal that addresses the parents’ moral structure 
and evidence based outcomes.174 
       Neonatologists and Level III nurseries have done much for neonates’ survival.  This is not 
available to all areas of the nation.  However, these centers not only help prevent premature 
births, but can impact further expenditures in treating them.  Efforts can best be used to focus on 
the following:  1) regionalizing NICU care so there is the most efficient and effective care 
available for all; 2) increasing research on outcomes regarding premature births focusing on 
prevention; and 3) increasing the use of case management by the health care providers, 
neonatologists, perinatologists and neonatal nurses, utilizing palliative care as well as outpatient 
services that best assist those children with disabilities.175  
        3.IV.B.2.  Ethics versus Economics 
        Medical advances have done much in improving the survival rate of premature infants.  Of 
the approximately four million births per year, 15% or approximately 500,000 are born 
premature, defined as less than 37 weeks gestational age, with 5%, or 25,000, of these weighing 
less than two pounds, of which 75%, or approximately 19,000, will survive.176  Of those admitted 
to the NICU, 75% are due to prematurity with the remaining 25% due to other diseases of the 
newborn.177  
       There is no question that care in the NICU is expensive.  Some critics have said the care is 
too expensive, not only for the individual neonate, but also for society as a whole when much of 
the care is futile.  Studies have been done to refute these critics by finding that approximately 6% 
of NICU costs are spent on non-survivors and when this is adjusted to money spent after 
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prediction of death is considered, only 4.5% is spent on what could be termed futile treatment.178  
Cost for the extremely low birth weight premature neonate is the most expensive and would be 
inexpensive if there were no NICUs as death would occur with it.  The estimated cost of saving 
the life of a low birth weight (1500 gram) neonate is estimated between $635,000---$1,000,000 
in 2015 dollars.179  The length of stay in the NICU is usually until the infant is at least 37 weeks, 
provided the infant is improving, which means that for a 23 week gestational age neonate, a 
minimum length of stay would be 14 weeks.180 
        Additional costs are incurred with complications.  The primary complications of premature 
births are respiratory distress syndrome, seen in 23% of neonates with an average cost of 
$65,000; intracranial hemorrhage, seen in approximately 5% but adds approximately $76,000 
and is an ominous diagnosis; and necrotizing enterocolitis only seen in approximately 23%, but 
is costly at an additional $100,000 with a high mortality rate, and sepsis.181 
       Some NICUs have implemented policies regarding discretionary resuscitation which does 
not resuscitate those at 23 weeks or less, offers resuscitation as an option at 24 weeks and 
encourages it at 25 weeks.182  Discretionary resuscitation is also used when neurologic 
impairment is believed to be significant and if the neonates were to live with these impairments, 
they contribute to 5%-50% of all NICU deaths.183  Discretionary resuscitation is not made based 
on gender, even though girl neonates have a better survival rate than boys, however, in some 
cultures there is less interest in NICU for female infants.184  Discretionary resuscitation policies 
impact individual NICU survival statistics.  They can also increase the racial disparity in preterm 
births as African American women have a 2-3 fold greater risk of a premature birth than white 
non-Hispanic women for reasons that are yet to be proven.185 
       The question still remains as to whether the costs generated by NICUs are outweighed by the 
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benefits.  The costs that often are not always addressed in the beginning of the neonates’ life are 
related to the ongoing medical, social, and educational needs of the premature newborn that may 
continue throughout their lives.  The most catastrophic disabilities that can occur are blindness, 
deafness, as well as cerebral palsy, while milder disabilities are attention deficit disorder, asthma, 
mental retardation, mild cerebral palsy, and educational needs of various degrees occurring in 
40% of those less than 26 weeks gestation.186  Overall NICU graduates need repeated 
hospitalizations and special education services nine times more than a full term infant with 
special education costs associated with low birth weight neonates estimated at $700 to $900 
million per year in 2015 dollars.187 Although the rate of survival has improved, the short and 
long term outcomes have not seen the same improvement with those neonates born less than 26 
weeks gestation having a 25% chance of incurring a disability so severe that they will never 
function independently.188   
       Of the total health care expenditures in the United States, NICU accounts for approximately 
1 to 2% of that total, which may seem small, but is approximately $30 billion with rapid 
changing technology and pharmaceuticals accounting for the majority of these costs.189  Even 
with these monumental costs, the NICU is the most cost effective of all critical care units and has 
been more closely scrutinized than that of the adult critical care units.  In NICU, 6% of costs 
relate to those who will not survive or are receiving futile treatment, while adult ICU has 40% of 
its costs going to the same category.190  The ethical decision is whether neonatal intensive care 
should be limited only to those predicted to benefit, because of the high cost associated with the 
care, which does not seem relevant or significant.  Withholding treatment to those less than 600 
grams equals a savings of 3.2% and would decrease the number of survivors by approximately 
575.191  However, if the trend continues to resuscitate smaller neonates, the financial impact  
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could continue to increase and have a greater impact vying for the already stretched health care  
dollar, as well as present ethical concerns. 
        In the high stress environment of the NICU, where a collaborative decision making model 
between health care providers and parents is the ideal, there is often a conflict among and 
between the various roles.  In the middle is the incapacitated and incompetent newborn whose 
life hangs in the balance of many of the decisions being made.  The next section describes the 
influence of the roles of the parents as well as the professionals with a focused look at the nurse  
and physician roles and how they are similar but different.  A closer look will be taken regarding 
the conflict that inherently occurs among and between the roles.    
 
3.V.  Influence of Roles 
        There is value in paying attention to the needs of the parents, as well as the professionals, in 
 the NICU environment, so as to facilitate ethical decision making regarding the neonate.  As the 
care of neonates has evolved over the past century, the role of parents has become more involved 
and the impact on the infant’s development has been significant.192  This change has been a 
challenge for the physicians and nurses as they have had to give up some of their control to the 
parents.  Through all this change, it is the neonate at the center that must be the focus and the 
reason to collaborate and manage the conflict that inevitably results in a stressful environment, 
such as the NICU. 
3.V.A.  Major Role Differentiation  
        The major roles that exist in the NICU, parent, nurse, and physician, can be viewed as  
partners with each having a part to play and, although the roles overlap, there is still unique  
responsibilities performed by each of the roles.  The family-centered care movement that has 
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become a standard of care for NICU’s, not only in the United States, but also in Europe, has  
helped in increasing parents’ confidence level in parenting, as well as staff receptivity of parents’  
increased involvement in their infant’s care.193   
        3.V.A.1.  Parental/Surrogate Roles 
        The parental role in the care of neonates has evolved over the years.  Dating back to the late 
1800’s, it was noted that mothers who did not participate in the care of the premature or sick 
newborn often abandoned them.194   A “hands off” philosophy for parents with their newborns 
was present as care switched from home to hospital deliveries with a segregation of mothers into 
rooms or wards and babies into nurseries.  It was also at this time when bottle feeding was 
encouraged over breast feeding as formula companies came into business.  This all changed in 
the 1940’s to 1950’s with the advent of rooming-in where the infants stayed with their mothers in 
their hospital rooms yielding less infections as strict rules of separation went away encouraging 
parental involvement with their newborns.195  Today family centered care is the preferred model 
where families are encouraged to be a part of the infants’ care to include that in the NICU.196 
        The role and experience in the NICU, as perceived by the mother and father, is different.  
The mother feels powerless with a strong need to reclaim her relationship with the newborn, 
while the father can experience shock at first seeing a premature or ill newborn then sees an 
opportunity for a beginning new connection with the newborn.197  Fathers struggle with bonding 
more than mothers because of the infants’ “fragility”, plus as mothers portray stress and sadness, 
the fathers tend to focus on them.198   The fathers are the ones who benefit the most from the        
clinical updates and the medical information which they use in making end-of-life decisions  
as the more fact finding parent in the process.199  By developing supportive interventions for the 
fathers early in the postpartum period, the fathers’ stress can be reduced and their fathering 
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ability can be empowered significantly.200 
        Attachment theory stresses several key factors.  These are the importance of the first six 
months of life plus the role the first hour after birth plays; the connection between child and 
caregiver for emotional as well as psychological development; and that this attachment begins in 
pregnancy increasing during the nine months.201  With premature or sick neonates, this 
attachment can be delayed or in some cases not even happen if steps are not taken to help ensure 
that it takes place.  The staff always has to be concerned with the neonates’ safety, but as soon as 
possible the parents should be encouraged and instructed on how to touch and hold their infant.  
One way to enhance touching and bonding is by placing the naked infant on the parent’s bare 
chest, known as kangaroo mother care (KMC), which has shown to benefit both infant and 
parents.202 
        There are mixed views on the extent of involvement of parents in end-of-life decisions.   
This variant view is primarily based on perspective.  Most all parents and health care 
professionals agree that decisions should be made as a collaborative effort between parents and 
the providers.203  However, that involvement in the decision making is perceived differently by 
the different parties involved.  When parents are asked by physicians whether to proceed with a 
decision, such as to withdraw treatment including mechanical ventilation, the physicians believe 
the parents were part of that decision, but the parents may see this as only approval, which is not 
the same as making the decision.204  A shared decision model has the following elements: 1) both 
physicians and parents are participants; 2) both physicians and parents share information and are 
free to ask questions; and 3) both parties move toward a consensus for the decision.205  This may 
come down to more of a process than what is actually decided.   
        There is agreement that the withdrawal of treatment should never be one party’s decision as 
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the guilt falls to the party making the decision and can be haunting over time.206  It has been 
shown that it is easier for parents to make end-of-life decisions in the delivery room than in the 
NICU after emotional bonds with the infant have been formed.207  Other influences that impact 
the parents’ decision making ability regarding their infant include support from family and 
friends, cultural plus religious beliefs, maturity of the parents, and the relationship with health 
care professionals.208 
        Just as the parents fill the role of caregivers to their newborn, as well as shared decision 
makers, the health care professionals also have roles to fill.  The nurses and physicians are the 
two most prominent roles that interact, not only with each other, but also with the newborn and 
the parents in the NICU.  Following is a discussion on their roles, as well as how their roles are 
similar, yet different, and how they contribute to the end-of-life decisions as well as ethical 
dilemmas in the NICU.  
        3.V.A.2.  Professional Roles---Nurse versus Physician 
        Many have believed for a long time that nurses and physicians not only had different roles, 
but also were different in their ethical analysis and reasoning which could be seen at play in a 
NICU.  The nurse’s role was perceived as “caring” and the physician’s as “curing” where 
physicians made decisions, then wrote orders to be followed by the nurses, who lived with these 
decisions obligated to carry them out as written.209  On closer look, the differences were not as 
great as first perceived.  Both nurses and physicians had the same moral duty to minimize 
suffering and “do the right thing” with both experiencing end-of-life decisions as the top ethical 
struggle.210  
       In the ethical struggle at the end-of-life, both nurses and physicians experienced similar 
conflicts for different reasons.  First in the area of values that were in conflict, the nurses were 
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apt to see the physicians acting on their own values versus the patient’s, whereas, the physicians 
often saw the parents acting in their own best interest rather than the patient’s.   Second, in the 
area of limited resources, nurses felt this in staffing cutbacks or shortages while physicians saw it 
as triaging patients for critical care based on those most apt to survive.  Finally, in the area of 
institutional hierarchy, nurses believed they were not being heard or having an impact on patient 
care decisions and physicians felt pressure to monitor resource utilization while balancing  
demanding parents.211 
        The differences in nurses and physicians can be traced to their role responsibilities; the 
status and authority that their individual roles give them; gender, although more males are 
entering nursing with more females becoming physicians, gender differentiation blending has yet 
to be seen; and culture differences seen in the training as well as the workplace.212  Other 
differences are that nurses often feel they are limited by physicians to speak their beliefs or act 
on them, while physicians did not feel this restriction from nurses.  When nurses do risk speaking 
out, especially in the area where they believe the neonate is suffering and decisions need to be 
made regarding withdrawing care, it is not always well received by physicians.213 
       Nurses and physicians in their roles are both concerned with what choice of action to take or 
is being taken in relation to the neonates.  These concerns are especially true in the extremely 
low birth weight neonates where there is the “grey zone’ for survival and the choice of action is 
never clear leading to moral conflict in the physician or moral distress in the nurse.214  Moral 
distress, an issue for all of nursing, is when one knows the right thing to do but because of 
institutional limitations the right thing cannot be done.215  Neonatal nurses are especially prone to 
moral distress in the care of the extremely low birth weight newborns because of the uncertainty 
with their survival, plus both the short as well as long term outcomes, leading to a poor quality of   
154 
 
life with numerous disabilities.216  
        Both the nurse and physician perspectives are needed to assist parents in the difficult end-of        
-life decisions.  End-of-life decision making is improved when nurses are present at family 
meetings and case reviews.  The presence of nurses at these discussions helped bring nurses’ and 
physicians’ perspectives to the table to assist parents in making the difficult decisions.217 
       The combination of the parental role along with the professional roles in a small stressful 
environment, such as a NICU, inevitably leads to conflict.  This conflict is more apt to surface 
when the pressure is present to make end-of-life decisions.  The conflict can get to a point where 
it becomes the focus versus coming to a consensus in the decision making process.  Therefore, 
there is value in knowing how to recognize the conflict and manage it so that it serves all those it 
affects without being an obstacle to the task at hand. 
3.V.B.  Role Conflicts 
        The environment in most NICUs is one where communication and compassion surround  
the infant and parents in a team approach where conflict is rare.218  However, each unit should 
have processes in place to recognize signs of conflict with training in conflict resolution. 
       3.V.B.1.  Risk Factors—Parents versus Professionals 
        As NICUs have researched and developed programs and processes for resolving conflicts, 
 some important findings have resulted.  These findings are:  1) end-of-life decisions that 
involved withholding or withdrawing treatment were usually initiated by physicians as they saw 
the poor prognosis before the parents.  However, nurses often saw the prognosis first as they 
perceived the infant’s suffering; 2) conflicts between members of the health care team occurred 
infrequently (4% of cases) and between the parents and medical team more often (12% of cases).  
These conflicts were usually regarding the infant’s neurologic status; and 3) that end-of-life  
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decisions are best put on hold until the conflicts can be resolved through increased 
communication, more frequent meetings and second opinions, if needed.219   
        There is never a way to be sure of what situation or which staff, physician or parent 
interaction will lead to conflict but there are some risk factors that, when present, can give the 
health care providers an alert so as to begin conflict resolution strategies early.  From 
characteristics related to the parents, conflict can be more prone to occur when there are intense 
religious beliefs, different cultures, low educational levels, language barriers, negative medical 
experiences in the past, and discord between parents.220  Whenever the parents feel a lack of trust 
from the providers, whether that be the physicians or nursing staff for whatever reason, conflict 
is most likely to occur.221  Characteristics related to the health care team are such things as poor 
relationships with the parents; not being available to parents or too many different care givers; 
religious beliefs of providers that conflict with parents; or no leadership for the physicians or  
other health care providers.222 
        When anticipating the conflict that may occur in the NICU, especially when end-of-life 
decisions must be made, it is beneficial to understand the sources of the conflict so they can be 
addressed prospectively.  Conflict arises within the family, within the health care team, or 
between the team and the family.  Of these three areas, the one that is most common affecting the 
entire unit, is that which occurs between the team and the family.223  The top four sources of 
conflict between the health care team and the family are the following:  1) communication---this 
can be related to language barriers, inadequate or poor communication from the team, or poor 
comprehension of the prognosis of the neonate by the family; 2) unavailability of family---this 
affects the frequency and ability to keep communications open, in addition, to making timely 
decisions as a collaboration between the family and the health care team; 3) plan of care 
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disagreements---this is most often in relation to end-of-life decisions as they relate to futile 
treatment and withholding or withdrawing further treatment; and 4) emotional issues and poor 
coping on behalf of the parents---this can be expressed as anger, anxiety, depression, or general 
withdrawal from the scene which can be compounded if the parents are very young and part of a 
dysfunctional family who are unable to be supportive.224 
        In spite of knowing the risk factors for conflict, and taking steps to be sure all sides are  
heard with questions answered, conflict may still occur.  Following is a discussion on how to 
anticipate and manage conflict. 
        3.V.B.2.  Conflict Management 
       When conflict does occur in the NICU, it is almost always due to inadequate 
communication.  This communication usually centers on whether to intensify, continue, or 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment for the critically ill neonate.225   A key in managing the 
conflict is understanding the rationale for families to insist on continuing treatment when the 
providers believe it to be futile and misappropriate use of resources.  These rationale include:  1) 
the family not comprehending the poor prognosis.  The solution is to maintain frequent, open 
communication between providers and family; 2) strong religious beliefs that hold for a miracle 
to occur or that only God can take measures to end life.  The remedy is to present facts as well as 
include religious leaders into the discussions, whenever possible; 3) a belief that more can 
always be done, as well as a lack of confidence in the diagnosis and prognosis.  The approach is 
to focus on gaining trust with frequent communication; 4) there is a perceived secondary gain 
from continuing the life-sustaining treatment, such as a mother of a critically ill neonate who 
fears that the father of the infant will leave her if the child dies; and 5) disagreement with the  
significance of the neonate’s condition with its potential outcome and disabilities.  The key here 
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is to understand from the parents’ perspective, and not the providers’ perspective, how the  
parents plan to care for this infant into childhood and possible adulthood.  The parents need all  
facts so a realistic decision can be made.226 
        A means to enhance communication, plus decrease conflict, is through written information, 
whether via e-mail or paper, as a means to address questions, problems, and reinforce important 
points of information.227   Futile treatment is sometimes used in discussions with parents as when 
treatment given to the infant is no longer of benefit.  However, futility is not an absolute term 
and for parents who have struggled to conceive, they do not see any treatment as futile so 
avoiding this term in conversations is recommended.228  Other means to try to expedite decision 
making with parents, when there is conflict, is a lack of trust, such as using the best interest of 
the patient standard, or limited resources (e.g. bed availability for another infant), are also often 
not useful.229  Even if it comes to a point that the parents cannot agree to withdraw life sustaining  
treatment that is futile, ethically and legally it can be withdrawn.230   However, before it comes to  
that, all steps should be taken to assist with a consensus decision. 
       Outside resources that can assist with resolving conflicts include other family members, 
second opinions of physicians, religious leaders and ethics committees.  An ethics committee can 
assist with the uncertainty and conflict in the NICU through policy development, case 
consultation, educational offering, and advisory functions that assist both staff as well as  
parents.231 
       It is vital that institutions support education strategies that address impending disputes 
regarding futility.  Clinicians need practice in these crucial conversations in order to gain the 
necessary skills so when they are faced with a potential futility concern they are skilled in 
minimizing the conflict from families.232  These educational strategies may include role playing,   
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fictional case reviews, and small group meetings to increase open discussion.233  
        The interplay of the various roles affect the end-of-life decision making in all health care 
areas, but is especially evident at the beginning of life where these ethical decisions are most 
difficult.  The next section presents evidence based ethics by first describing the importance of 
communication, the link to all decisions, followed by fundamental questions in the ethics of end-
of-life treatment for neonates. 
 
3.VI.  Evidence Based Ethics Applied to Neonates 
        Evidence based ethics requires the rigorous and discerning utilization of the best evidence 
in making ethical decisions regarding a particular patient in a particular situation.234  Evidence 
based ethics focuses on knowing the patient in great detail, understanding what evidence is in the 
literature regarding the patients’ diagnosis, as well as prognosis, and recognizing ethical issues 
plus the principles at play.235 
        3.VI.A.  Communication as the Link---Language Matters 
        In the process of communication, language does matter.  Not only what is said, but what is 
not said.  Therefore, it is important to communicate frequently, repeating information often, as 
parents with a critically ill infant are experiencing tremendous stress and have problems 
comprehending information.236 Following is a discussion of the parents’, physicians’ and nurses’ 
view on what is valued in communication followed by the best approaches to end-of-life 
discussions. 
        3.VI.A.1.  Parents’, Physicians’, and Nurses’ View   
        All decisions and conflicts are based on communication, either ensuring that it is adequate 
or correcting poor or insufficient communication.  Both health care professionals and parents 
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name communication as key in end-of-life decisions.237  Physicians have identified the following 
ethical concerns in communicating with parents:  1) what to tell---there is so much uncertainty 
that communicating too much negativity can take away hope which leaves parents with nothing; 
2) if the communication is misinterpreted, it can compound the parents’ stress; and 3) to time the 
information appropriately giving the parents adequate time to make end-of-life decisions.238  
With all this second guessing their communication, it is no surprise that some physicians 
withdraw or avoid communication as a way to deal with all the concerns. 
        The parents, as a general rule, request several components to be met in the area of 
 communication.  First of all, the majority of parents want comprehensive, as well as evidence 
based information regarding their neonate, which they will most likely validate via the 
internet.239  These parents also request that this information be given frequently without the 
parents having to probe and interrogate for each answer.240   Parents also prefer a shared decision 
model between the physicians and themselves.   
        Second, just as physicians see the value of hope, so do the parents.  They do not want those 
who communicate with them to be dishonest, but they do want optimism where there might be 
some.241  Third, when parents are involved with end-of-life decisions, these decisions are time-
consuming as well as tedious and may require repeat conversations since parents require more 
time to accept a poor prognosis than the health care team.242  Finally, parents want to be able to 
express their feelings without criticism, if that cannot be done with the nurses and physicians, 
then have another outlet, such as spiritual care or social workers who also participate in the 
patients’ care.243 
       Nursing’s concern with communication is that the parents be given clear, as well as accurate 
information in a timely manner.  Nurses expressed a strong need to be a part of decision making 
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discussions with parents and physicians so they could support and reinforce what has been 
discussed or decided.  Often nurses believe physicians tend to approach parents too late or have 
the end-of-life discussions after the neonate, as well as the parents have been suffering longer 
than the nurses think necessary.244   
        Staff do not always speak up and verbally communicate their disgruntlement or distress but 
 can send out non-verbal cues.  These non-verbal cues include standing away during clinical 
rounds and not engaging in the process; focusing on the clinical signs of the neonate to get  
attention; requesting an expert or a second opinion in hopes this person will help see the 
situation for what it is; discussing with groups of staff their frustrations; and fixating on the 
parents and the lack of information they have received regarding the neonate’s condition when 
they may not be the case.245 
       In the process of communication, language does matter.  Parents should be encouraged to 
name their neonate and all conservations should then focus on that name versus a diagnosis or a 
gestational age, such as the “24 weeker”.246  As language matters, words are, likewise, important 
and parents report that certain terms are more objectionable than others.  Words to avoid include 
“doing everything”, “futile”, “you can have another child”, “there is no hope”, and “there is 
nothing we can do”.247  
        3.VI.A.2.  Approaches to End-of-Life Discussions 
        With the combination of stress, sleep deprivation, anxiety, and potential PTSD, it is difficult 
for the parents to communicate openly or to remember what they have been told.  Suggestions to 
improve communication include:  1) having health care professionals introduce themselves 
repeatedly to parents; 2) hand out business cards to parents and family which state how to  
communicate with providers; 3) inform parents of shift rotations; and 4) inform the parents of 
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opportunities to e-mail or text, if available, so questions can be answered in a timely manner.248  
        Along with improved communication, an opportunity that is all too often missed in the care 
of the critically ill neonate is palliative care.  Adult palliative care programs appeared in the 
United States in the 1980’s but fetal palliative care did not begin until the mid-2000’s.249  The 
majority of deaths in the NICU occur after withdrawal of life sustaining treatment.  These deaths 
occur in one of two phases.  The first is usually in the first 24-96 hours of life as a result of 
extreme prematurity, anomalies or sepsis and the second phase is 3 weeks to 3 months where 
intensive care technology failed as the focus changed from cure to comfort or palliative care.250  
Palliative care is most often involved in the second phase as there is more time for involvement 
prior to the infant’s death, however, there are opportunities to enhance this involvement. 
       The first opportunity revolves around the “uniqueness” of neonatal palliative care.  Palliative 
care is not meant to only be about the end-of-life, but in the NICU, that is when it usually 
happens, so that palliative care becomes involved at the beginning of life which is the end-of-life 
for the neonate.251  The second opportunity is related to communication as well as conflicts 
among providers, especially nurses and physicians.   Physicians struggle to make the final 
decision that it is an end-of-life situation so they may postpone the decisions, while nurses see it 
earlier and become frustrated with the physician. 252   This can lead to a delay in getting 
palliative care involved.  The final opportunity is in the area of administration.  Administrative 
support is needed for a strong neonatal palliative care program.253  In order to get that support, 
clinicians need to identify the need for the program then communicate that need to 
administration.  Finding a champion among both the nursing and medical staff can be helpful in 
this support. 
        The benefits of palliative care to the neonatal population involves both preventing as well as 
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relieving pain and suffering in the neonate, in addition to supporting the family during the dying 
process and after.254  Some best practices for providing that support include:  1) calling the infant 
by name; 2) offering sincere sympathy allowing opportunities for silence when appropriate; 3) 
showing emotion regarding the neonate’s death; 4) providing objects for future memories such as 
pictures, foot prints, a lock of hair etc.; 5) providing information regarding support groups; and 
6) ensuring follow-up with family after discharge to include autopsy results if one is 
performed.255  A comprehensive palliative care program is one that not only deals with the 
neonatal issues after birth but also begins in the perinatal period when there are life threatening  
diagnoses during the pregnancy, follows the mother and neonate during the birth and after the  
neonate’s death.256  Although both neonatal and perinatal palliative care programs are still  
developing, their value has been demonstrated and offer hope for the future for those suffering 
the loss of a newborn.         
        With communication as the link to evidence based ethics and ethical decision making, the 
core fundamental ethical questions can be confronted in relation to end-of-life for the neonate. 
3.VI.B.  Fundamental Questions at End-of-Life 
        Evidence based ethics, unlike evidence based medicine, which focuses on intuition, clinical 
experience, and expert opinion, considers values as well as best interests and preferences of 
patients/surrogates in contemplating treatment decisions.257  The most basic of all questions is if 
continued treatment appears to be futile, is there any obligation to continue and that question gets 
asked with adults as with neonates.  There is no one answer as it varies with each situation.  Of 
the fundamental questions to be asked in the immediate post birth time period, two are discussed 
here.  
        3.VI.B.1.  Resuscitate or Do Not Resuscitate 
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        The first fundamental question that is presented at the moment of birth, is to resuscitate or 
not, which also translates to the utilization of neonatal intensive care.  Birth weight and 
gestational age have been the benchmarks to determine, not only survival but also if the neonate 
will survive with severe disabilities, which may or may not be visible at birth.  Use of the 
concept of futility in the neonate is weak and unjustified, as a strict use of quantitative futility 
would require 100 infants born in the one facility, with the same physical parameters, which is 
difficult to reach due to the low numbers.258  Tyson and Stoll suggest four categories on a 
continuum ranging from unreasonable to mandatory.  Unreasonable is where intensive care 
should not be offered as it would provide no benefit, plus the pain and suffering could be seen as 
a form of child abuse, to mandatory where intensive care would be provided, even if parents 
object, with society having a duty to provide such care. 259  The two categories in between are 
investigational, where it is unlikely that the benefits exceed the burdens, and optional where it is 
not clear that there will be benefit.260  In the United States, Canada and the Netherlands, between 
69% and 93% of all neonatal deaths occur after withholding or withdrawing treatments which is 
done in the NICU.261  These numbers vary greatly within the same country and within the same 
state, as well as city, in the United States which is being attributed to cultural differences in 
addition to physician differences. 
        Since the development of the specialty of neonatology, many advances have occurred that 
have saved lives of premature neonates.  However, in today’s world, the science has advanced 
faster that the ability to know when to stop its progress because the uncertainty associated with 
the potential mental and physical disabilities.262  Parents can often be influenced by the 
physicians in what decisions to make concerning the life and death of their neonate.  Studies  
indicate that the neonatologists’ views regarding hastening death, as well as their personal fear of 
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death, strongly influences how they address resuscitation of a premature neonate.263  The greater  
their fear of death, the more likely they are to hasten death when there is a strong chance the   
neonate will have mental or physical disabilities.264 
        In considering whether to resuscitate or not, the question expands to whether the best 
interest of the neonate should be the only consideration or should the family as well as society 
also be considered.  It is difficult to separate the neonates’ interest from their families when 
considering the future in terms of caring for a disabled child.265  Such a decision as to whether to 
consider the family or not can have a major impact on the family.  If the decision is to consider  
the family, then there is an imperative to justify ethically who else besides the patient is being 
considered, while this is not done in other patients of all ages.266 
        The best interest of society can also be considered.  This includes considering the resources 
needed not only for the prolonged NICU stay, but also for the ongoing care for many of these 
children who have disabilities.267  However, interests of society as the reason to not resuscitate 
will not be ethically justified until it is universal and not only applicable to neonates. 
        3.VI.B.2.  Management of Pain  
        The second fundamental question is related to treating pain in the neonate.  Approximately 
40 years ago the theory was that newborns and, especially premature neonates, lacked the 
anatomical and endocrine development in their nervous system to perceive pain.268  In fact, the 
risks of respiratory depression and hypotension following pain medications were believed to 
outweigh any potential benefits of the pain treatment.269 
       The next age of thinking occurred approximately 10 years later and as a result of research it 
was believed that neonates did feel pain plus under treatment could lead to greater mortality and  
morbidity.270  Furthermore, long term significance of inadequate pain management in neonates 
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 could lead to emotional and learning disorders as well as disabilities.271  
        The 21st century has brought concerns related to pain treatment in the neonate with too 
little having untoward consequences and too much, likewise, having untoward consequences.  
Not only is the amount a concern, but also the drug being used can impact the outcome.  
Research on such a difficult topic is done with animal subjects because of the ethical concerns of 
using neonates in controlled studies.  This adds to the delay in timely results because the animals 
and human findings are not the same, as well as there is variability between critically ill 
neonates.272  Therefore, care for the newborn premature neonate requires a pain plan from birth  
that minimizes painful procedures, utilizes both pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic 
treatment, and assesses the neonate frequently for signs of pain, along with signs of 
overtreatment.273 
        When neonatal pain studies have been performed they are usually completed retrospectively 
looking at what treatment the neonate had in the NICU that affected the status of the child’s 
health in the present day.  One study examined procedural pain, as evidenced by skin breaking 
procedures in preterm neonates of <32 weeks gestational age, and what, if any, affect this had on 
postnatal growth as evidence by weight and head circumference measured at birth, 32 weeks and 
40 weeks.274  The results indicated that there was a correlation between the number of painful 
procedures and growth in that the more pain led to decreased body and head growth.275  What 
affect this might have on the older child is not yet known.    
     What these studies have revealed, as well as clinical observations, is that pain needs to be 
treated.   Not only does pain need to be treated in the premature neonate, the choice of analgesic 
is vital as some can lead to further harm in the neonate.   
        Another study looked at the relationship of pain-related stress in neonates and its effect on 
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visual perceptual abilities and functional brain activity in school age children whose average age 
was seven.  Magnetoencephalography (MEG) was used to measure the brain activity.  The 
results showed a direct correlation in those extremely low gestational age neonates (ELGW <28 
weeks) with cumulative neonatal pain-related stress, showing changes in brain oscillations that 
had a negative effect on visual perceptual abilities.276  An additional finding in this study was 
that morphine, as an analgesic, did not improve associations of pain with functional brain 
activity, an important clinical factor for not choosing morphine as an analgesic.277 A second 
finding was that the changes in the “architecture” of brain oscillations as it pertains to pain-
related stress and visual perceptual abilities is seen in extremely low gestational age (ELGA {27 
weeks or less}) neonates but not in very low gestational age (VLGA {28 to 32 weeks}).278   This 
is thought to be due to the differences in the brain development between the two age groups. 
        Associated with the treatment of pain, or the presence of opioids in the maternal population, 
is the neonatal abstinence syndrome.  This syndrome presents as varied signs and behaviors in 
newborns when there is a sudden withdrawal and discontinuance of the drugs from the mother at 
birth.279  This syndrome is responsible for an increase in NICU admissions since 2004 with 4%-
20% of all NICU days in 2013 being associated with this syndrome.280  Many of the mothers are 
using heroin or methadone as a treatment for opioid addiction which causes the syndrome to 
occur in the neonate.  No specific treatment works for all neonates, however, morphine in 
decreasing doses is most often used to wean the neonate off the drugs.281  Fortunately this 
syndrome is less severe and less prevalent in premature neonates because they are not exposed to 
the drugs for as long a time in utero, there is less fatty tissue for the drugs to accumulate in, there 
is decreased receptor sensitivity as well as development, and the transportation time across the 
placenta is decreased.282 
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        Even when the fundamental ethical questions are addressed to the best of the health care 
providers’ ability, using evidence based ethics, the best answer may be neonatal palliative care. 
When neonatal palliative care is engaged early in the life of the critically ill neonate, its full 
benefit can be realized for the infant as well as the family and health care providers. 
 
3.VII.  Conclusion 
        Since the beginning of neonatal intensive care units, medical futility has been an issue in the 
care of neonates.   Long before there were ethics committees or regulations, such as “Baby Doe”, 
to help guide decisions regarding end-of-life, neonatologists were left to decide which treatments 
were indicated and which were not.  With the passage of time, the medical technology and 
pharmaceuticals available have become more advanced making for endless choices in the way 
care is delivered to the tiniest members of society.  To compound the situation, parental 
autonomy has become increasingly pronounced which has often ended up in a “tug of war” 
between parents and physicians when continued futile treatment is a topic of discussion and 
decision.  An added pressure comes from hospital administration and third party payers to 
control expenses, or at least justify treatment costs, that do not appear to be providing a benefit.  
These societal, ethical and legal mandates too often have left the issue of medical futility 
unresolved. 
        The major ethical concern in caring for premature neonates at end-of-life begins at birth and 
focuses on whether to resuscitate the newborn, which is a decision usually needed in the delivery 
room from parents who are reeling from the shock of a parenthood gone awry.  There is  
also an on-going struggle with considering the best interest standard and keeping in mind whose 
interest it really is—the neonate’s, the parent’s, the health care providers’, or society’s. 
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        From the delivery room, the decisions move to the NICU where withholding and 
withdrawing treatment is decided when the burden seems to exceed the benefit and the question 
of futile treatment becomes paramount.  The concern for futile treatment has become such an 
increasing issue filled with much controversy as premature neonates are now being saved at 
younger gestational ages and smaller weights making the ethical questions resound from many 
sources.   
        In between the two major decision points much work is done to prevent the neonate from 
becoming a victim of the treatment as well as minimizing suffering, without hastening death.  As 
many of the premature infants are “saved’ and survive, the unanswered questions and ethical  
concerns are related to whether this survival came at a cost that will involve a lifetime of  
disabilities that cannot be determined at birth.   
        In the care of the critically ill neonate, much work has been done to include the parents in  
the infant’s care from the beginning.   This inclusion helps with bonding but also builds 
relationships that serve to make the parents participants in the care and decision making 
involving the infant.  Even with the parents involved with decision making in the NICU, the 
decisions are difficult, often prolonged leading to stress, and produce suffering on the part of all 
involved to include the family, providers, and the infant.   
        There is hope for the future for futility and the neonates who are seen to be suffering from 
prolonged dying.   Palliative care, although new to the neonatal world, is that hope for infants, 
parents, and health care providers.  With the goal of managing symptoms and providing support, 
palliative care can help all those involved with the neonate to make difficult decisions that, in 
actuality, do consider the best interest of the patient. 
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  Chapter 4:   Futility and Pediatrics 
 
4.I.  Introduction 
        Children are not just little adults, as they were once thought to be.1  The pediatric 
population, ranging from 1 to 18 years of age, present with diseases and conditions that make 
them unique.  Infants who once died from childbirth, prematurity, or congenital anomalies now 
survive.  Children who used to succumb to an assortment of childhood illnesses, cancer, and 
infections now live due to immunizations, disease prevention, cancer therapies, and antibiotics.  
However, this special age group continues to be plagued by intentional and unintentional 
injuries, AIDS, congenital anomalies, and malignancies providing immense challenges, as well 
as a daunting reminder of health care’s limitations.2  
        The death of a child has an overwhelming and life-altering effect on every member of the 
family, as well as those who provided care to the child.  Although many of the deaths have been 
prevented, there are some that, even with the best of efforts, cannot keep death from having the 
last word.  Because of the devastating impact a child’s death can have, the issue of discussing 
medical futility is often avoided, which can lead to prolonged suffering for the child, the family, 
and all those providing care.   It is not unusual for children to initiate the tough conversation 
concerning end-of-life when they have had enough, triggering a whole set of emotions and 
ethical dilemmas in the family and health care providers. 
        Chapter 4 will address the pediatric population and the unique challenges medical futility 
presents by first looking at it from a historical perspective then lay the groundwork via a 
theoretical framework.  The second part of the chapter examines the role the consent process  
plays looking at evidence based practice, closing with the hope for the future in palliative care. 
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4.II.  Historical Perspective 
        Pediatrics is defined as the study and care of infants, children, as well as adolescents that is 
concerned with, not only all organ systems to include their biological growth, but also the 
environment, social, and political influences on the health and welfare of each individual.3  In 
viewing past history, the young have been regarded as society’s most vulnerable and often most 
disadvantaged.  Because of this view, organizations and governments have intervened to take 
steps in the form of acts, regulations, or declarations meant to serve and protect this vulnerable 
population.  An example is in 1959, when the United Nations issued the Declaration of the 
Rights of the Child, which stated the universal assumption that children have basic rights and 
needs that should to be protected.4   However, even with all the efforts to protect this population, 
they are often not enough to prevent illnesses and catastrophic events from happening. 
        Historically, there are diseases and influences that affect the childhood years.  Many of 
these childhood illnesses and influences present ethical dilemmas that are unique and 
challenging, especially when they cause a pediatric patient to be critically ill.  At the same time, 
there comes instances in caring for the critically ill pediatric patient when further treatment is 
futile, offering no benefit, and at times prolonging suffering.  The next section explores 
childhood illnesses and the ethical challenge of medical futility. 
4.II.A.  Childhood Illnesses 
         Childhood illnesses were primarily infectious diseases, until the early to middle 20th 
century, when they were replaced by childhood chronic illnesses.5  This change came about as a  
result of disease control, immunizations, sanitation, improved living conditions, and access to  
medical care leading to a major improved effect on the mortality of children.6    
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        4.II.A.1.  Change and Its Effect 
         The infants and children that would have died years ago, especially in developed countries, 
 from childbirth complications, prematurity, and congenital anomalies, or birth defects, are now 
surviving.7  Because of all the medical advances and improvements, the childhood infections in 
the United States have been eliminated, in some cases, or minimized in others.8  Despite these 
improved rates, children still die with approximately 3% of the deaths in the United States each 
year being children.9           
        Pediatric critical care is a relatively new field and evolved as the needs of the pediatric 
population intensified, especially related to cardiac surgery and mechanical ventilation.  The first 
pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) was in Sweden in 1955 and in the United States, at 
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, in 1967.10  PICUs spread across the United States in the 
1970’s, but it was not until 1987, that a certification examination was available for the specialty 
of pediatric critical care medicine.11  The journal, Pediatric Critical Care Medicine, began in 
2000.12  There are approximately 337 PICUs in the United States for a total of 4000 beds, which 
is smaller than the estimated 67,000 adult critical care beds and 20,000 neonatal intensive care 
beds.13  Because of the small numbers, most PICUs are found in larger institutions, especially 
those that are associated with universities.  This can present as a hardship for families, with a 
critically ill child, who do not live close to a university or larger institution that has a PICU.  
        Studies that examined the end-of-life support categories prior to death in PICUs, indicated 
that 46% of the time there was a withdrawal of life support; 23% were declared brain dead; 16% 
were a do not resuscitate; limitations of support in 3%; no limitations in 10% and no advance 
directives in 3%.14  Other findings were that African Americans limited treatment less  
frequently, institutions with no trauma centers had lower rates of limitations and that limiting  
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treatments were now more common in the United States than 10 to 15 years ago.15 
        When looking at the health of children from a global view, in 2010, there were 135 million 
births in the world of which 121 million, or 90%, were in developing countries, with India 
having the most at 27.2 million and China the second most at 16.5 million.16  Although many of 
the world problems between developing and developed countries are similar, as the global 
interconnectedness is greater than ever, there are major differences that affect the health of the 
pediatric population.  These include the following disparities:  1) economics; 2) education, 
social, and cultural differences; 3) infectious agents; 4) climate and geography; 5) agricultural 
resources and practices; 6) gene frequencies for some diseases; 7) health and social welfare 
structure; and 8) political stability and forces.17 
        As a result of all the disparities, world leaders came together in 2000 to address them and 
develop goals related to child and maternal health.  These goals were to be met by 2015, called 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), of which four targeted children, with MDG #4 
focusing on a reduction, by two thirds, in mortality for children less than five years of age.18  The 
final data reflects that there has been a decrease from 90 to 48 deaths per 1000 live births in the 
under-five population, (a reduction from 15 to 6 in developed countries and from 99 to 53 in 
developing countries), with all countries reducing by one half, except the sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asian countries.19  Even with the improvements, the goal of two thirds was not met. 
        One thing for certain that has attracted attention, whether that be in developed or developing 
countries, is the influence the environment can have on the health of children, not only helping to 
create the sickness in the first place, but continuing to contribute to it over the lifetime. 
        4.II.A.2.  Environmental Health Hazards 
        Children are exposed to all types of environmental hazards beginning in the womb through 
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adolescence.  The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 8,900,000 children die each 
year from some form of pollution and of these, 94% are in low and middle income countries.20  
For those under the age of five, it is estimated that environmentally related diseases are 
responsible for the deaths of approximately 3,000,000 children in the world every year.21   The 
“basic” risks for environmental exposures are more apt to be found in the developing countries, 
but are also present in many of the Southern states, as well as California.22  The “basic” risks 
include unsafe water, inadequate housing, substandard food preparation, faulty plumbing and 
waste disposal.23  The more “modern” environmental risks are to be found everywhere and 
include man-made or natural materials that can be found in the water, air, soil, and food chain as 
well as global climate change, radiation, or electronic waste.24  Although there are enough 
hazards in the present environment to be sufficient threats to children’s health, the past can come 
back to haunt the environment through contaminants in the soil from past industrial waste.25 
        The environmental hazards that affect childhood illnesses, leading to potential critical 
illness and end-of-life situations are three major categories.  These are asthma, childhood cancers 
and neurodevelopmental disorders.   
        The most common chronic disease found in children is asthma and between 1980-1995 it 
prevalence doubled in the United States.26  The cause for the increase is not known and, although 
the disease can be inherited, the genetic features are most likely not the reason for the increase.  
The most likely reason can be found in the air pollution, such as being exposed to ozone 
combined with an outdoor exercise routine.27  The outdoor pollutants increase in titers in the 
afternoon and when children were studied, based on the amount of time and time of day spent 
outdoors, there was a correlation between the air pollution and lung functional growth, such as  
the more pollution the less growth.28  However, the disease of asthma is not only about outside 
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air pollution, it is also known that indoor pollutants exacerbate it as well.  These include tobacco  
smoke, dust mites, pesticides, exposure to cockroaches, and materials added to plastics, such as  
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) to make them more flexible.29 
        The second most common cause of death to children in the United States, aged 0-19, is 
cancer.  In 2014, there were 15,780 cases of cancer for children ages 0-19 with 1,960 deaths.30  
Between 2003 and 2012 there was a 2% decrease in the number of children’s deaths due to 
cancer, which was not due to a decrease in the incidence, but believed to be because of improved 
diagnosis and treatment.31  The three cancers that are the most prevalent are leukemia, central 
nervous system tumors, and lymphomas with etiologies greatly influenced by environmental 
chemicals, especially while in utero, as well as drug exposure early in life.32  
        The third and final group of conditions, that are believed to be affected by the environment, 
are neurodevelopmental disorders which include attention deficit or hyperactive disorder, autism, 
dyslexia, and mental retardation.33  Approximately 3-8% of the 4,000,000 infants born each year 
in the United States will be affected by one of these disorders with less than 25% of them having 
a known etiology.34  Those with known etiologies are believed to be caused by genetic factors, 
chromosomal anomalies, in utero exposure to drugs of abuse, and untoward events in early life.35  
The etiologies for neurodevelopmental disorders are showing that environmental exposures may 
be responsible for the cause, include exposure to lead, ethyl alcohol, and methyl mercury.36  
Agricultural pesticide exposure during gestation has also shown a relationship to the incidence of 
neurodevelopmental disorders.37  However, with these known relationships, there is still much 
unknown about the 80,000 chemicals registered with the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and of the more than 3000 (1,000,000 pounds) chemicals imported yearly, only  
43% have had a toxicity assessment.38  This leaves many potential unknowns that could be 
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having an impact on society’s children.  
       Children dying was once an expected occurrence as it happened so frequently, however, 
with all the medical advances, this is no longer the case making a child’s death an infrequent and 
life-altering event.  Still futile treatments do occur when treatments are no longer of benefit to 
the child, but it is a difficult topic to discuss making the withholding and withdrawing of 
treatment an arduous decision for both family and health care providers. 
4.II.B.  Medical Futility 
        As in the care of the critically ill adult patient, medically futile treatment decisions must 
also be confronted in the pediatric patient.  The difference between the adult and pediatric futility 
discussions are two-fold, making the dilemmas surrounding medical futility with children 
exceedingly more difficult than adults.39  First, is the profoundly held opinion that somehow 
children should be different and immune from death, or at least until some hypothetical point in 
time or age compounding the ability to make end-of-life decisions.  Second, the uncertainty that 
exists in pediatric illnesses and conditions that makes it difficult to predict the course of the 
disease or its eventual outcome.40  Along with these differences, the patterns of death in the 
pediatric patient are different than the adult and the legal, as well as ethical decision making 
process, has nuances that are unique to this group of patients. 
        4.II.B.1.  Patterns and Views of Death 
        In developed countries, the majority of children’s deaths occur in a hospital and almost 
three quarters of these deaths occur in a critical care unit.41  Of those children who die in critical 
care units, most occur after decisions are made to either withhold or withdraw treatment.42  
Therefore, these deaths are not unexpected and usually follow lengthy courses of treatment 
before an end-of-life decision is made regarding the initiation or continuation of treatment. The  
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ill and dying child elicits such an emotional response that it makes these decisions difficult for  
families and health care providers.43 
       There were 2,626,418 total deaths in the Unites States in 2014, which is an age adjusted rate 
of 724.6 deaths per 100,000 population.44  When examining the break out by age of the 
children’s deaths in 2013, compared with 1980, there has been a significant decrease.   For the 
infants under one year of age, where the most deaths occur, 1980 saw deaths of 1288.3/100,000 
and 2013 was 594.7; ages 1-4 in1980 was 63.9/100,000 and 25.5 in 2013; ages 5-14 was 
30.6/100,000 and 13.0 in 2013; and in the 15-19 age group, which is the second highest after the 
infants, in 1980 was 97.9/100,000 and 44.8 in 2013.45   Total children deaths are less than 3%, or 
approximately 55,000 of the total 2.6 million deaths.46   The top causes of death for those less 
than five years of age, as well as those five to nine, are congenital anomalies, malignancies, 
unintentional injuries, intentional injuries, and influenza.47   For those ages nine to 14 and 15 to 
19, the causes are intentional as well as unintentional injuries, and malignancies.48   
        In contrast, the major causes of death in developing countries, in those less than five years 
of age, are pneumonia, diarrhea, measles, malaria, and malnutrition.49   Developing countries still 
struggle with infectious diseases and conditions that are results of environmental hazards.  In the 
United States from age five to 18, the unintentional injuries are caused by accidents and the 
intentional injuries are from homicides, suicides, plus child abuse.50  It is in adolescence that 
behavior begins to be linked to disease that will go into adulthood and lead to chronic diseases.  
These behaviors include such things as smoking, drinking, diet and exercise.  
        A death of a child is such a lasting sorrow that the fear and sorrow begin with the diagnosis 
and last a lifetime.  Children also develop their understanding and beliefs regarding death from  
their parents and their life experiences, with those who have had a personal experience with 
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death usually having a better understanding of personal mortality.51  When it is the child who is 
dying, it calls into play those understandings and fears.  There are four principal features of death 
understanding that are usually mastered by children between the ages of five and ten.52  These 
include the following:  1) inevitability:  The acceptance that all living things, including oneself, 
eventually die; 2) irreversibility:  Once dead there is no returning back to the living; 3) cessation 
of function or non-functionality:  All bodily functions cease at death; and 4) causality:  Death is 
caused by bodily function breakdown.53   Studies reveal that there is no gender differences in 
understanding death and that once a level of understanding is reached, the fear is reduced but 
tends to return in adolescence.54   This returned fear is thought to be that different factors now 
enter into the fear such as those from the cognitive, social and psychological world.55 
       Children who are critically ill or at the end-of-life from illness, congenital anomalies, or 
injury often are aware of their impending death but do not always initiate any conversation 
regarding the death.56  Parents vary on whether they initiate a death conversation.  In a study of 
430 parents, with children dying from cancer, only 27% talked with the child about death; 25% 
used the word “death”; 22% sensed that their child was aware of the impending death; and 46% 
never sensed that their child was aware of the death.57  Secondary findings were that religious 
parents were more apt to have talked to their children than non-religious, with the religious 
beliefs giving comfort to the children, and that no one regretted talking to their child about death, 
but there were regrets if they had not.58 
       When there comes a time in a child’s critical illness that further treatment offers no benefit, 
it is a time for decisions to be made.  Parents and health care providers may not be in agreement  
as to what decisions to make.  These decisions rarely go the legal route, but they do often raise 
ethical concerns. 
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        4.II.B.2.  Legal and Ethical Decision Making Process 
        The decision making process in pediatrics that distinguishes it from that in the adult realm is  
that there are three parties partaking in the process:  the pediatric patient, the parents, and the 
health care providers.59  The assumption is that the parents have the best interest of the child in 
mind, however it can be a struggle to know the limits of parental decision making authority and 
when to challenge it. 
       There have been times when hospitals and physicians believed the parents were not acting in 
the best interest of the child when medically futile treatment was being provided.  At these times, 
it was not unusual for the legal system to be used in attempt to get assistance with medical 
recommendations.  As a rule, the courts have not favored physicians or hospitals in using their 
authority to usurp parental wishes.60  Even with continued attempts to petition the legal system, it 
has been made very clear in futility cases, in the United States, that it is not going to help 
physicians and hospitals in ending futile treatment.61   In the end, it is the parents who decide any 
futile treatment decisions for the child.  Therefore, it is imperative that open communication 
between parents and health care providers be a focus. 
        The ethical decision making process in pediatrics calls upon ethical theory.  This theory is 
based on the foundation of the three major players where the physician is acting on behalf of the 
child, the parents are acting on behalf of the child, and together the physician and parents act 
together as co-fiduciaries for the benefit of the child.62  The physician only addresses health 
issues, the parents address both health and non-health issues, and as the physician, together with 
the parents, as co-fiduciaries, there are constraints based on professional integrity.63  These 
constraints are that the physician has an obligation to preserve the child’s life when there are  
medical treatments which are expected to prevent loss of the child’s  health and life.64  However,   
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the parents cannot expect the physician to act outside of medical norms or professional integrity.   
In an ideal situation there is on-going communication that allows for free discussion minimizing 
conflict so that joint decisions can be reached. 
        Nurses can be of benefit when they are part of the discussions between parents and 
physicians, as they spend the most time at the bedside with the patient and the patient’s family.  
Studies with nurses in PICUs indicate that caring for critically ill pediatric patients, when parents 
wish to continue aggressive treatment that is futile, affects the nurses with feelings of anger, 
stress, and helplessness.65  Not wishing to take away the last ray of hope, nurses often are quiet 
when they want to speak up to parents and help present realistic goals, if only to plan a good  
death for the patient.66   Therefore, a team approach that includes physicians, nurses, and parents  
can be helpful for all players in caring for a critically ill child. 
        A theoretical framework provides the support for further discussion of futility in the 
pediatric population.   The next section will first discuss moral status with a closer look at the 
rights of the children along with the parental rights.  The second part will take an overall look at 
the family with an examination of the life support decisions that can be presented in the critical 
care unit at the end-of-life. 
 
4.III.  Theoretical Framework 
        As with the newborns, the framework for examining futility in pediatrics is based on the 
moral status of the child and the significance that holds at the various ages from 1 to 18.  There is 
such a wide range of developmental levels in the years that are included in the pediatric 
population that the rights and needs of the children can have a broad variance making it difficult  
to have “one size fits all”. 
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4.III.A.  Determining Moral Status 
       The majority of the moral status of children, as well as adults, comes from recognizing the 
fact that they are persons or human beings which is accompanied by the rights of humans such as 
“life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, etc.”67  Because of this recognition, health care providers must 
be committed to seeing that the children are respected as individuals with full value at each age 
and stage of development.68   This is especially important in the critically ill child who because 
of the illness cannot always have a voice or control any of the care being delivered. The smaller 
the children, the more they are dependent on others, and the more they need others to be sure 
their rights are being protected and their needs met.69 
        Other sources of moral status can be found in roles, such as teacher or laborer etc., reflected 
duties to others, and political power which can affect moral status via different levels in that 
power.70  Of these remaining sources of moral status, children due to their lack of maturity, are 
unable to achieve them until adulthood.71  Not only can children not achieve them, but also 
children at the beginning of life are unable to meet their basic needs or negotiate barriers in 
society to get their needs met.72   
        4.III.A.1.  Children’s Rights 
       Recognizing that humans have rights is a persuasive way of saying they have moral status.73 
Rights have two basic functions, one being to protect the individual and the other is to place 
restrictions on the behavior of the moral agent of the individual.74  Even if there is a universal 
belief that children have moral status based on the fact that they are human, which grants them 
rights, there is all too often a disconnect between theory and practice.  This can be seen globally  
in children by the lack of education, the exploitation, the unsafe and hazardous living conditions  
and the abuse, as well as neglect, which millions of children endure every day.75   
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        There are various thoughts on the rights of children expressed by various philosophers. 
 These include the following:  1) that children have no rights but their moral status must be 
protected; 2) children have the same rights as adults, although children at all ages do not have the 
right or ability to act on these rights, such as drive a car at a young age; 3) children have basic 
human rights and gain other rights as they age and mature; and 4) children have welfare rights 
but not liberty rights, however, adults have both.76  Even for those who do not believe children 
have rights, there is an obligation on some adult’s part to see that the children are cared for and 
protected.77  Those that believe children do have rights also believe these rights correlate with 
duties from an adult or group of adults to see that the rights are preserved.78 
        Those who support the children’s rights theories, focus on the status of children as “being” 
rather than “becoming”.79  However, they distinguish the rights into three categories.  The first is 
the right to provision, which includes the basic needs of food, shelter, and education.80  The 
second set of children’s rights deals with the right to protection, which includes being protected 
from abuse, exploitation, neglect or danger of any kind.81  The last set of rights pertain to the 
right to autonomy.  This is looked upon as the most vital of the three and one of “being” versus 
“becoming” treating the child as a person with levels of autonomy commiserate with age.82 
        With autonomy comes a level of decision making that is dependent on cognitive ability and 
past experiences, rather than a particular age.83  Children that have lived with a long term chronic 
illness or disability are more apt to have a better grasp of the issues regarding treatment than 
those who have not.84  This can prove beneficial for decisions regarding futile treatment as long 
as the child is not too ill to participate in the decision. 
        In 1989, 190 countries came together to develop and pass the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child which is one of the most ratified human rights treaties in history.85  It also  
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addresses many principles to protect the rights of children to include allowing children to 
participate in the medical decisions, whenever possible.86  Although the convention was signed 
by President Clinton in 1995, the United States is one of three countries who have not ratified it, 
Somalia and South Sudan are the other two.87 The reasons for non-ratification are based on 
concerns that there will be legal ramifications regarding more financial support for children 
needs and potential governmental lawsuits.88  A lack of ratification does not mean the United 
States does not support children’s rights, in fact, the United States has always been committed to 
human rights.  However, there is room for improvement in the children’s rights arena in the 
following areas:  1) the United States is the only high income country to not grant paid maternity 
leave; 2) the United States is the only country in the world that a child under 18 can be sentenced 
to life in prison without parole and the U.N. Convention opposes this; and 3) in the United 
States, 21.2% of children live in poverty compared to the other member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) where the average is 
13.3%.89 
        When treatments for children have become futile, no longer providing benefit or meeting 
the goals for the patient, children have rights.  These rights, which may include both parents and 
health care providers, ensure that the best medical treatments have been provided and that no 
further treatment is available or warranted.  Even when that is the case, parents often insist on 
futile treatment.  They insist because they feel helpless and powerless, their reasoning may be 
faulty, they may doubt the validity of the prognosis, they are hoping for a miracle, and they put 
trust in God as well as their religious beliefs.90  In these cases, futile treatments continue to be  
provided and communication links need to remain open with the topic being broached at frequent  
intervals. 
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        4.III.A.2.  Parental Rights 
        Just as children have rights, so do parents, with parental authority coming with rights based 
on the fact that the parent is the sole agent of the child.91  Parental rights are best explained as 
rights with “thresholds”.92  A right with a threshold means the right can be overridden if one of 
two conditions are met.  These conditions are: 1) if the right conflicts with a right that is stronger, 
and 2) if overridden there will be a greater benefit to another.93  If parents insist on continuing 
futile treatments that are believed to be causing the child prolonged suffering, theoretically this 
could be viewed as an infringement on the parental rights.  As described above, in cases of 
medical futility, it is difficult to take action in these cases and the court system has not been a 
source of assistance.  However, to view parental rights with thresholds explains how these rights 
can exist while still granting ethical and moral scrutiny to the children.94 
        The rights of parents have been described as “stewardship rights”, versus owner rights, 
which adds to the complexity of the moral status of parents.  A steward is an agent or surrogate 
for another doing what is best for the child, whereas, an owner acts as if the other person is 
property and actions follow what is best for the owner.95  This additional moral status of parents 
translates into the children’s right to be sure they are protected as well as have their needs met, 
such as being nurtured, educated, and developed.96  Just as parents are responsible to feed 
children, bathe them, keep them safe, it also progresses to making them attend school, behave 
appropriately toward others and help them to grow up to be independent members of society.97 
Along with the rights of parents, comes the duties to not violate the child’s rights, to be sure no 
one else violates these rights and to protect the interests of the child.98   Failure to do any of these 
duties can lead to a limited and eventual loss of parental rights.   
        When a critically ill child is at a point where medical treatment is not having a benefit and 
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prognosis is very poor, the parents usually have the right to determine the next steps.99  This right 
is a point of discussion between the health care providers and the parents as to how further 
treatments are planned, as well as how ethical concerns are addressed.  However, even though 
parents have immense responsibility in caring for a child, their authority is not absolute.100  If the 
health care team is asked to act in a way that seems to not be in the child’s best interest, then the 
team has a duty to not comply.101  Before this action is taken, it should be clear to all concerned 
that the requested action is not in the child’s best interest and that it is harmful to the child.102  In 
general, in cases of continuing treatments that are termed futile, parental decisions are tolerated 
with a focus on reaching a point of agreement regarding withholding and withdrawing treatment. 
        The moral status of the child is at the center of the theoretical framework for medical futility 
in pediatrics with children’s rights and parental rights supporting it.  Another aspect of the  
theoretical framework is looking at the perspective of the family which examines both the views  
of the family and the various life support decisions. 
4.III.B.  Family Perspective 
        Studies have shown that physicians, in the pediatric intensive care unit when end-of-life 
decisions must be made, are reluctant to resort to unilateral decision making and do so in less 
than 2.7% of cases.103  Difficult decisions are often referred to ethics committees, however, as 
these committees are usually composed of nurses, physicians, and hospital representatives, the 
parents and children do not always appear to receive fair representation.  This potential for 
unilateral decision making and underrepresentation of parents and children in the critical care  
unit lead to the conclusion that, as long as reasonable, the parents’ wishes need to be  
accommodated.104   
        When dealing with the critically ill child within the pediatric intensive care unit, the child 
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cannot be separated from the family.  Therefore, in essence the family unit, which includes the 
patient, as well as the parents, siblings, and extended family, all become the focus of care.  
Following is a discussion on three views of the family. 
        4.III.B.1.  Views of the Family 
        The first view of the family relates to the most basic structured view when there are parents, 
children, and often extended family members such as grandparents.  This view is based on a 
blood relationship where there was a socially approved sexual relationship that produced 
offspring that established a residence of living together.105  This was what was once referred to 
as the nuclear family that has now been challenged.  It is seen as controversial as there are now 
single parents and homosexual couples who have become parents either through surrogates or 
adoption.106  What was once the norm to have a mother who stayed at home caring for children 
and the home, as well as a father who was the breadwinner, as well as major decision maker, has 
been replaced by all variants of this “norm”.  As divorce rates continue to be high, children are 
bounced back and forth from one family structure to another in a short lifetime.  Fathers may 
now be the stay-at-home dad, if both parents work outside the home, blurring the lines of 
authority in the home which translates to the hospital and decisions to be made there. 
        The second view of the family refers to the family in its social being.  The family is seen as 
a social system which focuses on the authority and needs of the family as it centers on the needs 
of the individual.107  Within this structure, the family has moral obligations and moral 
responsibilities.  In times of illness, especially critically ill children who are alert enough to 
participate in end-of-life decisions, this view opposes the role of the child in independent 
decision making holding the “family” as the source of decisions which equates to the parents in 
most cases.108  This view of the family is in opposition to the U.N. Convention for the Rights of  
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the Child which advocates for parents to only be agents for their children’s best interest  
encouraging the children to make independent decisions, when appropriate. 
        The third, and final view of the family, is a more liberal view of the liberal social-
constructivist view.  This view is when the family structure is created, through consent with 
liberty and equality for all members whose authority can change at any time per agreement.109  
So the view of children and decision making in critical care is that children are to participate as 
fully as possible as long as decisions show growth in the child’s moral capacity and autonomy.110  
The parents are still the trusted parties who are subject to oversight by the hospital and the state.  
This particular view of the family has been accepted by some feminists, homosexual activists, 
and other anti-establishment groups who wish to rescue the family from traditional patriarchal 
and historical norms.111 
        Three views of the family have been presented with no one being superior to the other. 
Knowing how the family is defined and viewed for each critically ill child is vital in establishing 
lines of communication and for decision making regarding the children’s care.  Regardless of 
how the family is configured, viewed, or functions, there are personal roles it must fit in order to 
meet the needs of the child.  These include: 1) love—a child needs someone to love them 
unconditionally throughout their childhood and adolescence; 2) physical care and homemaker 
who tends to all physical needs to include a clean, neat house with adequate nutritional food; 3) 
financial support, which may be from sources in the home, outside the home, or governmental 
sources; 4) moral education and teacher who teaches values to live by but also cognitive 
knowledge that is taught in schools, to some extent, but augmented in the home; 5) socializer as 
one who integrates the child into society which is a role shared by many; and 6) a gender role 
model which may reside inside the home or outside it, but it is necessary for role integration.112  
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Therefore, despite the conflicting views of the family, meeting children’s needs so they can grow 
in autonomy and self-actualization is the goal.  Even with the best intentions, it is not unusual for 
a critically ill child or adolescent to regress and become more dependent, both physically and 
psychologically, as the end-of-life approaches.113 
        With the family and its structure being part of the theoretical framework and the basis for 
decision making in collaboration with the health care team, there are many decisions that are  
needed to be made along the course of the illness.  Three of the major types of decisions are 
discussed in the following section. 
         4.III.B.2.  End-of-Life Decisions 
        The first category of decisions focuses on who is going to make the health care and on-
going decisions regarding the child’s care.  As a general rule, in pediatrics, the parents make the 
decisions.  However, because pediatrics covers the ages from 1 to 18, there are adolescents, and 
some young children, who can participate in the decision making process.  It is encouraged, 
whenever possible, that children be at least a part of discussions regarding difficult decisions.114  
Just because children partake in the discussion, does not mean they will have the final say and 
for years courts held that a child was a minor and was legally unable to withhold consent to 
treatment.115  There has been a change in that thinking, if the child can show signs of maturity 
and intelligence, via the mature minor doctrine, plus understanding the consequence of a 
decision to refuse or consent to a specific treatment, then the child’s wishes carry significant 
weight.116  Who makes the decisions can also vary based on cultural beliefs, such as not  
including the child or the women in discussions or decisions.  Health care providers are faced  
with respecting these values, even if they are not in agreement. 
        A second type of decisions that are often asked to be made for the critically ill patient is in 
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regard to medical treatment.  The first of these refer to not starting versus stopping treatments.   
Although these have been determined to be ethically the same, families often do not perceive 
them as such and have more difficulty with stopping or withdrawing treatment.117 
        When clinicians work with pediatric patients and families at the end-of-life and the topic 
becomes continuing futile treatments or discontinuing them, the clinician can have a major 
influence one way or another.  Clinicians, too, have their own influencers.  They are greatly 
influenced by their personal, religious and cultural values as well as their emotional response to 
the child’s illness and end-of-life.  They can also be influenced by other factors which include: 1) 
a lack of knowledge or understanding of the evidence regarding the benefits and burdens of end-
of-life treatments; 2) an overall lack of education in clinical ethics and the many dilemmas that 
present themselves; and 3) the confusion and helplessness regarding the role palliative care can 
play, especially when life sustaining treatments have been withheld or withdrawn.118 
        A second part of the treatment decisions concern life sustaining treatment and which will be 
used and which will not.  Each child and the particular illness weighs heavily in these decisions.  
However, the ones that are first considered are most often cardiopulmonary resuscitation and 
mechanical ventilation.  A do not resuscitate decision is more readily reached because it is about 
a point in the future when the child has a cardiopulmonary arrest, however, a decision to stop 
mechanical ventilation is more difficult and may mean imminent death for the child.119  Other 
treatment decisions include artificial nutrition and hydration, antibiotics, blood transfusions, and 
kidney dialysis.  Of these, stopping the artificial nutrition and hydration is especially onerous in 
the pediatric population.  This difficulty is because feeding children is such an essential task of  
parenting that when it ceases, it symbolizes such finality in the child’s life with death soon to  
follow, plus the nursing staff struggle with not feeding children, especially small children.120 
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        The third and final type of decisions to be made regarding the child’s care in critical care 
when further treatments appear to be futile without providing benefit to the patient, is what will 
be the criteria or guideposts along the way to signal that a critical decision must be made.  The 
topic of quality of life is often discussed versus the quantity of life, and as the American 
Academy of Pediatrics has stated in reference to palliative care, “its focus is to add life to years 
and not years to life”.121  However, quality of life considerations are not without ethical 
trepidations.  Such considerations involve both objective data regarding the child’s prognosis,  
with or without treatment, as well as subjective factors considering when is enough suffering  
enough so that it exceeds any benefit of the treatment.122 
         For treatment to be initiated, withdrawn or discontinued, the consent of the patient or 
patient’s surrogate is required.  A person cannot legally consent before the age of 18.  However, 
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has been instrumental in expressing views on the 
concept of informed consent in pediatric patients to ensure that the child is a part of the decision 
making process, whenever possible.123  The next section addresses the role of assent, informed 
consent, and parental permission by discussing developmental and clinical considerations to 
include the Best Interest standard and the Harm Principle.  The importance of maintaining the 
parent/child relationship will be examined to include the provider’s role and how medical futility 
plays a part in that relationship. 
 
4.IV.  Role of Assent, Informed Consent, and Parental Permission 
        Prior to the establishment of the concept of informed consent, the physician made all the  
treatment decisions.  Now it is believed that the patient or surrogate has the right to make 
treatment decisions, in collaboration with the physicians, in an understandable language that 
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includes treatment options, rights, benefits, and alternatives.124  In applying informed consent to  
pediatrics, the child’s parents or surrogates/proxy decision makers are usually the ones who give 
the consent, or permission, as one person cannot consent for another.125  In giving this 
permission, the Best Interest standard is utilized in the decision making process.   
4.IV.A.  Developmental and Clinical Considerations 
        As the treatment options have increased using more and more of the available technology 
plus pharmaceuticals, the medical decision making for parents has gotten more complex.  There 
is no longer a clear “right answer” to many of the decisions facing parents as well as health care 
providers. To add to the complexity, involving children in making these tough choices is 
encouraged as the treatment preferences come down to personal values and perceived quality of 
life.126 
        4.IV.A.1.  Decisional Capacity  
        One approach to the decision capabilities of children uses the “rules of seven” where 
children less than seven years are considered unable to make decisions; those 8-14 years of age 
are unlikely to have the ability to make major decisions, but children vary; and those older than 
14 have the ability to make decisions.127  
        When children less than seven years of age are being cared for, the premise is that they 
cannot make decisions and, therefore, the Best Interest standard apples.  The second age group, 
8-14 years, is usually able to reason, plus use logic, but may be very rule-oriented and less 
flexible when looking at choices, however, they are usually able to assent to treatment.128  The 
AAP, in 1995, defined assent as having four components.  These include, 1) assessing the patient 
to attain an appropriate level of awareness of condition; 2) informing the patient of expectations  
of the disease and treatment; 3) assessing the patient’s level of understanding; and 4) obtaining 
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agreement by the patient for the plan of care.129  
        The adolescent group, those greater than 14 years of age, are usually able to consent.  They 
do not pass the minimum age of consent, but can do complex reasoning, discern multiple 
options, anticipate outcomes, all of which is influenced by emotional maturity.130  Some 
adolescents may not be of legal age to consent, but by being emancipated they are able to 
consent before the age of 18.  Emancipation includes those who are either married, in the 
military service, self-supporting and/or not residing at home, a parent or are pregnant, or a court 
has declared them emancipated.131  In some states emancipated minors can make decisions 
regarding any medical treatment while in other states a “mature minor” that demonstrates 
maturity and knowledge, similar to an adult, can make medical decisions, even if they conflict 
with their parent’s perspective.132   
        The degree to which children are included in medical decision making varies with 
physicians.  Indicators in using assent are influenced by the parent’s wishes, how the child either 
verbalizes agreement or exhibits non-verbal agreement, and the absence of overt disagreement, 
such as actively protesting through screaming, kicking or other actions.133  
        In cases of medical futility, factors which influence the use of assent in end-of-life decisions 
fall into three categories.  The first category is child factors which range from a lack of arousal to 
a high state of anxiety or depression in addition to physical discomfort especially pain, nausea,  
and vomiting.134   The second category relates to family factors that are highly influenced by 
religious and cultural beliefs and who is allowed to participate in the decision making.135  The 
last category is situational factors and can be based on the degree of difficulty with the decision  
in that all choices have strong negative ramifications or when a decision must be made 
immediately in an emergent situation, which does not allow time for any consideration.136 
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        Nurses spend the most time, as compared with all other care givers, with the sick child. 
 This time commitment allows for a unique perspective on many aspects of care.  Including 
children in decisions regarding their own care is one of these areas.  The majority of nurses agree 
that the children’s views regarding their care is a vital issue and one that shows respect for 
children’s rights.137  However, there is variability among and between children based on age, 
attitude, mental status, plus levels of well-being so that a generalized statement cannot be applied 
in practice but must be individualized to the child and situation.138  For those children with a long 
term chronic illness, many become so well versed and knowledgeable regarding their disease or 
condition that some nurses are threatened by the child’s knowledge, especially when they 
question their care.139  This can serve to be counter-productive to having the children be full 
participants in their care. 
        When assent is used with children in medical decision making, there must always be room 
for dissent.  A child’s dissent should carry significant importance, especially if the treatment is 
not vital or can be postponed without serious risk.140  Forcing a child to assent through bribery or 
manipulation is never permissible. 141  However, when there is an impasse, plus the parents and 
providers believe the treatment is necessary but the child dissents, forced treatment, although 
morally suspect, is sometimes done after acknowledging to the child the “what” and “why” of  
the action.142   The example where action is taken when the child may dissent and parents do not  
give permission, is when emergent treatment is needed to save a child’s life and is most often 
related to religious beliefs, such as giving blood to a Jehovah’s Witness child.143   In this 
instance, a court order is obtained in order to proceed with blood transfusion. 
        For the many times that it is not possible for the child to assent to treatment decisions, the 
parents are the surrogate decision makers through the Best Interest standard.  However, when the 
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child is put in harm’s way through the decision, the Harm Principle may be the more appropriate 
approach to use than the Best Interest standard.  
        4.IV.A.2.  Best Interest Standard and the Harm Principle 
        Since children are considered incompetent to make legally binding decisions regarding their 
health care, providers, parents or surrogates are called upon to do this through the Best Interest 
standard.144  The Best Interest standard implies that the parent/surrogate will do what is right for 
the child maximizing benefits and minimizing risks.145  Although the standard was first 
established in 1899 to protect children from crime and incarceration, it now addresses all areas 
where the rights of children need to be protected.146  Even children who in a healthy state may be 
able to express their views regarding their own health, may not be able to do so when critically 
ill or nearing end-of-life, therefore, the Best Interest standard becomes more applicable at these 
times.   
        Beauchamp and Childress define the Best Interest standard as when a decision maker 
decides, among the available options, which provides the best benefit after weighing the patient’s 
interests against the benefits and risks.147  Consequently, when the child’s preferences or 
interests are unknown or not clear, as when critically ill, the parents or surrogates must still 
consider the best interest of the child.  This includes making determinations that deal with 
suffering, preservation of life, and the quality of life.148 
        Most health care providers and parents would agree that medical treatment should be 
provided in the child’s best interest, however, there are critics of the best interest standard who 
say it does not serve the child well.  The first criticism is that the Best Interest standard is not 
clearly defined, as well as it is often applied in an erratic manner.149  In determining benefit  
versus harm, these are subjective and open to many interpretations between the various parents 
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and providers.  A child’s parents, as well as the health care providers, can have conflicting views  
regarding what is the best next steps in the course of care for the child, yet, both invoke the Best 
Interest standard with no one right answer.150 
        The second criticism focuses on the Best Interest standard being too narrow and demanding 
when applied to specific cases.151  For example, if a child has a rare fatal disease and being in a 
university institution offers experimental treatment that might extend life, but not cure the 
underlying disease, this might be construed to mean moving the family closer to the institution as 
in the child’s best interest.   The best interest standard necessitates action to what is reasonable, 
even if this is not clearly defined.152  
        A final criticism of the Best Interest standard is that it fails to respect the family as the 
integrated unit that it is, regardless of the structure of the unit.153  By respecting the family and  
focusing on the child, decisions can still impact every member of the family.  Therefore, every  
decision must take the totality of the family into perspective. 
        Even with parents making decisions via the Best Interest standard, this authority is not 
absolute.154  When continued treatment is seen as futile or no longer providing benefit to the 
child and even producing prolonged suffering, health care providers may call upon the Best 
Interest standard as well as the parents.  This can appear to be in opposition.  The Best Interest 
standard is appropriate to use when there are alternate treatment choices to be made.  However, 
the Harm Principle may be better suited to determine when to seek legal assistance in the 
decision making process.155 
        The Harm Principle helps to identify when further action is needed.  It does not just imply 
that the decision is not in the child’s best interest, but that there might be actual harm to the child  
by the decision that is made, or in the process of being made.156  In most court decisions, they are 
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lenient giving great discretion to parents to decide what is in the child’s best interest, unless there 
is proof that the parent’s action is a threat to the child’s safety or health.157  In the end, the use of 
the Harm Principle is best used as a last resort when parents’ decisions are more likely to lead to 
death.158  In the case of medical futility or treatments that are not benefiting the child and are 
prolonging the suffering, it is a difficult case to prove that decisions are causing harm when the 
child is in the process of dying from their disease.         
        The parent/child relationship involves the parents’ understanding of their identity as parents, 
the associated role expectations and obligations, plus the responsibilities to their children.159  
However, these identities, roles, as well as responsibilities, get blurred and confused as their 
expert knowledge regarding their child is put to the test when making medical futility decisions.   
4.IV.B.  Maintaining Integrity of Parent/Child Relationship 
        In making difficult treatment decisions, and because of all the emotionalism associated with 
ill children, health care providers must focus on building relationships with both the parents and 
children.160  Futility decisions are best made as a collaborative effort between parents and health 
care providers, as well as children in some cases, depending on age.161    
      In the parent/child relationship, an authority based relationship is not only tolerated, it is 
expected.162  This authority plays out in making treatment decisions for “gravely” ill children in 
that when urgent decisions are needed, the tendency is to choose life without further discussion, 
but when the decision is less urgent, then the quality of life is more apt to be considered.163   As 
health care providers, the challenge is knowing that parents often follow a “roller coaster”  
emotional and decisional pattern that requires understanding, compassion, and communication  
by all caregivers. 
        4.IV.B.1.  Provider’s Role 
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        The provider’s role in maintaining the integrity of the parent/child relationship is critical.  It 
starts with understanding that as providers they have a large responsibility in this relationship.  
This is done in the three following ways:  1) recognizing that parental authority does exist which 
may include a strong use of persuasion and at times “coercion” to get the child to respond 
appropriately, as long as the means are not abusive or harmful to the child; 2) observing that 
parents use a certain amount of discretion in performing their duties, without outside 
interference, as long as there is no neglect or abuse; and 3) acknowledging the parents duty to 
advocate for their children and safeguard their rights.164  It is through this parent/child 
relationship that the parents have not only assumed the responsibility for their child but also to 
the community at large to develop a member worthy of it. 
        Parental authority is not the only ingredient in the parent/child relationship.  There is also a 
duty that is owed to see that the rights or interests of the child are protected.165  With this duty 
there is a fair amount of discretion on how to perform these duties without interference from 
outside individuals or agencies, provided actions are not neglectful or abusive.166 
        With adolescents who are critically ill, it is the provider’s role to assure that the patient’s 
interests are being met without undermining the parental role.167  This assurance includes 
controlling the young person’s access to information while encouraging the parents to share 
information and not inappropriately withhold it.168   
        Providers fill many roles when caring for the critically ill child at the end-of-life.  One such 
role is the supporter of the family.  Although this is most often performed by providers other than 
physicians, physicians do play a part with this focusing on the needs of the family to include 
emotional, environmental, informational, and spiritual needs.169   A second role is that of 
advocating for the patient.  This role requires more than support, to include medical knowledge 
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and helping the family navigate the clinical environment getting questions answered.170  A third 
role is one of information giver.  Based on what information that is given, the parents make 
decisions, often in collaboration with the physicians and other providers.  The type of decisions 
that are made in the pediatric critical care unit at the end-of-life include whether to attempt high 
risk treatments with unpredictable outcomes, whether to withhold or withdraw treatment, and 
whether to donate organs at death.171  In providing this information, the ethical principles of 
beneficence and non-maleficence are relied upon.  Beneficence implies that treatment will be 
centered on those which keep the child’s best interest in mind and that do not harm the child 
(non-maleficence).172 
        A fourth role for the provider is one of a decision maker.  In some cases, the physician 
provider assumes the paternalistic role in making end-of-life decisions when the parents cannot 
and are willing to acquiesce this role to the physician.173  It comes down to balancing parents’ 
autonomy with protecting the children who are most vulnerable at the time of illness.174  In other 
cases, there is shared decision making between the parents and physicians that involves 
discussing the parameters of the decision; swapping medical information plus the family values; 
validating the understanding of the information; deliberately considering the decision making 
role; and reaching consensus for the course of treatment, to include considering the values.175  
This approach to decision making results in greater levels of family satisfaction.176 
        A final role for all providers is to be alert to the traumatic stress that may be exhibited by 
the family of a child in the pediatric critical care unit.  Approximately one third of parents meet 
the diagnostic criteria for acute stress disorder, while the child is in the hospital, and one fifth 
show signs and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder months after the hospitalization  
event.177  With signs and symptoms occurring after discharge or death, there is reason to develop 
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programs that support parents during this difficult time. 
        In maintaining the integrity of the parent/child relationship, as well as promote a healthy 
relationship between parents and providers, the topic of medical futility or treatment that no 
longer provides a benefit can be onerous.  However, when medical treatments meet the futile 
description, compassionate caring, which has hopefully been occurring along the child’s disease 
course, is definitely needed. 
        4.IV.B.2.  Role of Medical Futility 
       As the terms medical futility and futile treatment have defied a standard definition over the 
centuries, having been around since the day of Hippocrates, there is general agreement on its 
meaning.  In general, it refers to treatment that either does not provide a good outcome for the 
patient, improve the quality of life, or prolongs the suffering or dying.178  Recently it has been 
stressed not only in the literature, but also by special interest groups and professional 
organizations that the use of the term “futility” or “futile” is often not understood, plus seems to 
imply hopelessness.179  The preferred term is “disproportionate burden” when the treatment 
provides more burden than benefit.180 
        Physicians can always refuse to provide treatments they believe to be futile or that provide 
disproportionate burden.  However, when this decision is invoked unilaterally it can be 
controversial since it will result in a conflict with the parents if they do not agree.181  Also when 
further treatment is described in the “futile” context, it may be more about the physician’s 
personal values than the treatment of the child. 
        There are ways a physician can communicate and justify the reasons to abandon continued 
treatment without invoking the futile terminology.  The first way is when further treatment is not  
the patient’s preference.182  In pediatrics, this is more apt to happen with adolescents but can also 
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occur with more mature children who can voice their preferences.  The second way further 
treatment may be refused is when it is not serving any detectable interest of the patient.183  An 
example would be a child who has leukemia that does not respond to bone marrow or stem cell 
transplantation with the transplant cells attacking the recipient’s cells leading to kidney failure.  
Although it seems to be futile treatment to do kidney dialysis, it would treat the kidney failure, 
but it would only prolong suffering with minimum benefit to the child as the underlying disease 
continues to attack the cells.184  A final way further treatment may be refused is based on scarce 
resources, whether this is due to the high cost of some treatments or their availability.185 
        When examining the role of medical futility in the parent/child and provider relationship, 
the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice play a part.  These 
principles provide the structure to uphold the fundamental ethical standards and actions within 
the community.186  With medical futility, autonomy applies to patients, parents, and providers all 
having the right to self-determination in making decisions among options.187  Patients and 
parents have the right to refuse treatments as well as the right to have access to treatments, 
although this does not mean any and all medical treatments.  If the treatment does not benefit the 
patient or harms the patient, the physician must exercise beneficence in not providing it.188  
Legally parental autonomy supersedes the child’s autonomy until they are 18 years of age, even 
if the child is mature, as well as knowledgeable about the treatment choices.189  For the physician 
to deceive the patient and parents into believing the treatment offers benefits when it does not, 
violates the trust in the relationship.  A family centered approach with honest open  
communication is paramount in making treatment decisions with few decisions ever being made  
without parental and physician consensus.190  
        Beneficence and non-maleficence involves doing good and not doing harm.  When applied 
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to children and medical futility, the physician must be aware of treatment that promotes the well-
being of the whole person.  When dealing with the stress of critically ill children, the situation 
may lead parents to not thinking rationally, which then leads them to not being emotionally able 
to make tough decisions.191  The principle of beneficence translates to a commitment by the 
physician to oversee that decisions are reasonable with the underlying family’s emotional, 
financial and spiritual values.192 
        The final principle is justice which is concerned with fair and equitable distribution of 
resources.193  The concern with medical futility and justice is whether there is fair distribution of 
medical resources, not only in the community, but also in society at large.  The debate on 
medical futility is focused on the debate between patient/family autonomy, physician 
beneficence, and distributive justice.194  In so doing this, the best interest of the patient must stay 
as the central focus. 
        Evidence based practice is a practice employed by health care practitioners that utilizes the 
best available evidence that has been scientifically validated in order to deliver the best possible 
care to patients.195  The next section examines selected areas of evidence based practice in 
pediatrics by discussing end-of-life interventions, especially when further treatments have either 
been withheld or withdrawn, and brain death in children. 
 
4.V.  Evidence Based Practice 
               Medical futility at end-of-life in pediatric patients differs from adults in two basic ways. 
First the psychological or emotional impact that impending death of a child can have on  
caregivers is so great that there is a tendency to forgo discussions regarding futile treatments.196  
A concentrated effort is needed to begin the discussions early.  The second difference is in 
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reference to the determination of brain death in children.  The brain death criteria cannot be used  
with the same certainty in pediatric patients as it can in adults.197  The difference is not explained  
by empirical data, but is thought to be due to a child’s brain being more resistant to injury.198   
4.V.A.  End-of-Life Interventions 
        Problems that have been identified by parents at the end-of-life in the pediatric population 
include a need for improved focus on the child’s symptoms and associated suffering that is 
commonly seen.199  The parents tend to focus on the child’s pain, quality of life, and chance for 
improvement when making these end-of-life decisions.200   Other problems are related to 
communication at all levels and relationships with the health care providers.201   
        Since pain has been identified as one of the top areas of concern for parents of critically ill 
children, health care providers must first and foremost ensure that the children’s pain needs are 
addressed, then their role expands to parental support in the grief process. 
        4.V.A.1.  Pain Control 
        Pain is the most common symptom at end-of-life, as well as the most feared.202  However, 
there are many approaches to deal with pain which can address its prevalence, but there needs to 
be adjustments to align with the various ages along the continuum of the pediatric patient.  
Assessment of pain in a child is different from an adult and the interventions, though similar, 
have unique differences in both pharmacological and non-pharmacological methods.203  The 
fears surrounding pain are centered on hastening the child’s death by giving too large a dose of 
medication or too often.  Research has shown that this fear is not justified and that respiratory 
depression is extremely rare in children under the age of two months with effective pain 
management showing an extended life versus that seen in those with inadequate pain relief.204  
Even though there have been advances in pediatric pain management, there remain challenges.   
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These challenges are due to a lack of a theoretical framework specific for pediatric pain; the 
uncertainty in interpreting children’s behavior; difficulties in measuring and applying  
methodologies; and biases brought to the table by both nurses’ and children’s past experiences, 
values and personal beliefs.205    
        Pain in children at the end-of-life can not only be due to the disease process, but also to the 
multiple losses, the lingering existential questions, the suffering as well as the pain may have 
symbolic significance indicating that death is approaching.206  With this approaching death can 
come additional emotional distress in the child, the parents, as well as the care givers.  Children 
fear being alone or abandoned as they approach the end-of-life.207  Therefore, not only must the 
pain be managed, but so must the emotional needs be addressed. 
        Most often pharmacologic means are used to manage the pain at the end-of-life and these 
are predominately from the opioid family.   Some non-pharmacologic approaches to pain that 
have been useful in children to reduce suffering, especially at the end-of-life, include music, 
imagery, hypnosis as well as massage.208  Of these, imagery has been especially useful when 
used along with pain medication and has helped express fears related to helplessness, 
anticipatory loss, and death.209  Imagery has also been shown to have sustained effects over an  
extended period of time making it useful for those children who are terminally ill and in the   
process of dying.210 
        Despite the focus on the various modalities on managing pediatric pain, there have been 
barriers in the treatment of pain in children.  The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) has 
identified some of these barriers.  These include:  1) the belief that children, especially infants 
and small children, feel little or no pain; 2) inadequate assessment and reassessment for pain by 
health care providers; 3) excessive fear of pain treatment effects, such as respiratory depression 
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and addiction; 4) the concern that acknowledging pain in children is too labor intensive and 
burdensome; 5) lack of knowledge regarding pain treatment in children; and 6) a general lack of 
understanding on the subjective experience of pain in children and getting an adequate 
description of the pain from the children.211  Even with these barriers, pain in children can be 
addressed, managed, and, in many instances, relieved.  However, research indicates that children 
are still dying in pain with parents reporting that 89% of children with cancer end their life 
suffering in pain.212  Pain is reported as being treated in 76% of the cases with less than 27% 
being successful, causing speculation that some physicians may be unaware of newer effective 
treatments that are available, or unaware of how to use them.213  Studies reveal that when pain is 
adequately addressed in the child there is relief, not only for the child, but there is also less 
emotional distress in the parents which leads to improved decision making by the parents.214 
        Managing pain in critical care at the end-of-life is most often done after withdrawing 
treatment.  At this time sedation and pain medications are given, even if amounts needed to 
provide comfort may hasten death under the principle of double effect.215  However the use of 
paralytic agents, although debated by some health care providers, are not to be used per standard 
ethical principles.216  The reason why paralytic agents are inappropriate is that they give patients 
the appearance of comfort, thereby “rendering” them unable to respond to any stimuli, including 
pain or discomfort, while still feeling both, so they serve no purpose for the patient.217  With 
intractable pain, there are few pediatric protocols compared to the adult population that has 
many.218  The few pediatric protocols take uncontrolled pain as seriously as a “cardiac arrest” 
using protocols of strong opioid choices that are titrated per symptom control.219 
        The care of children at the end-of-life, to include their death, does not end there.  As 
recommended by the Institute of Medicine, the care continues through the grieving process for 
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the grieving process for the parents to include bereavement support.220   
        4.V.A.2.  Grief and Bereavement Support  
        Grief is defined as the response to another’s death to include the emotional, physical, 
spiritual, social, and psychological domains.221  Studies indicate that the grief following a child’s 
death is more intense than that experienced following a loss of a spouse or parent.222  This loss is 
not only for the child, but also for a part of one’s self through the parental attachment.223  
Whereas, bereavement is defined as the “state” of having been through the experience of the loss 
of a significant other.224 
        There are several types of grief.  These are anticipatory, disenfranchised, and complicated 
or pathological grief.  Anticipatory grief occurs before the actual death and can begin at the 
moment of an ominous diagnosis when parents are made aware that a child has a life-limiting 
disease or condition.225  This grief can have ups and downs as the child seems to improve then 
worsen with an optimum length of time being approximately 6 to 18 months.226    
        A second type of grief is disenfranchised grief.  This type of grief occurs with a loss that 
cannot be acknowledged, socially supported, or mourned in public, such as the death of a 
disabled child that others see as a blessing or a death from child abuse or neglect that resulted by 
the behavior of the parents.227  
        A final type of grief is complicated, or pathological grief.  Although all grief is complicated, 
 the grief associated with a loss of a child is particularly complicated.  Some signs that may 
appear when grief has become more than the expected “normal” include:  1) active grieving that 
has gone on for an extended period of time; 2) subjective physical or psychological complaints 
such as headache, stomachache, and depression with obvious signs of weight loss or weight gain; 
3) inability to function in the workplace or at home or to care for other children; and 4) risk  
220 
 
taking behaviors, thoughts, and talk of suicide.228   At this point, intervention is needed to assist  
the individuals in the grieving process. 
        There have been many theories postulated regarding grief.  One theory relates to 
development.  As children grow and develop, their view of death changes from one that is 
reversible to one that is irreversible with death happening to all living things.229  Another theory 
sees grief as work.  Sigmund Freud was one of the first who saw grief as work and, 
consequently, the term of “working through one’s grief”.230  Other theories that are closely 
related to the work are those with stages or phases with many different ones calling the phase’s 
different names.  The Harvard Bereavement Study uses four stages with the first accepting the 
loss, the second experiencing the pain of the loss, the third adjusting to the environment without 
the person, and the fourth relocating the deceased person back into one’s life with ways to 
remember them.231   A final and more futuristic theory is one with continuing bonds with the 
deceased.  This theory, once seen as pathological grief, is now seen as adaptive and is 
recommended so that the parents continue a relationship with the deceased child.232  The bonding 
theory’s focus is “holding on while letting go” so that parents do not strive to diminish the grief 
but learn to keep it as it is and grow around it.233 
        The extent and severity of the grief are influenced by several factors.  In general, the mother 
of a deceased child experiences a more intense and longer grief than the father, especially with 
the younger child and the adolescent.234   In addition, parents of children who die unexpectedly 
also have a more intense grief reaction than those who experience an expected death, as they 
have been grieving since the diagnosis.235  Intrinsic factors that influence grief are related to the 
psychological make-up of the parents, their coping abilities, and response to stressful 
situations.236  Extrinsic factors that have the biggest impact on grief are the support of the  
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hospital staff and the “adequacy” of the information that has been shared through the child’s 
illness, especially at the end-of life.237   
        Another area that has been identified with importance is the recognition of spiritual needs of 
the grieving parents.238  The best way to address these needs is through a “caring presence”, 
which allows the parents to be at the bedside and care for the child through the dying process as 
well as help establish memories for the future.239  Related to one’s religion or spirituality four 
themes emerge.  These are prayer, faith, visits as well as support from hospital chaplains or one’s 
clergy, and belief in the divine nature of the parent/child relationship that extends beyond  
death.240   Providing an environment that supports these themes at the end-of-life is critical for   
the parents but also benefits children if they share the religious beliefs of their parents.         
       Additional priorities have been identified for interventions in end-of-life care for parents and 
children.  These include open, honest communication with accurate and timely information; easy 
access to health care providers; emotional support by staff; maintenance of the integrity of the 
parent child relationship, and faith support.241  
        Health care providers often experience profound grief following the death of a child.  One   
approach that has been used successfully is grief debriefing sessions following a child’s death 
where staff who have cared for the child can share their feelings and how they are managing 
their grief.242 
        No one argues that the death of a child is traumatic for all concerned.  However, there are 
instances where the declaration of death in a child is not always a simple task.  Such an instance 
surrounds the topic of brain death. 
4.V.B.  Brain Death 
        The concept of brain death came to be in the 1950’s with the advent of mechanical 
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ventilation and the progress in organ donation.243  Today brain death is recognized in both 
developed and developing countries with it being made into law in some countries.244  In the 
United States the Harvard Criteria for brain death, developed in 1968, still holds true today with 
some state-to-state differences based on the number of required physicians needed, plus the level 
of expertise of the physician, and the confirmatory tests recommended.245  Two states, New York 
and New Jersey since 1987 and 1991 respectively, have religious exclusions for brain death. This 
religious exclusion is based on the belief of the Orthodox Jews that only the cardio-respiratory 
criteria is suitable for the diagnosis of death.246  
        Brain death, as defined by the American Academy of Neurology in 2010, is when there is a 
loss of function in the entire brain to include the brain stem.247  This loss of function translates to 
the patient being unable to have motor responses as evidenced in movement to a stimulus; loss of 
brain stem reflexes; or loss of respiratory drive and effort when temperature and drugs have been 
normalized in the patient’s system.248  This loss of function is irreversible and is seen in both 
adults and children, however, it is more difficult to diagnose in children.  Because of this 
difficulty in diagnosing, there is often controversy surrounding pediatric brain death declaration.  
Following is a discussion on pediatric brain death, the futility disputes that may result with a case 
presentation on a patient who has been declared brain dead but medical treatment has continued. 
        4.V.B.1.  Pediatric versus Adult 
        Prior to the development of mechanical ventilation, death occurred when breathing ceased 
and the heart stopped beating, as one closely followed the other.  Confusion began when 
mechanical ventilation could keep the patient breathing and, therefore, the heart beating. This 
confusion was accelerated when the concept of brain death was discovered.  Although there are 
not two types of death, cardio-respiratory and brain, but two forms of recognition, many lay 
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people, and some health care professionals, do not understand the abstract way of seeing brain 
death.249  It is especially difficult when the patient is warm and the monitors reflect a beating 
heart with a rising chest from the mechanical ventilator.  Compounding the difficulty is to place 
this scenario into a pediatric intensive care unit where the level of stress is high and the 
acceptance of death is a difficult process. 
        Although brain death criteria was established in the 1960’s, it did not get introduced in the 
care of children until 1987.250  Brain death cannot be diagnosed in children with the same 
certainty as adults and as a result, extra studies such as EEG’s and cerebral flow studies may be 
indicated to assist in diagnosis, but they are no substitute for the clinical examination.251  The 
major differences between diagnosing brain death in children versus adults is that two clinical 
examinations are required for children (37 weeks gestation to 30 days require 24 hours between 
examinations and 30 days to 18 years require 12 hours between examinations), whereas, adults 
only require one.252  The two tests are to be performed by different physicians, both of whom are 
knowledgeable regarding brain death criteria, with both yielding consistent results.253 
        When brain death has been declared, the patient is considered dead and at that point in time,  
it becomes the date and time of death.254  This point definitely ends any futility disputes.  There 
are two other conditions that do not meet brain death criteria but which often add to the futility  
debate with some clinicians considering them a state of death.  These are the persistent 
vegetative state (PVS), also referred to as the permanent vegetative state,  and the minimally 
conscious state.255   
        PVS is considered irreversible when it has been present for more than three months after a 
non-traumatic event and more than 12 months after a traumatic event.256   PVS has been 
described as wakefulness without awareness and must meet the following criteria:  lack of 
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awareness of self or environment; no language or expression, except there may be random 
noises, groans or shouting; no behavioral responses to stimuli; presence of sleep/wake cycles; 
incontinence; and hypothalamic and brainstem function to allow survival.257  Although some 
have considered this diagnosis a “death diagnosis”, the majority of clinicians do not, but with an 
advance directive or surrogate decision maker, life sustaining treatment has been terminated in 
those in a PVS.  It is not just a medical, but an ethical issue, when all treatments, to include 
nutrition and hydration, are discontinued in a person in PVS.258 
        The minimally conscious state is often thought to be PVS but these patients may follow 
commands, respond to simple questions and articulate verbal responses that are intelligent but 
often not accurate.259  This condition was established because PVS was often misdiagnosed in  
patients who have some degree of awareness.  Ethical obligations for treatment include care that  
meets all the patients’ needs. 
       As has been stated, brain death declaration signifies that the patient is dead and continued 
treatment is inappropriate, futile, and considered an improper use of resources.  When the 
Harvard Brain Death criteria was established, the finality of the diagnosis was clear.  However, 
some states, some hospitals, and some clinicians have not held to the finality of this diagnosis 
allowing the children to remain “alive” in an irreversible coma after being declared dead.  The  
following section addresses the ethics of continuing treatment for those who have been declared  
brain dead with a case example illustrating the dilemma. 
        4.V.B.2.  Ethics of Continued Treatment Post Brain Death 
        Since the development of the brain death criteria, there has been misunderstanding 
regarding its significance and interpretation.  Brain death declaration means the patient is 
completely dead with no chance of recovery.260  Furthermore, the patient has died and any 
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further discussion regarding continued or new treatment is inappropriate.261  After the Harvard 
criteria for brain death laid out specific conditions for brain death, many state legislatures and 
court systems, beginning in 1970, acknowledged brain death as a legally recognized means of 
establishing death.262  Following in 1981, the U.S. Uniform Determination of Death Act added 
the brain death definition to the legal definition of death.263  In 2010, the American Academy of 
Neurology updated their 1995 guidelines for determining brain death in adults in hopes of 
improving standardization across the states and between all hospitals.264  However, there is still 
inconsistencies among states which makes it confusing for the public, especially if a person can 
be declared brain dead in one hospital but treated as “alive” in another.  Over time, despite 
concern and conversation, the concept of brain death has been accepted by the Catholic Church 
as long as there is sufficient “medical certainty” of the diagnosis to provide the necessary “moral 
certainty” on the moral ethical responsibilities.265 
        After brain death has been declared, treatment is withdrawn.  This withdrawal most often 
either occurs immediately or may be delayed if organ donation is going to occur, or if a short 
delay is requested to allow additional family to arrive.266  Requesting a delay beyond these 
reasons is unreasonable and may be due to a lack of understanding regarding brain death, the 
inability to “let go”, a state of denial, a sense of hope that is not rational, or unresolved feelings  
of guilt.267  As soon as brain death is declared, this becomes the time of death and the patient is 
no longer a person but is now a corpse still entitled to the utmost respect and care. 
        Even with the decision of brain death, there are cases when the family have requested 
continued medical treatment for weeks to months, and in some cases, years.  This creates an 
ethical dilemma for these reasons:  1) to continue to provide medical treatment to a corpse may 
compromise the professional integrity of the health care providers; 2) it confuses the family and 
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public regarding the death state of the patient promoting misunderstandings; 3) it contributes to 
moral distress in the health care providers; 4) it raises concerns related to justice, fairness, and 
equality in the treatment of others and those in the future; and 5) it can create a significant 
struggle if the family offers to personally fund the treatments of the deceased patient.268 
        One case of continued treatment after brain death that caught national attention is that of 
Jahi McMath.  At the time, Jahi was a 13 year old who suffered a cardio-pulmonary arrest 
following surgery, on December 9, 2013, to remove her tonsils, adenoids and uvula with a sub-
mucous resection of the post nasal cavity.269  She was declared brain dead on December 12, 2013 
following adherence to the pediatric brain death criteria.270  This adherence included two 
physicians (a neurologists and a pediatric intensivist) who performed a complete neurologic 
examination, independently, coming to the same conclusion after the apnea test with an EEG and 
nuclear scan showing no brain activity.271  The family did not agree that Jahi was dead and 
insisted that all treatments continue.  On December 15th all treatment was to be withdrawn, but 
with legal representation, the family met with hospital administration who agreed to continue 
mechanical ventilation temporarily.272  The case became a media frenzy with focus on racial 
disparities between the patient/family and hospital administration, in addition to family 
statements regarding disrespect from hospital administration.  The hospital spokesperson was 
unable to clarify any statements due to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) regulations.273   Legal action followed in the county superior court with several 
requests made by the family.  These requests included a restraining order against the hospital 
from removing Jahi from the ventilator, that the hospital perform a tracheostomy and place a 
feeding tube, and that a third physician be consulted for an additional neurological exam.274   The 
family had selected a physician from Ohio, who did not support brain death, to do the 
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neurological evaluation.  The judge granted an injunction until December 30th to give the family 
time to find another care facility for Jahi, he agreed to another outside reviewer but chose a 
physician from Stanford, and he did not agree to the tracheostomy or the feeding tube 
placement.275  The physician from Stanford was in agreement that Jahi was brain dead and 
confirmed it with a brain flow study.276   The family took responsibility for Jahi’s body on 
January 5, 2014 moving her to a care facility where a tracheostomy and feeding tube were 
placed.277  From California, the family took Jahi to New Jersey where she can stay indefinitely 
on life support under the protection of religious freedom.278  Today, she is 16 years old and 
remains on a mechanical ventilator with a feeding tube responding to simple verbal commands, 
per her family.279 
        There are more reported cases in the literature as well as the media and there are concerns 
that more will follow based on the reporting related to Jahi McMath.  More education and 
communication are needed for the public, for those who report the medical news, and for health 
care providers so that accurate information is given to those who have a family member declared 
brain dead.280  Hopefully this education and communication will be helpful so an occurrence,  
such as Jahi McMath’s does not repeat itself through unnecessary coverage and a public protest 
during this most difficult time.   
        Adult palliative care has proven to be effective in symptom management in life-limiting 
diseases, in preparing patients and families for the end-of-life, as well as in supporting families 
after death.  Palliative care has had a slow start in the pediatric population, but offers patients the 
same positive qualities as seen with the adults.  The next section addresses palliative care as an 
opportunity to enhance end-of-life care when further aggressive treatments are futile.  The  
history and evolution of pediatric palliative care will be discussed as well as what is in store for 
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the future. 
 
4.VI.  Palliative Care for Children 
      The low number of children’s deaths has lessened the urgency for the palliative care 
movement in the pediatric population resulting in a slower start than in the adult population.281  
However, palliative care’s value and importance have been recognized along with its challenges  
and barriers.  As a result there is a movement to increase the availability of palliative care and  
address the obstacles that are preventing its success.   
4.VI.A.  History and Evolution 
             Only 20% of the pediatric hospice programs have palliative programs which is not 
sufficient to meet the demands.282  Adult palliative care programs can serve as a guide for 
pediatric palliative programs, however, pediatric programs are unique and distinct from the adult 
programs.283  Both adult and pediatric programs are composed of symptom management, 
advance care planning, psychosocial concerns and spirituality.284  However, pediatric palliative 
programs must consider the developmental level of the child, as well as the needs of the parents.   
Historically, the focus has been on the curative versus the palliative with childhood illnesses.  
For those palliative programs that have grown and flourished, the results are rewarding with 
involvement of all staff members and the support of palliative care physicians.285 
        4.VI.A.1.  Definitions and Essential Components 
        Pediatric palliative care, as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO), is care that 
has as its goal the improvement of the quality of life for those children with a “life threatening” 
illness, as well as their families.  This is done by preventing and relieving suffering through the 
management of pain and other symptoms whether physical, psychosocial or spiritual.286  Life 
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threatening illness refers to those illnesses or conditions which pose a great risk of death to the 
patient and the treatment may yield a cure, but may also fail.287  Life-limiting illnesses, or life- 
shortening illnesses, refers to those for which there is no hope for a cure and, although palliative 
care may be more appropriate for these diseases, it is difficult to sort out those which may offer 
some hope and those which may not.288  
        In the United States, it is estimated that approximately 55,000 pediatric deaths occur 
annually with more than 56% of them occurring in hospitals, mainly in pediatric and neonatal 
intensive care units.289  Worldwide it is estimated that 7 million children could benefit from 
pediatric palliative care annually.290  In the United States, those children who could benefit from 
palliative care range from 5000 to 8600 daily.291 
        The hospice movement began in London in the late 1960’s, moving to the United States in 
the 1970’s, where palliative care was developed, with children being added in hospital based 
programs in the 1980’s.292  From there, free standing facilities for pediatric palliative care began 
to appear in the 2000’s.  The movement is still a slow progressing one because both parents and 
health care providers focus on an aggressive curative model until the very end.293  As a result, 
many children and families miss the many benefits a palliative care program can offer.  To know 
when to introduce palliative care is a challenge because the difference between palliative and 
curative are substantial.  Palliative care is still beneficial for the child who responds to treatment 
by going into remission, if only to provide assistance for future illness or reoccurrences.294 
        The basic components of any pediatric palliative care program includes the following five 
elements.  First, is the physical element which addresses all the physical symptoms with pain, 
dyspnea, and fatigue being the majority of physical complaints that are addressed.295  A second 
element is psychosocial.  This element is concerned with fears, coping skills, communication 
230 
 
styles, history of substance abuse, suicidality, and future resources for bereavement support.296  
The third element is spiritual concerns.  Addressing spiritual concerns includes beliefs, practices, 
rituals, role of prayer, and the meaning of life for both the child and the parents.297  The fourth 
element is advance care planning.  Advance care planning addresses who will be the decision 
makers, what to expect when end-of-life approaches, and goals of care.298  The final element 
deals with practical concerns and can include such things as financial issues, needed equipment 
if the child is to go home, and care of siblings.299 
        Regardless of where or when palliative care is consulted, there are concerns that can present 
as ethical dilemmas if they are not addressed early with communication occurring among all 
health care providers and the family. 
        4.VI.A.2.  Ethical Concerns 
        One of the ethical concerns that often occurs in the pediatric population, when it has been 
determined that further treatments would be futile, is whether artificial nutrition and hydration 
should continue.  This issue can also provide a major decision point for children in a persistent 
vegetative state.  Optimal nutrition is beneficial in many ways and especially in children who not 
only need it to maintain body systems but also to foster growth, especially in infancy and 
adolescence when there are normal accelerated growth spurts.300  Forgoing, or withdrawing, 
artificial nutrition and hydration is especially controversial in children because they cannot speak 
for themselves, in most cases, and because feeding is associated with the basic care of children, 
yet, nourishment alone is not considered curative.301  Many of those who object to discontinuing 
artificial nutrition and hydration see it as ordinary treatment versus the extraordinary treatments 
that are such things as mechanical ventilation and kidney dialysis.302 
        It is estimated that in the United States, approximately 4,000 to 10,000 children are in a 
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persistent vegetative state (PVS) compared with 10,000 to 25,000 adults.303  In a study of 
residents caring for children in a PVS whose parents wanted all treatments withdrawn, to include 
artificial nutrition and hydration, the residents were in agreement 100% to withhold medication 
and CPR; 97% to withdraw mechanical ventilation; but only 45% agreed to withdrawing 
artificial nutrition and hydration.  These differences are thought to be due to the fact that the 
residents lacked experience with these situations; that artificial nutrition and hydration is ethical 
and medically appropriate, in most cases, as food and fluids should always be provided to those 
who can partake of them; and health care providers are hesitant to “give up” on pediatric 
patients.304 
        Despite the ethical controversy that surrounds stopping artificial nutrition and hydration in 
children, there are three general categories where it may be ethically permissible.  The first is 
with total loss of neurologic function as seen in PVS or some states of anencephaly. To meet 
criteria for neurological loss of function there needs to be clinical certainty that the condition is 
irreversible with no chance that the child will regain consciousness.305  The second is irreversible 
total failure of the intestines, which is rare, and is most often seen in premature infants.306  
Nutrition via feeding tube may not be possible, but intravenous nutrition is available, although 
fraught with many complications.  This avenue would have to be maximized before artificial 
nutrition and hydration would be ethically permitted to be withdrawn, unless the child was 
actively dying.  The last category is imminent death which translates to death within days or 
weeks.307  In this instance, artificial nutrition and hydration may be prolonging the dying process. 
        Withholding artificial nutrition and hydration in the final moments or days of life is not 
going to make death happen any quicker.  However, withholding nutrition on someone who is 
not actively dying, and is tolerating the feeding, is an ethical concern as the intent may be to 
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accelerate the death process.308  The Catholic view, expressed in the Ethical and Religious 
Directives for Health Care Services, states that “in principle” there is an obligation to provide 
artificial nutrition and hydration, however, it is optional if it cannot reasonably prolong life or is 
a burden for the patient.309  To determine whether artificial nutrition and hydration are 
prolonging life or being a burden, the physician, other health care providers, and the patient, or in 
the case of a child, the parents, are responsible for determining if they are appropriate/ordinary or 
inappropriate/extraordinary. 
        Another ethical concern relates to palliative sedation, sometimes referred to as terminal 
sedation, however, palliative better fits the reason the sedation is administered.  Palliative 
sedation is the administration of sedation at the end-of-life that treats anxiety, pain and agitation 
that is unresponsive to routine treatment.310  The same medications are used as those routinely 
given to treat these symptoms but are titrated to higher doses that may lead to unconsciousness.  
If done appropriately and accelerated just to the point of relieving distress, this form of symptom 
relief should not hasten death, although this may be a concern for those who do not understand 
the principles and process.311 
        It is becoming more apparent that palliative care has a valued place in the care of children at 
 the end-of life.  There are identified challenges and barriers plus further research is needed  
needed before pediatric palliative care can claim its place in comprehensive pediatric care. 
4.VI.B.  Future of Palliative Care for Children 
        Palliative care for children is beginning to make a difference, however, there is more work 
to be done.  Too often palliative and hospice care are seen as one and the same.  They are 
different in that palliative care is symptom management for serious illnesses and conditions that 
can include curative approaches, while hospice care focuses on the dying patient.312  Since the 
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majority of pediatric deaths occur in critical care units, at first it would seem that intensive care 
and palliative care would be at odds.  This difference is because intensive care focuses on 
prolonging life through medical advances and technology while palliative care focuses on 
symptom management providing compassion and support.313  Still, intensive care and palliative 
care together contribute to solid and profound integration that meets the needs of patients and 
families by providing advanced technology along with supportive care.314 
        Despite the symbiotic relationship between intensive and palliative care, there are 
challenges and barriers that keep palliative care from providing the full benefit to the pediatric 
population, 
        4.VI.B.1.  Challenges and Barriers 
        There continues to be major challenges that are facing pediatric palliative care today.  The 
first is defining pediatric palliative care.  The answers continue to be that pediatric palliative care 
is for all life threatening diseases, which cast a wide net that is believed to offer the greater 
benefit to the greatest number of children.315  A second challenge is to identify the needs of  
pediatric palliative care.  The number of pediatric deaths are relatively small making it difficult   
to aggregate adequate data to determine what the needs are.316  As a result chaplains, social  
workers, and behavioral health referrals are used to meet the child’s needs leaving a wide  
disparity in the care provided.317 
        A third challenge relates to pediatric palliative care applying cultural and spiritual values 
into their program.  Palliative care programs promote open honest discussions including children 
in discussions, whenever possible, which doesn’t fit into all cultures.318  Therefore, pediatric 
palliative care programs must be flexible enough to adjust to various cultures.  Adult palliative  
care programs focus on total care to patients and their families which includes the spiritual 
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component, however, pediatric palliative care has been slow to include spirituality as part of their  
program.319   The urgency for including spirituality as part of the holistic approach has been 
identified and is now being included in programs across the nation.320   
        A fourth challenge is to see that health care professionals are educated regarding end-of-life 
care, as well as palliative care, so that referrals can be made appropriately.  Pediatric palliative 
care is a specialty that uses an interdisciplinary approach which includes nurses, physicians, 
social workers, psychologists, chaplains, therapists and volunteers.321  The training of specialty 
physicians, such as cardiologists, intensivists, pulmonologists etc. has historically focused on 
technical skills with minimum education in end-of-life communication, especially when working 
with children.322 Some of that has changed with the subspecialty of hospice and palliative 
medicine, plus pediatricians are now being trained regarding end-of-life care and the use of 
palliative care programs.323   
        A final challenge is to provide support to those providers who provide day-to-day care to 
the children who are dying and at the end-of-life.  Caring for children and families at this 
juncture in life can be very rewarding, but it is also stressful for the caregivers who have to learn 
how to grieve before moving on to caring for the next patient.324 
        These challenges are demanding, especially when there are barriers that get in the way of 
addressing them.  These barriers include:  1) the uncertainty of the diagnosis and prognosis 
which often delays advance care planning and palliative care consultation;325 2) limited access to 
pediatric palliative programs, especially in rural areas, since they tend to be located in larger 
cities which does not allow equal access for all patients;326 3) communication—either lacking or 
inadequate between and among health care professionals as well as with the family, which is a 
barrier for maximizing palliative care.327  Studies indicate that the families’ interactions with  
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staff is an important as the communication with the medical team;328 and 4) the inappropriate 
continuation of futile treatments, even though there is no hope for improvement.329  
        With all the challenges and barriers, pediatric palliative care is a hope for the future.  To 
manage this hope, more research is needed for it is through research that practice is changed. 
        4.VI.B.2.  Future Research 
        The pediatric palliative care specialty has been modeled after the adult programs but, since 
the pediatric population is different from adults, there has been trial and error, observation, and 
common sense used to design the pediatric programs.   What is now needed is clinical research 
that can provide data from which to form standards and principles for pediatric palliative 
programs in order to standardize the approach that is evidence based.330 
        Some of the major challenges to completing research on the pediatric population for 
palliative care are complex.  First, the diversity of ages and diagnoses extends over the  
continuum, unlike the adult, which tends to be in the elderly and, in most cases, is confined to 
cancer and cardiac diagnoses.331  Second, there are a small number of cases in the pediatric 
population making generalizability difficult but does not rule out research as qualitative studies  
can be done.332   Third, there is an ethical vulnerability with children that leads to difficulty in  
enrolling research subjects.  This can be due to health care provider’s reluctance to refer, parents 
feeling obligated to enroll their children or are ill informed so they adamantly refuse to enroll, 
and the on-going issue with the uncertainty of the diagnosis or prognosis.333 
        Even though there are challenges, research has been accomplished which has led to findings 
that can be beneficial to those who provide pediatric palliative care.  Some of the findings reveal 
that the children cover a wide variety of diagnoses and age ranges with the majority having some 
cognitive impairment plus dependence on multiple medications and technology.334  The time 
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frame for the children to receive palliative care is much longer than adults and can easily extend 
beyond a year with two out of three patients still being alive after a year.335  Neurologic 
impairment leads to major signs and symptoms with palliative care being consulted early in the 
diagnosis, which may be in the intensive care unit.  Therefore, there is a need for pediatric 
palliative care team members to have a familiarity and comfort with the critical care 
environment.336 
        The Institute of Medicine (IOM) as well as the National Institute of Health (NIH) have both 
promoted palliative care for the pediatric and adult populations.  The NIH and National Institute 
of Nursing Research (NINR) launched a campaign in 2014 called Palliative Care:  
Conversations Matter to focus on bringing this care to patients, families, and health care  
providers.337   Their promotion has provided a website with brochures videos and information on 
the details of palliative care.  This continued promotion, plus the feedback from health care 
providers and parents, are resulting in more pediatric palliative care programs being developed to 
serve this special population. 
 
 
4.VII.  Conclusion 
        Dying is a natural process of life, but when it happens in childhood it seems unnatural and, 
although the numbers are small, it can be devastating.  With the death of a child, the hopes and 
dreams for the future and what might have been dies as well.  Children who used to die from 
congenital anomalies or childhood diseases are now surviving due to medical advances.  
However, there are sufficient injured and chronically ill children in the pediatric critical care 
units across the nation that medical futility is an issue. 
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        Because the death of a child is so traumatic, not only for the family, but also for the health 
care providers, approaching the topic of futile treatment is difficult and often avoided.  The topic  
is not only avoided, but the curative approach is also the focus up to the end-of-life.  Even so, if 
the terminology of “futility” is avoided in discussions, there are still treatments being given that 
are not providing benefit to children or adding quality of life, and may be prolonging suffering. 
        Those who care for children face a big challenge because there are many developmental 
changes and challenges between the ages of 1 to 18.  This challenge is compounded when the 
child is critically ill and at the end-of-life.  The health care team must develop relationships with 
the child, as well as the family, as they work collaboratively to determine the best treatment for 
the child.  A treatment that respects the family structure, as well as function, taking into mind the 
many needs of the child. 
        There are ethical concerns for children who are critically ill.  There is an obligation for 
health care providers to see that the child is as comfortable as possible with pain being managed, 
as well as other physical symptoms.  There is also a pressing need to address the emotional needs 
of the child as well as the family.  During the treatment of the child, there is also a role that 
requires the health care provider to assure that the parents are keeping the child’s best interest, 
first and foremost, while not extending the dying process or prolonging suffering.            
        Pediatric palliative care offers hope for the future as those skilled in its principles and 
processes work closely with the critical care team.  This partnership provides technology, works 
on symptom management, as well as providing support and comfort at this difficult time.  
Palliative care is there not only through the illness at the end-of-life, but also through grief 
support for the family after the child’s death.  Nevertheless, despite what palliative care can do, a 
call to action is needed to assure more programs are available with the needed research to 
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validate best practices.   Nothing will relieve all suffering, but there has never been an imperative 
greater for a cause more worthy. 
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Chapter 5:  Futility and Adults 
  
5.1.   Introduction     
        It is a relatively simple task to know when someone needs to receive critical care.  To help 
determine when that time has come, there are various types of admission criteria for critical care 
units that attempt to objectify a patient’s deteriorating condition via physiological and clinical 
criteria.1  It is a more difficult task to know who to exclude from admission to critical care.  It is 
also more difficult to know when it is time to discontinue the treatments provided by these 
specialized areas, especially when the treatments no longer provide a benefit to the patient or are 
seen to be medically futile. 
        It is common in all critical care units, such as neonatal, pediatric and adult, to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment when they are no longer providing a benefit to the patient, 
leading to most of the deaths in critical care.2  In most instances, this process in uncomplicated as 
the patient/families and providers are in agreement.  However, there are times when the issue of 
medical futility creates conflict between the patient/families and providers leading to what can be 
a struggle for the patient prolonging the dying process. 
        When referring to medical futility, the population that is most often the focus is adults.  Of 
the adult population, it is usually the elderly that are more apt to receive futile treatment at the 
end-of-life.  In the United States, those over 65 years of age account for over 50% of critical care 
patients, however, they comprise less than 15% of the overall population, although this is 
growing at a rapid rate.3  These elderly have a longer length of stay, higher mortality rate, and 
higher cost of care than those younger, with the 70-79 year olds having the highest admission 
rate.4  Chapter 5 examines futility and the adult population.  The first part of the chapter 
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addresses a theoretical framework based on competency versus capacity and the role autonomy 
plays, not only for the patient, but also for the family, health care providers, and community. The 
cost of end-of-life care is also examined as a problem that cannot be ignored.  The second part of 
Chapter 5 describes evidence based practices for the adult by addressing advance directives plus 
policies and legislation as potential solutions for medical futility.  Overtreatment, contradictions 
in treatment, and the nuances of withholding and withdrawing treatment with the presentation of 
palliative care as a viable option will also be addressed. 
 
5.II.  Theoretical Framework 
        The theoretical framework that embodies medical futility in adults, which ends up focusing 
on the elderly, is the ability to make independent and fully informed decisions about the 
treatments they receive or do not receive.   As the population has aged, and continues to do so, 
the presence of “cognitive impairment” has also increased making the assessment of decision 
making capacity more vital.5  This decision making capacity, as well as competence of these 
patients are complex concepts.  Not only are there decisions to be made regarding routine 
subjects, such as driving, living alone, and finances, but also health care decisions become more 
prevalent and critical with some facing end-of-life choices.6  This decision making ability puts 
the focus on the principle of autonomy.  To fully employ the principle of autonomy, the 
conditions of competence or capacity must be present.   
        This section examines competency and capacity from their definitions to considerations   
with a look at various approaches to end-of-life decisions.  Substituted judgment versus best 
interest will be discussed as ways for surrogate decision makers to approach end-of-life decisions 
when the patient lacks decision making capacity. 
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5.II.A.  Competency versus Capacity 
        Competence is defined as being able to complete a task or duty.7  Only judges, or the court, 
can determine whether a person is competent or incompetent.  Whereas, the term capacity is used 
in the medical arena which refers to whether the person has the capacity to understand the 
information and make appropriate decisions.8   The terms competence and capacity, and their 
opposites “incompetence” and “lack of decision making capacity”, are often used 
interchangeably, but they were first described as being different.  “Incompetence” is a term used 
by the court system when referring to a person who lacks competence, whereas, “lack of decision 
making capacity” is a term used by medical providers to describe a person who lacks the ability 
to make health care decisions.9   
        States vary as to their definitions of decision making capacity but the definitions usually 
involve the following four elements.  The patients need to: 1) understand the information 
provided regarding the treatment; 2) acknowledge the current medical situation to include their 
own personal values; 3) utilize logical rationale in making a decision; and 4) communicate their 
final decision.10  In turn, competence has been described as patients being able to 1) 
communicate a choice; 2) understand the information and issue; 3) manipulate the information; 
and 4) appreciate the information.11  During the 1990’s, many states found that the terminology 
for competence and decision making capacity was so similar that it was difficult to differentiate 
the two, therefore, many states now use the capacity terminology for both competence and 
capacity decisions.12 
        In determining decision making capacity of patients in critical care, first it is vital that the 
providers separate their beliefs, values, and opinions from those of the patients.13   Any physician 
can assess for decisional capacity, however, it is often delegated to a psychiatrist or psychologist 
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as they have had more experience with this assessment.14  The advantage of primary physicians 
doing the assessment is that they know the patient better and can therefore, see small changes 
that a physician who is seeing the patient for the first time might miss.15  Just as which physician 
is best to assess the decisional capacity of the patient, there are other considerations related to 
capacity.  Following is a discussion of these considerations. 
        5.II.A.1.  Considerations Related to Capacity 
        The process to determine decisional capacity begins with a conversation with a patient, 
while observing the patient’s behavior, then progresses to dialogue with family, friends, and 
staff.16  Other means include standardized assessment tools.  Several of these tools have shown a 
close correlation between expert assessment and scores on the tools.17  The standardized tools are 
easy to use and can help physicians, when psychiatrists or psychologists are not available, to 
assist in patient assessment for capacity.18 
        So many decisions hinge on the decisional capacity of the patient making it an ethical 
obligation for providers to, not only understand the concept, but also to advocate for the rights of 
the patient.  There are several considerations that are paramount in the decisional capacity 
process.  First, it is possible for a patient to be legally incompetent while still having the 
decisional capacity to make certain health care decisions.19  If such a situation would be present, 
the provider needs to seek legal counsel or request an ethics consult to assist in working through 
the right thing for the patient. 
        A second consideration focuses on the often thought premise that patients have decisional 
capacity as long as they agree to the medical advice or treatment and, conversely, that their 
decisional capacity is questionable when they go against medical advice, or refuse the 
treatment.20  It is more about the process the patient used to arrive at the decision and not what 
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the final decision is that the patient made.  It is not realistic to assess every patient for capacity, 
but when the risks of the medical treatment are high, compared to the benefits, there should be 
consideration given to the patient’s capacity.21  If there are any questions, then a formal 
determination of capacity is needed. 
        A third consideration is believing that the decisional capacity is an “all or nothing” 
situation.22  Patients may be able to make some health care decision but not others.  An example 
is that a patient may be able to decide regarding receiving antibiotic therapy for a cellulitis but 
not have the ability to decide regarding a complicated neurosurgical procedure which has many 
risks involved in having the procedure, as well as risks to not having the procedure.23  In line 
with the “all or nothing” premise is the belief that once determined to lack decisional capacity 
that this is a permanent state.24  Decisional capacity can fluctuate based on the patient’s 
condition, time of day, medications received, and the presence of delirium.25 
        A final consideration for decisional capacity is in the realm of mental illness.  A mental 
health diagnosis, such as depression or schizophrenia, does not automatically qualify as having a 
lack of decisional capacity.26  Even if there are thought disturbances or an involuntary 
commitment to a mental institution, each case must be considered separately for decisional 
capacity.27  The two leading causes for a lack of decisional capacity are delirium and dementia,  
which are considered psychiatric disorders, even though they may be a result of a physiological  
or medical etiology.28 
        For patients who are able to communicate, it is easy to determine decisional capacity.  For 
those in the critical care unit it is more difficult.  A discussion of approaches to use in 
determining decisional capacity in critical care follows. 
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        5.II.A.2.  Approaches to Determining Decisional Capacity 
        Determining decisional capacity in critically ill patients can be a daunting task.  One can 
appear to have the capacity to make simple decisions, yet, not have the capacity to make life and 
death decisions or those that involve life-sustaining treatment.29  The following concerns 
illustrate only part of the reasons why it is challenging to assess capacity in the critical care unit.  
First, there is often a mechanical ventilator preventing verbal communication, so in order to 
communicate, patients must be able to write, or be able to respond to yes or no questions by 
nodding their head, or point to letter boards to spell responses.30  If the ventilator is connected to 
a tracheostomy tube or a tube inserted through the nose, instead of a tube in the mouth, patients 
can form words with their mouth provided the person communicating with the patient can “lip 
read”.  Studies on patients who are mechanically ventilated reveal that approximately 50% can 
recall the ventilated experience, and that is in patients who have decisional capacity, leading to 
questions regarding the accuracy of assessing decisional capacity in ventilated patients.31 
        A second concern that affects the approach to determining decisional capacity in the critical 
care unit is the influence of medications, especially sedatives.  Patients who are mechanically 
ventilated are often receiving continuous intravenous sedation to decrease anxiety, to prevent 
injuries to self, to help assure a level of comfort, and to improve the efficacy of the ventilator.32  
Although there are benefits to sedating the ventilated patient, there are also repercussions which 
can have untoward effects on the patient.  These include longer critical care lengths of stay, 
longer duration of mechanical ventilation, increased complications associated with the ventilator, 
and cognitive deficiencies, such as delirium or post-traumatic stress disorder.33  The cognitive 
deficiencies from the sedation can make it impossible to accurately assess decisional capacity.  
As a result of these untoward effects of sedation for those who are mechanically ventilated, there 
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is a trend to use lighter sedation.  Studies indicate that the lighter sedation may be helpful to the 
staff as the patient is more alert and cooperative, however, the patient’s thinking is often unclear 
and can lead to additional stress and sleep deprivation which does not benefit the patient.34 
        An approach that has been presented for modulating decisional capacity is a sliding scale 
strategy which was first endorsed by the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.35  With the sliding scale 
strategy, the issue of capacity needs greater evidence as the risk involved with the decision to be 
made becomes greater.36   
        A way to utilize the sliding scale strategy is from a three level approach.  The first level 
considers decisions that are not dangerous as long as the patient exhibits “awareness” of the 
medical situation.37  These decisions usually have limited alternatives and are of high benefit/low 
risk, such as agreeing to a blood transfusion.38  The second level involves an increased level of 
understanding of the medical situation and its proposed treatment to include no treatment at all.39  
To refuse treatment involves a higher level of capacity, such as a patient newly diagnosed with 
lymphoma deciding to not receive chemotherapy because of the potential side effects which are 
offensive and frightening.40  The third level is the most rigorous and challenging as it involves an 
appreciation, as well as understanding, of the medical condition and its treatment.41  This level is 
where dangerous decisions are made, such as amputation of a limb. 
        The sliding scale approach implies that an individual’s capacity is contingent on the 
significance or outcome of the decision.42   There are those who have objected to the sliding 
scale in deciding decisional capacity.  This objection is based on the belief that one’s capacity 
does not vary with risk as stated in the sliding scale strategy.43  Instead one’s decisional capacity 
increases as the difficulty of the decision increases not as the “risk” of the outcome increases.44  
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There is nothing to support that more decisional capacity is needed to make risky decisions.  
Other objections to the sliding scale include the premise that it supports paternalistic behavior by 
providers.  This paternalistic behavior by providers is seen to limit the patients’ discretion for 
self-choice, or autonomy.45  Proponents of the sliding scale counter the objections with the belief 
that a sliding scale approach protects patient autonomy.46  When comparing injury versus 
autonomy, if the error is on the side of autonomy or capacity, serious harm may occur, whereas, 
if the error is on the avoidance of injury and incapacity there may be a violation of autonomy.47 
       Approaching patients at the end-of-life, or those who are receiving medically inappropriate 
treatments, determining decisional capacity, is the right thing to do.  However, the fact remains 
that the majority of patients in critical care lack decisional capacity as evidenced in a study of 
4250 critically ill patients where only 5% were considered to have capacity.48  To further 
complicate the critical care environment, the wishes of the patient are only known in 
approximately 20% of cases which comes from the family.49  It is not known whether the family 
speaks from a direct conversation with the patient or whether it is based on a guess or 
presumption.50  Nevertheless, the providers are left to depend on the family, or a designated 
surrogate decision maker, to assist with health care decisions in critical care at the end-of-life.  
Making decisions regarding end-of-life treatment for patients who no longer have decisional 
capacity is one of the most ethically demanding processes.51   Following is a discussion on 
surrogate decision making, its standards, to include substituted judgment plus the best interests 
standard, as well as potential problems with surrogate decision makers. 
5.II.B  Surrogate Decision Making 
        The majority of deaths that occur in critical care units, regardless of whether that is in the 
neonatal, pediatric, or adult units, are due to a “conscious” decision to discontinue life-sustaining 
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treatment.52  At this point in the patient’s care, patients most often cannot make decisions either 
due to the state of their illness or the fact that they lack decisional capacity.  Therefore, a 
surrogate decision maker, in collaboration with the providers, is left to make these end-of-life 
choices.  A surrogate decision maker is most often the next of kin, unless specifically stated in an 
advance directive.  Many states have enacted legislation which does hierarchical ranking of 
family members based on authority position in the family, such as first the spouse, then parents, 
then children, then siblings, etc.53  Other states, such as Colorado and Hawaii, have a proxy law 
where all “interested parties” meet and select a surrogate decision maker or “medical proxy”.54  
If an agreement cannot be reached, then one of the group goes to court and begins the 
guardianship process.55 
        It is estimated that surrogates make approximately 75% of medical decisions for those in 
critical care, which only adds to the stress of being a friend or family member of a loved one at 
the end-of-life.56  The surrogate role is one that few are prepared for, likewise, providers are 
often not prepared to effectively work with surrogates.57  Therefore, it becomes a learning 
experience on the part of both players—surrogates and providers. 
        In the process of decision making, there are standards that help guide the way, even though 
these standards are not always followed.  Instead other bases are used for the surrogate decision 
making.  Following is a discussion of these methods. 
        5.II.B.1.  Standards for Decision Making 
        The first standard for surrogate decision making is substituted judgment.  Substituted  
judgment is when a surrogate makes a decision based on the known preferences of the patient.58  
In other words, this is the decision patients would make if they were competent.59  These  
preferences have usually been explicitly stated to the surrogate or the surrogate believes, based 
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on statements made, that this would be the patient’s preference.  60   
        Substituted judgment is meant to be an extension of the patient’s autonomy and the extent 
to which this occurs varies.61   Research has shown that this standard is weak, but it still remains 
the preferred approach to decision making for the incompetent patient, or for one lacking 
decisional capacity, because in most cases it supports patient autonomy.62  The weakness of the 
standard is exhibited in three ways.  First, there is evidence that one’s end-of-life preferences 
change over time and that these changes are more apt to be less if written in an advance 
directive.63  Second, in a side-by-side study where surrogates were asked to state expected 
preferences of the patient and patients were asked to state their preferences, surrogates were 
accurate approximately 68% of the time.64  Efforts to increase conversations and utilize 
educational material were of minimal benefit.  Finally, research with patients has found that they 
do not want specific instructions to be followed if they cannot contribute to the decisions, but 
instead, they want input from all family members, as well as providers, in making life-sustaining 
decisions.65 
        A second standard that is used when a surrogate does not know the patient’s preferences or 
values is the best interests standard.  This is the standard used by parents for their children who 
are unable to let their wishes be known.  It is also used when adults are incapacitated all their life 
so preferences are never known.  The best interests standard involves making choices or 
decisions based on what a “reasonable person” in a similar situation would choose.66  Family 
members are usually in the best position to know values, interests, and religious views of the 
patient since this family relationship is based on love and intimacy not often found in other 
relationships.67  However, not all family relationships are loving and caring where each wills the 
best for the other.  There may be few family members and those who are located may have had 
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no meaningful interactions with the patient so there is little reason to believe they will know the 
patient’s values.  There are also many dysfunctional families so keeping the best interest of the 
patient in mind might not be possible.68 
        The challenge of the best interests standard is to be able to assess the surrogate’s perception 
of the patient’s best interest.  The surrogate does not have the same discretion in making 
decisions as the competent autonomous patient.  The decision has to be in line with what a 
reasonable person would decide in the same situation otherwise the decision is rejected.69 
         Besides the substituted judgment standard and the best interests standard, there are other 
surrogate basis for decision making.  The first is based on conversations between surrogates and 
patients, although only 66% end up using these conversations in the decision making process 
and, when they do, most of it is in the standard of substituted judgment.70  A second basis for the 
surrogate to use in making decisions is to rely on written documents which are most often 
advance directives.  The evidence shows that because wishes are put in writing, the families 
often do not take the next step and have follow up conversations about their written wishes so 
questions can be asked before the directives are invoked.71  A third basis for the surrogate to use 
in making decisions is based on their own intuition, optimism, faith belief, and values.72  Even 
when surrogates try to separate out their own personal views, it can be difficult, especially if they 
are stressed and fatigued. 
        As surrogate decision making is commonplace in critical care, it is not without its special 
concerns and potential problems.  Following is a discussion on some of these potential problems 
regarding surrogate decision making in critical care. 
        5.II.B.2.  Potential Problems 
        One of the major concerns related to decision making at the end-of-life in critical care is 
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when the patient lacks both decision making capacity and a surrogate decision maker.  It is not 
unusual for those without decisional capacity or a surrogate decision maker to also not have an 
advance directive.  It has been shown that one in 20 deaths in critical care have none of the 
three—decisional capacity, surrogate decision maker, or advance directives.73  The majority of 
states have no laws that provide guidance when these situations exist.  Those states that do have 
laws, some give authority to providers to make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment, 
some stipulate the appointment of a legal guardian to make the decisions, and others utilize a 
multi-disciplinary committee from within the institution.74  When there is not a surrogate to 
speak on behalf of the patient, it has been found that decisions are less open and more apt to 
express judgments regarding the patient’s social and individual value.75  The volume of these 
patients who lack decisional capacity, surrogates, and advance directives range from 6% to 24% 
of the critical care volume.76  The majority of these patients are older males, who are mentally ill 
or homeless, having lost contact with their families and are admitted for respiratory failure.77 
        When the patient is incapacitated without a surrogate decision maker, studies that have been 
done illustrate several key findings.  These include; 1) as many as one in six incapacitated 
patients in critical care do not have a surrogate decision maker for their entire stay; 2) the length 
of stay for these patients is longer than those with a surrogate, possibly due to the fact that their 
severity of illness is greater and time is taken to locate family or friends to assist with decision 
making; and 3) most often the primary physician for the patient collaborated with other  
physicians in making end-of-life decisions, versus going through the court system or contacting  
the ethics committee, despite state laws dictating this as action to be taken.78 
        A second potential problem when working with surrogates is clarifying the identity of the 
surrogate.  If patients have not put into writing who they wish to make their health care 
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decisions, then the institution is bound to comply with state laws whether that be by hierarchal 
rank or proxy.  The key is to communicate with all family members to be sure they understand 
who the designated surrogate will be, to affirm that the surrogate has decisional capacity, and to 
address what decisions the surrogate will be making.79 This is not a one-time communication but 
involves frequent communication that is a dialogue with all family members allowing for 
questions and answers. 
        A third concern when working with a surrogate decision maker is finding one who is 
uninvolved.  This surrogate may not have close ties with the patient or be aware of values and 
preferences which may require legal counsel or an ethics consult.80  Even if the surrogate does 
not know the patient well enough to utilize the substituted judgment standard, the best interests 
standard can still be applied. 
        A final concern relates to when there are multiple potential surrogates.  This situation may 
arise when the designated surrogate is unwilling or incapacitated, either physically or mentally to 
take on the responsibility.81  It can also be a major issue when there is conflict in the family.  
This conflict could be evidenced when the patient has not begun divorce proceedings but is in 
another close relationship and the married partner insists on making all decisions.   In such cases, 
judicial statues may help the resolution, however, it leads to a delay in making any immediate 
health care decisions.    
        Being competent or having capacity is the pivotal framework for futility in the adult and 
they support the basic principle of autonomy.  When considering capacity and autonomy at the 
end-of-life, a balance is needed between self-determination and the avoidance of injury or harm.   
        The next section examines end-of-life care with a focus on the ethics goals, especially 
autonomy.  The cost problem identified with end-of-life care will also be explored. 
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5.III.  End-of-Life Care 
        An integral part of the “human condition”, that is never more prominent than at the end-of-
life, is the innate inclination for survival.82  With this inclination for survival, death is not an 
option to the point that patients or surrogates will often choose pain and suffering in hopes of 
“beating the odds” by trying one more treatment or procedure versus palliative care.83   Having a 
surgical procedure at the end-of-life has little effect on prolonging life or adding to the quality of 
that life with over 25% of Medicare beneficiaries reporting a surgical procedure within the last 
three months of life.84  Yet, many providers continue to discuss all possible treatments for any 
given condition whether they are in the best interest of a particular patient or whether the 
provider believes they are futile or medically inappropriate.85  This is all done to honor patient 
respect and autonomy illustrating a more patient-driven approach than a patient-centered one.  
Patient-centered would include increased communication between patient/family and providers 
to choose the best option for the goals of the patient.86     
        Respect for autonomy is at the core of bioethics and is identified as one of the basic ethical 
principles.87   This principle emerged in part due to the atrocities performed in Nazi 
concentration camps that led to the Nuremberg Code.88   Furthermore, the ethical debate that 
surrounded both Karen Quinlan (1970’s) and Nancy Cruzan (1980’s) were key in establishing 
autonomy as the primary ethical principle in medicine.89  
        Following is a discussion on the ethics goals with particular attention to autonomy and the 
role it plays for the patient, family, providers and community.  An example will be presented 
using the case of Sam Golubchuk to illustrate the principle of autonomy. 
5.III.A.  Ethics Goals 
         The ethics goals that are the focus at the end-of-life are four fold.  First is to relieve  
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suffering.  At the end-of-life the ethical benchmarks are not only to do no harm, but to also 
relieve suffering.90  This suffering is not always just in the physical sense, such as pain and other 
somatic symptoms.  Findings indicate that one in four end-of-life cancer patients suffer 
“unbearably” with half of these experiencing psychological, social, and existential suffering.91  
Although palliative care providers are prepared to address all types of suffering, other providers 
are not, and can benefit from additional education on this topic.92 
        The second ethics goal is to assist the patient to experience living while in the process of 
dying.  This means providing a peaceful environment, which can be a challenge in the critical 
care arena, and providing an opportunity to have the remaining moments be as meaningful as 
possible.93 
        The third ethics goal is to respect the dignity of the patient by supplying the patient’s sense 
of identity to the very end-of-life.94  There is a correlation with loss of dignity and feeling of 
being a burden to others.95  With further clarification, patients conceive dignity as a sense of 
autonomy or freedom that tends to diminish as the end-of-life approaches.96  Therefore, a focus 
needs to be on maintaining individual identity as the end-of-life nears. 
        The fourth and final ethics goal is the respect for persons which supports self-determination 
or autonomy.  Terminally ill patients have identified having a sense of control at the end-of-life 
as a major contributor to their quality of life.97  The patients in critical care may lack the ability 
to communicate their needs, but the goal should be to honor them based on advance directives or  
feedback from surrogates. 
        Autonomy has long played a part for the patient, however, there is a role that autonomy 
plays for the family, provider and community.   Following is further discussion on how 
autonomy plays a role for the patient, family, provider, and community. 
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        5.III.A.1.  Autonomy:  Patient, Family, and Provider 
        Autonomy is one of the four basic ethical principles.  It is defined and explained in a far- 
reaching manner.  Autonomy is often likened to integrity, independence, free will and 
individuality.98  It is also associated with the qualities of self-assertion, awareness of one’s own 
interests, and freedom from responsibility.99  Autonomy can be referred to as actions, beliefs, 
rules, principles, and thoughts with the one common element being that autonomy is a 
worthwhile value to have.100 
        Starting in the 1970’s, the renewed awareness of both the Nazi medical experiments during 
World War II and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, plus the civil rights movement, as well as the 
“second wave-feminism, led to a shift away from paternalism.101  This shift was to a model of 
autonomy for the patient where self-determination was the rule that providers were to follow.102  
Not unlike futility, autonomy has also been difficult to define in a simple standard definition, but 
autonomy implies both the patients “right” to make their own choices, as well as others 
“obligation” to let them make these choices.103 
       A patient who has been found to be legally competent, or to have decisional capacity to 
make health care decisions, may make the decision to forgo certain or all treatments.104  There 
are certain exceptions where the patients may not refuse treatment as doing so may harm others, 
such as refusing treatment for certain infectious diseases.  This is based on the Harm Principle 
where an individual’s freedom can be restricted if it may harm others.105  There are also religious 
practices that may serve to guide the patients’ autonomous decisions such as donating organs, 
which has limitations in some religions.106 
       Although an autonomous patient may refuse treatment, this does not equate to requesting or 
demanding treatment.107  This scenario usually presents itself at or near the end-of-life when  
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further treatment is deemed medically inappropriate, or futile, by the providers and is being 
requested by the family or surrogate.108 
        Beginning in the 1990’s, the shift from the individual focused on more of a “relational 
autonomy” which emphasized the family’s voice into decisions.109  At the end-of-life, the family 
can feel a great burden as they become the decision makers.  This burden is related to time spent 
at the bedside, energy depleted, stress from time away from family, and financial strain from 
time away from the job.110  The rights and responsibilities of family members is not always clear 
and it can become more confusing and stressful as patients are no longer able to speak for 
themselves.  This confusion is compounded when there are cultural, religious, and 
socioeconomic factors.111  For family members who value their autonomy, it is important for 
them to maintain their self-determination to manage their own lives during the time when they 
have a patient in critical care near the end-of-life. 
        The autonomy of providers most often is referring to the physician.  This is usually involved 
when the family or surrogate demands treatment that the physicians object to because of the 
belief that it would not provide medical benefit.112  The belief is that the original initiation of 
medical futility as a reason to not provide certain treatments was a resistance to patient 
autonomy.113  This led to a negative connotation for physician autonomy often to be equated with 
paternalism.  However, they are different in that paternalism does not always consider the 
patient’s best interest and physician autonomy tends to do so.114 
        The patient-physician relationship is one of “mutual obligation” so that the context of one 
must be balanced with the context of the other.115  The autonomy of the physician can be 
considered from three points of view:  1) as an individual; 2) as a physician who is the clinician;  
and 3) as a member of a profession.116   The physician is unable to separate the individual from   
274 
 
the physician with all the personal values, beliefs and religious views, however, it is the  
physicians’ responsibility to be aware of these personal conflicts and  make a conscious effort to 
not impose them on the patient.117 
        The physician autonomy also comes with the expectations of expert knowledge to perform 
the duties of the job, which the public expects.118  The physician must be allowed to use this 
knowledge, expertise, and judgment in making health care decisions in collaboration with 
patients/families.  This does not mean physicians can be made to do anything that is beyond their 
personal values.  It does mean that they need to inform the patient/family of choices that are  
within medical standards, to include transfer to another physician or facility, if the physician  
does not agree with the choices.119 
        The autonomy of the patient/family is often considered while the autonomy of the provider 
is often overlooked, however, there is another player in the form of the community which plays a 
role in the futility debate.  Following is a discussion of the autonomy of the community followed 
by a case example that illustrates the role autonomy can play in concert with decisional capacity 
and medically inappropriate treatment. 
        5.III.A.2.  Autonomy:  Community with Case Example 
        Community autonomy cannot be separated from personal autonomy as any intervention that 
is done for the benefit of the community needs to be weighed against the effect on personal 
autonomy.120  There are times when the community needs to take on a paternalistic role when 
there is reason to believe that an individual’s autonomy is being threatened, such as from a 
public health danger.121  Still there is more that can be done in the community-personal 
autonomy relationship which is likely to change based on two causes.  First, the continuing  
increase in respect for individual autonomy will impact the community by increasing their 
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awareness of how community factors impact personal health.122  Second, is the increased  
presence of communities in health care delivery, moving from an individual-centered view to a 
community-centered view of health, which benefits the greater good.123 
        For patients in critical care who are at the end-of-life receiving medical treatments, there is 
an on-going debate and concern regarding the expanded use of resources that are needed to 
provide and pay for this care.  An example of when the use of resources places the personal 
autonomy of patients and families in conflict with the community autonomy, is when the 
resources are supported via pressure for taxes for public insurers.124  The end-of-life medically 
inappropriate treatment, not only affects the economic factor, but it also limits the availability of  
 precious critical care beds to those who might medically benefit from them. 
        A case that illustrates the autonomy conflict between patient autonomy, family autonomy,  
and provider autonomy is the case of Sam Golubchuk (Mr. G.).   Mr. G. was an 84 year old 
Orthodox Jew, from Manitoba Canada, who in January 2008 suffered a severe brain injury after 
a fall.125  It was agreed by all caregivers that he was not brain dead nor was he in a persistent 
vegetative state, with speculation that he was in a minimal conscious state (MCS).126  Those in a 
MCS indicate no verbal or non-verbal communication, although it is difficult to differentiate 
from a persistent vegetative state.127 
        With the passage of a month, in February 2008, after being mechanically ventilated and fed 
through a gastrostomy tube, Mr. G’s health continued to deteriorate and the providers wanted to 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.128  The patient’s daughter and son were in opposition to this 
action, which they believed the patient would also be opposed to, as this was in conflict to 
Orthodox Jewish law.129  As this debate was transpiring, the College of Physicians and Surgeons 
of Manitoba issued a guideline related to life-sustaining treatment.  This guideline stated that the 
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minimum goal of life-sustaining treatment was for the patient to maintain or recover a degree of 
function so as to be aware of self and the environment in order to participate in life.130  If the 
physician determines this degree of participation is not possible for the patient, then life-
sustaining treatment may be withdrawn without family approval or consent.131 
        As steps were being taken to withdraw life sustaining treatment, the family took the case 
through the court system and they obtained a legal ruling against discontinuing the life-
sustaining treatment.132   The patient died before the trial date of natural causes. 
        There were several key issues in this case.  First, it is an insult to the principle of patient 
autonomy as evidenced by the guidelines from the College of Physicians and Surgeons.133  The 
second key issue is that patient autonomy is limited in that some requests can and should be 
overruled based on the circumstances.134  The third issue is that the physician’s autonomy and 
professional autonomy were challenged as the primary physician believed further treatment was 
“unethical”.135  The primary physician, who had decided to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, 
resigned his privileges from the hospital instead of complying with the court order to treat the 
patient.136  In his resignation letter, he made reference to the large skin ulcers on Mr. G. as 
“torture” stating that surgical intervention would be needed to “hack’ away his “infected flesh” 
and to inflict this “assault” was not only “grotesque” but an “abomination”---“I can’t do it”.137  
Other providers were, likewise, resigning and refusing to care for the patient.  The fourth issue is 
that in today’s society there is a strong belief that as long as the patient is paying for it (or third 
party payer), then the physician should provide it, and the decision is the patient’s.138  The fifth 
and final issue reflects back on autonomy and how patient/family autonomy is not an absolute as  
providers need the authority to exert their professional autonomy by refusing to provide futile   
treatment.139  
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       Whenever the end-of-life care, with the treatments that go with it, are discussed, the 
barriers to end-of-life care, including the cost problem, eventually become part of the  
discussion.  At no time does this discussion become more pointed and controversial than when 
medically futile treatments are added to the equation.  Following is a presentation of the barriers 
to optimum end-of-life care including statistics to describe the cost problem and approaches that 
can be useful to minimize these barriers. 
5.III.B.  Barriers to End-of-Life Care 
        There are four major barriers that can get in the way of making end-of-life care an optimal 
experience.  First, there are barriers at the patient/family level.  These include the inability of 
patient/family to accept death as a normal process, the patient’s attitude toward their care which 
include such things as pain management, and insufficient or lack of health insurance.140  
        The second barrier pertains to those that come via the various providers.  Although this 
most often relates to physicians, it can be nurses, social workers, and the various therapies such 
as rehab or respiratory.  The biggest barrier comes back to communication between patient and 
providers as well as between and among providers.141  This communication involves having 
honest critical conversations with families regarding prognosis and when it is time to involve a 
comfort versus cure approach.142 
        The third barrier relates to the health care system.  Too often end-of-life care is fragmented 
and uncoordinated with questionable coverage by third party payers.143  In addition, rules, 
regulations, and cost containment efforts put additional pressure on all health care providers. 
       The fourth and final barrier is a result of society, especially related to attitudes related to 
death and dying.  The media has often portrayed death, especially cancer death, as frightening 
and painful leading to the movement toward physician assisted death as the end-of-life nears.144 
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        The utilization of critical care beds, with the associated high costs, has continued to escalate 
over the years.  If health care is to be affordable providing the resources to patients as needed, 
both consumers and providers need to realize that cost control is a fact for end-of-life 
discussions.  Following is a discussion on the cost problem with suggested approaches.   
        5.III.B.1.  The Nature of the Cost Problem 
        Overall, health care costs continue to climb with the most current data reported in 2015 for 
2014 indicating an increase of 5.3% from 2013.145  This increase which equates to $3.0 trillion, 
or $9525/per person, yielding a 17.5% of the Gross Domestic Product being spent on health care 
in 2014, an increase from 17.3% in 2013.146  Critical care has, historically, been seen as a high 
cost area that gets looked at when cost containment is discussed, or ways of cutting costs are 
needed.  Although room rates vary across the nation, following are examples from the  Cleveland 
Medical Center for “charges” per day for the following rooms as of January 1, 2016:  standard 
semi private room $2120;  adult intensive care $6160; pediatric intensive care $9470; and 
neonatal intensive care $8760.147  These are only room charges and do not cover other charges 
for treatments, equipment, supplies, or pharmaceuticals.  
        Many have made suggestions on how to reduce the cost of health care, especially at the end 
of life.  These include initiatives on the elderly, those receiving medically inappropriate 
treatments, or those whose death is imminent.148  An additional explanation for limiting critical 
care was given by the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks 
for Treatment (SUPPORT).  The SUPPORT study found after studying a large group of critically 
ill patients with less than a predictable six month life expectancy of approximately 50%, that 
they died at a large expense after being in a coma for at least 10 days, on a ventilator in pain, 
with a do not resuscitate order written two days before death.149  Further work with SUPPORT 
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found that it is difficult to identify those who have a short life expectancy or that denying them 
treatment in critical care would have led to any compelling savings.150  However, this did not 
mean palliative care did not have significant value for all patients whether there was a large cost 
savings or not. 
        Another study which looked at data from 2000 to 2010 reported in 2016, was the first to 
analyze the use of critical care beds based on age specific data.151 Some of the findings from this 
study include:  1) the increase in adult critical care beds corresponded to the increase in adult 
population but the opposite was not true for the neonatal population where the beds increased but 
the population decreased.  The neonatal bed increase was due to increased survival of premature 
infants and improved prenatal care; 2) the increase in hospital bed usage reflects Roemer’s Law 
of the 1950’s that implies the more beds there are the more beds will be used; 3) proportionately 
there are more users of Medicaid beds than those used by Medicare patients.  Medicaid patients 
use more critical care beds as they are often younger and in poorer health then the Medicare 
patients waiting to access the health care system until they are very ill.152 
        Of all the expenditures in the last year of life, approximately 33% are spent in the last 
month.153  The majority of these last month costs are for such things as mechanical ventilation as 
well as resuscitation, accounting for 78% of the costs in the last year.154  What was shown to 
make a difference was when there were end-of-life discussions between patients and providers.  
This difference was shown in less life-sustaining treatments and fewer critical care admissions, 
with no effect on outcomes, plus there was a perceived better quality of life.155  A final study 
with approximately 2.1 million patients was completed from 2008-2012, in ages greater than 80 
(42%) and ages greater than 65 (28%) with 18% having a chronic illness that required prior 
hospitalization.156  Of these selected patients, interventions were to include advance care 
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planning with palliative care.  The findings were as follows:  1) depending on the effectiveness 
of the interventions, the range of savings is $34,000 to $800,000 per patient; and 2) advance care 
planning is more effective in reducing costs than palliative care but both are effective.157  Based 
on the United States spending more than $80 billion on critical care per year, results can be  
anticipated to be a potential savings of $8.8 billion (11%) over the course of a year with the 
implementation of advance care planning plus palliative care.158 
        The cost of end-of-life treatments in critical care and medically inappropriate treatments is 
something that cannot be ignored.  Advance care planning and palliative care show promise not 
only for addressing the cost problem, but also for removing barriers to optimal end-of-life care.  
Following is a discussion on these and other approaches to removing barriers. 
        5.III.B.2.  Approaches to Removing Barriers 
        Of all the approaches to removing barriers to end-of-life care, not only is palliative care 
linked with cost savings, but it also can decrease pain with symptom management, offer 
emotional support to patient as well as family, and increase patient/family satisfaction.159  
Although palliative care is becoming more prevalent in institutions, there are still barriers to its 
integration into critical care.  These barriers include the following:  1) confusion of palliative 
care with hospice care by patients as well as providers; 2) concern that palliative care will 
“hasten” death; 3) the view that critical care and palliative care are opposing approaches rather 
than “complementary”; 4) inadequate preparation of providers in skills to provide high quality  
palliative care; and 5) excessive demands on critical care providers without appropriate   
compensation for palliative care excellence.160   
        Advance care planning is another initiative for removing barriers to end-of-life care.  
However, when advance care planning, followed by an advance directive, is done in the acute 
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care setting the results are disappointing, plus they are not always followed.161  Whereas, when  
the advance care planning and advance directives are completed in the community, the results  
are more favorable, not only for the control of costs, but also for the benefit of the patient.162 
        Inherent in all approaches to improving end-of-life care is communication.  Communication 
skills, like any other skill, must be taught, learned, and practiced in order to be effective and 
accomplish its expected outcomes.163  Strategies that have shown to improve communication 
include frequent formal and informal family meetings, daily team consensus discussions on the 
patient’s progress with a plan of care, proactive ethics consultations, and proactive case findings 
by a palliative care team.164  It is key to have the major providers involved in all family 
discussions such as physicians, nurses, as well as social workers and that there is open, honest 
dialogue in a sensitive manner utilizing knowledge of the patient’s/families’ values and 
beliefs.165 
        Additional approaches to providing end-of-life care include enhanced communication plus 
four practices to optimize that care.  The first practice is to enhance one’s personal comfort with 
death.  The majority of physicians have not been trained to deal with uncertainty, whether that be 
the uncertainly of diagnosis, prognosis, or death which can lead to “avoidance behavior”.166  
Therefore, the place to start is for providers to deal with their own death, with its associated grief 
and loss, which means outside help may be needed so that the patient and family can have 
discussions with the providers in an honest and open manner.167 
        The second practice is to create an environment for the crucial conversations.  These 
conversations are important, therefore, choosing a quiet protected space away from the chaos of 
the critical care environment is key, along with having the right people present for the  
conversation.168   The “right” people include key family members, as well as those providing  
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care to the patients, both physicians and nurses.  Having a meeting with the team before the 
family meeting, much like a dress rehearsal, helps set the goals for the meeting and gets the team 
on the same page before the family is brought to the meeting. 
        The third practice is for providers to be willing to let go of all the control or to at least begin 
to do so.  Whenever a family has a patient in critical care, especially adult critical care, they are 
besieged with rules from what to touch, when to visit, how long, etc. so they soon have no say 
while still dealing with an ill and often dying family member.  By allowing the family more 
access to the patient, plus the ability to participate in the care of the patient, as well as the 
opportunity to see that providers do not have all the answers and can show their discomfort, can 
do much to help family members.169 
        The fourth and final practice is to facilitate end-of-life decisions.  When a family is already 
consumed with guilt, sadness, anger, and grief it is unfair to add to the pile of emotions with a 
decision about “pulling the plug”.170  It is okay to evoke the patient’s wishes and to share 
thoughts of how the provider would act if they were in the family’s position.  The next step is to  
give the family time to process the information with a follow-up meeting to answer questions 
and proceed with a decision.171 
        With the struggles that present themselves in end-of-life care, which range from various 
players seeking autonomy to the constant presence of cost control, both palliative care and 
advance care planning offer hope for the future.  There continues to be initiatives that have been 
tried or are being tried from a different approach in hopes of addressing medically inappropriate 
treatment or medical futility.  The next section focuses on medical futility and what various  
institutions, states, or national legislatures have implemented in hope of providing solutions to 
medically inappropriate treatment. 
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5.IV.  Medical Futility and Potential Solutions 
        Medical futility, or medically inappropriate treatment, continues to occur in all critical care 
units in the world for multiple reasons.  The most insurmountable reason is that futility defies 
any standard definition so it is a subjective concept that varies from patient to patient and 
situation to situation.172  Despite that roadblock, there have been attempts to develop policies, 
use the court system, or develop legislation to help approach and settle the conflicts that 
invariably arise regarding medical futility.  Some of these attempted actions have had more 
success in accomplishing the desired goals than others.  The first part of this section will address 
advance directives to include their historical development and types.  The second part of this 
section discusses policies and legislation to include the Texas Advance Directive Act (TADA) as 
well as Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST). 
5.IV.A.  Advance Directives 
       Advance directives came about as a means to help patients have a voice at the end-of-life 
regarding their own wishes.  They are to help ensure patient autonomy when patients no longer 
can speak for themselves.173  Advance directives also improve the quality of care at the end-of-
life as well as reduce health care costs.174  Starting in the 1970’s (Karen Ann Quinlan) into the 
1990’s (Nancy Cruzan), these two cases brought the importance of end-of-life care planning to 
the attention of the public.175  The use of advance directives, although well intentioned, has not 
been as successful as was once hoped.176  Even with this limited success, advance directives are 
still worthy of retaining in theory, but a different approach may be needed.  Following is a 
discussion of the historical development of advance directives, the various types of directives, 
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) attempt to increase the completed directives 
via a payment system to providers. 
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        5.IV.A.1  Historical Development 
        Documented back to 1914, following a malpractice case, the lower courts found in favor of 
the physician and institution, however, the Court of Appeals issued a ruling in favor of the 
plaintiff stating that humans have the right to decide what is to be done to their body.177   
        It was in the 1960’s that attempts were made to legalize tools that were called advance 
directives, such as the living wills, durable power of attorney and disposition of a proxy.178  
However, the legislation of the two laws, living will laws and durable power of attorney laws, 
did not occur until after two significant court decisions.  The first was Karen Quinlan, which 
produced the first state supreme court decision regarding end-of-life and led to the living will 
law in 1976.179  The second court decision was Nancy Cruzan, which produced the first U.S. 
Supreme Court decision on end-of-life, in 1990, and led to the durable power of attorney law.180  
In both of these cases, the parents of the young women requested they be removed from life 
support, after a period of time, when they did not improve following their illness.  The legal 
system was used and eventually permission was granted, however, Karen Quinlan went on to 
live 10 years sustained by tube feedings and Nancy Cruzan died within the month following 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.181  The parents of both Quinlan and Cruzan were in long 
involved conflict with, not only the legal system, but also with physicians and the hospitals who 
were all struggling to come to terms with the end-of-life issues. 
       It is believed that all the publicity regarding the Nancy Cruzan case, as well as the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, helped lead to the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA) of 1990.182 
The family of Nancy Cruzan proved to be very eloquent in speaking for those who could not 
speak for themselves and, although work had begun on the Act long before the Supreme Court 
ruling, it only added to the support that something had to be done.183  The PDSA became part of 
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the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in 1990.184  The Act requires that health care 
institutions, who receive funding from Medicare and Medicaid, inquire if the patient has an 
advance directive, if so, could they have it brought in for the medical record and if they do not 
have one, then information is to be offered.185  The patient is to receive all this information upon 
admission to the facility and the caregivers are to document the discussion, plus what 
information was given to the patient in the medical record.  The Joint Commission also requires 
the organizations they survey to ask patients pertinent questions regarding advance directives, 
offering information and education to the patient, followed by thorough documentation of this in 
the medical record.186 
        The most current effort to enhance and increase advance care planning and advance 
directives began January 1, 2016.  This was when the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) 
began to pay for voluntary advance care planning under the Medicare Physician Fee Scheduling 
(MPFS) and the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS).187  Physicians, as well 
as non-physician practitioners, can bill CMS each time there is a 30 minute discussion with a 
patient regarding advance care planning or advance directives, either when it is medically 
necessary or as part of an annual wellness visit (AWV).188    After six months since 
implementation of the reimbursement for provider conversations regarding advance care 
planning, only 14% of providers have billed for these conversations citing they are not sure what 
to say and are concerned the patient will give up hope.189 
        Research indicates that over 60% of those over 18 years of age want their end-of-life wishes 
observed.190  However, the most current data reflects that only 18-30% of Americans have 
completed an advance directive.191  Patients state the main reasons for not completing advance 
directives are that they do not know what they are, or that their family knows that they want.192  
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Additional reasons that completing advance directives are delayed are that it is difficult to 
discuss end-of-life issues, patients change their minds often, and patients wait for providers to 
initiate the conversation.193  Fear is another reason to not complete advance directives.  These 
fears include fear of substandard care or neglect if there is an advance directive, as well as fear of 
withdrawal of care before it is appropriate, and fear of not having the advance directive 
followed.194 Patients who are more apt to have advance directives include those who are older,  
have a higher level of education, are of a higher socioeconomic status, and are of the white 
Caucasian race.195 
        The presence of an advance directive is not to take the place of frequent communication 
between patient/family and provider to ensure that decisions previously made have not 
changed.196  These discussions should be not only with the patient, but also with key family 
members, and should be directed communication focusing on meeting the patient’s needs.197 
        When an individual does decide to complete an advance directive, there are two basic types.  
Following is a discussion on these types. 
        5.IV.A.2.  Types of Advance Directives 
        Luis Rutner, a human-rights lawyer, brought forth the first advance directive proposed by 
the Euthanasia Society in 1967, which was referred to as a “living will”.198 There are basically 
only two types of advance directives.  The treatment directive, or living will, and the proxy 
directive, or medical durable power of attorney (MDPOA).199 
        The treatment directive, or living will, by its name conveys an importance, as well as legal 
meaning to the document, which is often relegated to a location with all legal documents and 
never looked at again.200  The living will, completed by an individual while fully aware, details 
the types of treatment preferred at the end-of-life, if unable to express preferred wishes.201 
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        There are three factors to consider when living wills are discussed.  First, the absence of a 
living ill does not translate to meaning the patient wants “everything” done at the end-of-life.202  
These end-of-life treatment concerns need to be discussed whether there is a living will or not.  
Second, the presence of a living will does not translate into forgoing treatment at the end-of-life 
because living wills can differentiate what not to receive, as well as what treatment is wanted.203  
Therefore, the living will must be read in collaboration with the patient/family and providers.  
Third, CPR needs to be addressed separately from the living will, unless it is specifically 
addressed in the document, because the presence of a living will does not mean do not 
resuscitate.204. 
        The strengths of a living will are as follows:  1) it allows a patient to put choices and wishes 
in writing; 2) the usefulness is commensurate with the detail; and 3) it becomes a communication 
tool for all concerned regarding the care of the patient.205  The major weaknesses of a living will 
are:  1) it is impossible to list all possible conditions and contingencies in one document; and 2) 
the “laundry list” approach may leave out too many options leaving family and providers at a 
loss looking for clues on what to do in any given situation.206 
        The second type of advance directive is the proxy directive, or medical durable power of 
attorney.  In this advance directive, individuals select someone to make all medical decisions 
when they can no longer do so.207  The strengths of a MDPOA are:  1) it is an advantage for 
providers to have a designated person to communicate with and to assist in the decision making 
process at the end-of-life; 2) the patient’s choose who they want to make their health care 
decisions rather than it being left to family members or surrogate, if there is no one designated; 
and 3) some patients find it unnecessary to complete a living will if they have faith in the  
MDPOA to follow their wishes in all circumstances.208  The weaknesses of the MDPOA include: 
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1) those named MDPOA may be reluctant to take the responsibility when the actual time arrives  
to do so; 2) many individuals are not able to be the “all” to anybody when the time comes, unless  
something spells out the patient’s wishes in writing; and 3) there may be no one to take the  
responsibility of a MDPOA due to the mobility of Americans and the social isolation of society, 
plus families are often estranged or deceased.209 
        Advance directives are one approach to help ease the burden of medically inappropriate 
treatment at the end-of-life.  Other attempts to help provide solutions to this dilemma have been  
the development of policies and enactment of legislation.  Following is a discussion on these 
approaches. 
5.IV.B.  Policies and Legislation 
        Many institutions and providers have long struggled with the concept of medical futility, or 
medically inappropriate treatment, and how best to approach it or to “deal” with it at the bedside.  
In the majority of cases, there is communication and dialogue between families and providers in 
critical care that eventually comes to a collaborative decision which is best for the patient that 
minimizes pain and suffering.210  However, this is not always the case as these exceptions get all 
the attention, even when exemplary communication and superb relational skills may not resolve 
the conflicts that arise at the end-of-life.211 
        To help resolve the conflicts that occur regarding futile treatments, answers were sought by 
putting solutions into a written format.  In the middle to late 1990’s, professional organizations, 
as well as policy advocates, encouraged the development of institutional policies on futility to 
help with the conflicts that were arising at the end-of-life.212  In addition, in order to give 
additional strength to a policy, some states such as Texas, took policies through the legislative  
process.  Following is a discussion on the policies and legislation for addressing end-of-life  
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concerns. 
        5.IV.B.1.  Policy Development 
        An approach that institutions have used in establishing futility policies is a multi-
institutional approach.  Sometimes that is a policy between hospitals in a location or region, such 
as Houston, Texas where three hospitals came together to develop a policy.213  Other times it is a 
policy that is applied to institutions within a system such as the Mercy Health System which used 
the Houston policy as a guide.214  Whether multiple institutions or a single institution develops 
the policy, the method that is most often used is a process approach.  Because of the difficulty in 
defining futility, policies are best served by not trying to spell out a definition.  The best  
approach is detailing what steps to take when the providers believe the patient is receiving  
medically futile treatment plus a conflict exists between the family and providers.215 
        From the experience of various institutions who have developed futility policies, some best 
practices have emerged.  One is when putting medically futile policies in writing, wording is 
always important.  The Houston policy makes a conscious effort to avoid the term “futile care’ as 
care is never futile.216  Another best practice is to put a role for hospital administration in the 
policy so the burden of any action taken is not borne only by the clinicians.217  Most of the 
policies utilize the ethics committee of the institution as a mediator when conflict between 
families and providers occurs with many institutions finding that having this in writing in the 
policy makes it happen often leading to a resolution of the dispute.218 
        Recommendations for inclusion in futility policies are numerous with the top three 
described as follows.  First, a key component of the policies is to have an interdisciplinary 
committee develop the policy, review/revise it annually, and review each case layering it with 
bureaucracy to protect patients, family and providers.219  Second, critical care must never lose 
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sight of its two primary goals which are to provide acute treatment that has a reasonable 
expectation for survival outside the unit and, if unable to do so, then to provide palliative care 
through the remainder of life.220  Third, the presence of futile treatment, or medically 
inappropriate treatment, is to be decided on a case-by-case and situation-by-situation basis 
avoiding the use of the term “futile”.221 
        When the basic policy statements are included in the policy then the mere procedural 
aspects can be addresses such as 1) enlisting second opinions when there are potential medically 
inappropriate treatments in the critical care unit; 2) keep the family and surrogate informed of all 
actions to include ethics committee sessions so they can be present; 3) offer transfer to another 
physician or institution providing assistance with the process; and 4) Communicate! 
Communicate! Communicate!222  Of these, the fourth which stresses communication has shown 
that the lack of genuine honest conversations often leads to an impasse between families and 
providers early in the patient’s progress.223  As a result, providers tend to make up their mind, 
share it with families who then feel disrespected, as well as mistrustful and unheard, so they “dig 
in their heels” even more resulting in a standstill in the care of the patient.224 
        Even with some prescribed standards that are best to include in a futility policy, there are 
still differences between the various institutional policies.  The major differences include the 
following:  1) some policies allow for the providers to have unilateral decision making authority 
to the point of discontinuing futile treatment without the family’s consent, while others gave the 
ultimate decision making to the patient/family; and 2) many policies recommend involving the 
ethics committee, but rarely is it a requirement.225 
        Overall, for those institutions who have developed policies on medical futility the results 
have been positive.  These positive results have been an improvement in the quality of life for  
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patients at the end-of-life, as well as a reduction in conflicts between families and providers at  
this difficult time.226   Actual data to illustrate policy effectiveness is difficult to quantify with 
most of the data being subjective feedback. 
        Despite institutional futility policies in place to help confront medically inappropriate 
treatment, physicians were reluctant to fully operationalize them fearing litigation, although this 
was rarely tested.227  One state, Texas, approached the futility debate in the form of legislation 
which became the Texas Advance Directives Act of 1999.  Following is an examination of this 
act as well as a discussion on Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST). 
        5.IV.B.2.  Texas Advance Directives Act and POLST 
        In 1999, the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 
issued guidelines on medical futility.  These guidelines recommended a process-oriented 
approach to settling disputes with attempts to transfer patients and, if that failed, then the futility 
treatment could be discontinued.228  Shortly after the action of the AMA Council, the Texas 
legislature passed the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) of 1999. 
       The TADA put in place a step-by-step process to follow whenever there was debate between 
family and providers regarding the provision of medically inappropriate treatment that cannot be 
resolved through frequent conversations.  The key provisions include: 1) the provider’s refusal to 
continue or begin treatment that is seen as medically inappropriate is reviewed by an institutional 
appointed committee, most often an interdisciplinary ethics committee, of which the providers 
for the patient do not attend; 2) the family may attend the consultative committee with a 48 hour 
notice; 3) the committee will report the results of the meeting in writing to both the family and 
place a copy in the medical record; 4) if the committee is unable to resolve the dispute, the 
institution, working with the family, will attempt to transfer the patient to another provider and 
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institution; 5) if after 10 days no provider/institution has been found to accept the patient, then 
the treatment may be withheld or withdrawn; 6) the family or surrogate may request a 
continuance from the court to find another provider; and 7) if no continuance is granted by the 
court, the treatment may be withdrawn granting civil and criminal immunity to the provider.229 
        Some critics of the TADA have stated that their concerns are both political and 
constitutional.  The political concern is that the providers, mostly physicians, are granted too 
much power.  Physicians make the medically inappropriate decisions, they sit on the ethics 
committees that can help support or refute the medically inappropriate treatment decisions, and 
then they are immune from civil or criminal prosecution.230  The constitutional concern relates to 
its vagueness, which should make it void, plus its use breaches the due process for patients’ 
rights, which is the right to be heard.231 
        Another criticism for the TADA comes from the view of the Catholic faith.  The provisions 
for the act are seen as “dehumanizing”, which disregards patients as people with their own story 
and life to live.232  The act is seen as a means to prevent patients from wasting resources adding 
that a 10 day window is insufficient time for the majority of families to find another physician 
and institution to care for the patient, which adds to the perception of the act as “unethical”.233      
        Final criticism focuses on three intrinsic problems with TADA.  First, there is great 
uncertainty on the part of providers in determining when treatment is medically futile which may 
vary from provider to provider in the same circumstances.234   The second problem is that most 
institution’s ethics committees are composed of individuals from the hospital and colleagues of 
the physicians who are caring for the patient that the case concerns.235  The committee 
compositions may lead to questions regarding objectivity on the part of the committee who are  
now the ultimate decision makers for the outcome of the patient.236  The third problem relates to    
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the judges who have no jurisdiction over the decision of the institutional committees. 
        Those who are proponents of TADA believe that it ensures fairness and justice which are 
supported by the AMA.  It accomplishes this by:  1) offering patients the right to address wishes 
with an advance directive prior to end-of-life; 2) encouraging shared decision making at the end-
of-life between family and provider if the patient cannot participate; 3) having the freedom to 
bring in an outside consultant when desired; and 4) engaging with the institutional committee 
that gives the patient choice.237  
        With the pros and cons that have been associated with the TADA, there has been initial data 
but little after that.  Most hospitals (86%) used ethics committees to resolve disputes and 70% of 
the committees agreed with the physicians.238  Additional data included:  1) of 2922 ethics 
consults, 974 were for futility; 2) 65 ten-day letters were issued; and 3) within the 10 days, 11 
were transferred, 22 died, 27 had treatment withdrawn, and five had treatment continued.239 
        Another way end-of-life wishes are communicated is through Physician Orders for Life 
Sustaining Treatment (POLST), which is a 1-2 page check off medical order sheet, on brightly 
colored paper, that follows the patient across care settings.240  Its use is for those with a serious 
life limiting illness who are expected to die within a year and, although it began with hospice 
patients in Oregon, its use is now seen in hospitals, nursing homes and patients often keep their 
copy at home so it can travel with them.241  The POLST can serve to limit interventions or to 
clarify what treatments are desirable.  Living wills are often full of legalese that requires time to 
decipher, while a POLST form is a quick way to determine the patients’ wishes.  These wishes 
are in regard to resuscitation, antibiotics, treatment options of comfort measures versus 
aggressive treatment, plus artificial fluid and nutrition.242   POLST is not an advance directive, it 
is an order set and does not replace a living will.243 
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       The use of POLST has been found to be followed by health care providers more readily than 
advance directives and the orders more accurately reflect the patient’s last wishes.244   The use of 
orders has had some push back from the Catholic leaders because some states have dropped the 
requirement that patients must be terminally ill (Colorado) before using the form.245  Another 
Catholic concern is that it allows patients to refuse any medical treatment for any reason 
removing any liability from the providers or institution and can be a form of assisted suicide.246 
        When evidence based practice in medicine attempts to align with medical futility, there are 
some definite problems.  There is a great deal of “moral baggage” that accompanies medical 
futility to include a lack of definition, what policies are best to be utilized, and what treatments 
have the best success at end-of-life.247  The next section addresses evidence based practices for 
the adult patient receiving medically inappropriate treatments. 
 
5.V.  Evidence Based Practices 
        Each presenting case of patients at the end-of-life, who are receiving medically 
inappropriate treatment, are different making it nearly impossible to create patient guidelines to 
base futility confirmation.248  Add these concerns to the prevalent lack of trust between patients 
and providers at end-of-life and evidence based practice appears to be doomed.249 
         The initial lack of trust between patients/families and providers sets the stage for 
overtreatment as well as undertreatment with the pendulum swinging as to who is the driver of 
that treatment, be it the patient, most often the family, or providers.  Following is an examination 
of over and undertreatment as it occurs at the end-of-life.  Closely aligned with this over and 
under treatment are contradictions, defined as opposing views on an issue, which will also be 
discussed. 
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5.V.A.  Avoiding Overtreatment and Undertreatment  
        As medical futility is confronted in the adult critically ill patient, two potential occurrences 
need to be monitored and addressed when appropriate.  These are over and undertreatment.  The 
United States has the perception of having an immense problem with overtreatment of patients, 
which carries a negative connotation.250  This overtreatment can be viewed as physician driven 
or patient driven.  Historically, physicians acted in a paternalistic manner making all the 
decisions for patients.251  This view changed when patients became more autonomous wanting a 
say in their own care.  Following is a discussion of provider and patient/family overtreatment as 
well as undertreatment. 
        5.V.A.1.  Provider Driven 
        There is a perception of overtreatment by providers in the United States.  This came about 
as providers, especially physicians, were granted the power to do treatments that they wished 
because of their education and training, plus the “doctor knows best” was believed to be true by 
patients.252  Back to the 1970’s, there were also other factors at play that led to provider 
overtreatment.  These were:  1) the fee for service system rewarded procedures over cognitive 
skills; 2) fear of malpractice led to “defensive” medicine; 3) the burst of technology led to its use 
at a higher cost; 4) the providers intolerance of uncertainly led to increased use of treatments and 
tests to help attain a more certain diagnosis and prognosis; and 5) there was an oversupply of 
specialists who were trained to be diagnostic specific in their approach to medical care.253 
        The doctrine of informed consent has been helpful in controlling physician driven 
overtreatment.  As the need for informed consent was in place by the 1970’s, the patients are 
are now expected to give consent prior to the initiation of all treatments.254  A part of that 
consent is to inform the patient/family of what a reasonable person would want to know to 
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include the risks, the available options, to include doing nothing, and the consequences of doing 
nothing.255 
        In critical care, there are most often hospital based physicians, or intensivists, caring for the 
patients.  Studies have shown that without prior relationship with the patients, and no advance 
directives to help in making end-of-life decisions, the hospital based physicians show a low level 
of accuracy in predicting the patient’s preferences.256  As a result, hospital based physicians tend 
to make overtreatment errors.257  Whereas, primary care physicians, without advance directives 
to help in end-of-life decisions, tend to make undertreatment errors.258  Critical care nurses have 
perceived overtreatment by physicians which they credit to “fear of litigation” as well as a 
struggle to defy death by not “giving up” until there are no more options.259  There is also a push 
in that direction from families who want “everything” done, yet, they do not always know what 
“everything” means.260 
        Overtreatment, in the form of testing or procedures, is not a benign process with iatrogenic 
complications occurring frequently.  Inappropriate hospital use has been found to occur in 20-
44% of cases with inappropriate procedures being performed 14-32% of the time.261  There is a 
social disparity in overtreatment with those with high income being more apt to receive treatment 
than those who are poorer and more often in greater need.262  To withdraw treatment does not 
always create conflict.  In a large study, it was revealed that 57% of families/surrogates agreed 
with the providers’ recommendation to withdraw treatment, 90% agreed within five days, and 
only in 4% of the cases did the families/surrogates insist on the treatment continuing.263 
        The issue of undertreatment by physicians is difficult to identify in research, with few 
exceptions.  One of the means undertreatment is suspected is when financial incentives are 
driving patient care as the providers income is directly correlated to the resources they use.264  
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This was more apt to have occurred in the 1980’s with the use of health maintenance 
organizations (HMO’s).     
        Another area of undertreatment is with the use of POLST.  The orders on the POLST are 
limited and meet the needs for many as they near death, however, some patients do not believe 
they give an opportunity for choices or contingencies leading to undertreatment.265 
        As providers are responsible for both overtreatment and undertreatment, patients and their 
families can be responsible for both as well.  Following is a discussion on overtreatment for the 
patient/family. 
        5.V.A.2.  Patient and Family Driven  
       Patient driven overtreatment, which is usually family or surrogate driven, is frequently seen 
in critical care at the end-of-life.  The concept of medical futility was introduced as a means to 
respond to this patient/family overtreatment.266  The cases that brought patient driven 
overtreatment to the forefront concerned dying patients or those in a PVS where continued 
medical treatment was not benefiting the patient and was considered futile.  
        Patients have a right to self-determination but as they are often incapacitated at the end-of-
life, the surrogate decision maker decides on what treatment the patient is to receive.  This 
surrogate, whether appointed by the patient in writing or granted by default to the next of kin 
when the patient is incapacitated, tend to make errors of overtreatment, rather than 
undertreatment, although both are possible.267   
        Research regarding surrogate decision making indicates that they prefer to be the decision 
makers in value laded decisions compared with more medical type decisions, such as what 
treatment to initiate or discontinue.268  Very few surrogates wish to give all decisional authority  
to providers, but greater than 90% want to know the providers’ opinion regarding the 
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continuation of life sustaining treatment.269  The providers must be skilled at balancing variation  
in the decision preference of family surrogates as well as the different levels of authority that 
means for the providers. 
       Uncertainty is present for families and surrogates when making treatment decisions.  This 
uncertainty leads to indecisiveness which in turn leads to continuing all treatments, or 
overtreatment, until a decision can be made.270  As a result the patient can experience a 
distressing and lingering death.  Having frequent meetings between families/surrogates and 
providers has been found to be the best solution to this problem of indecisiveness.  This 
indecisiveness is most often a result of unclear or no direction from the patient, a surrogate who 
is unable to articulate the patient’s preference, or a mistrust of the physician.271  Evidence 
suggests that surrogate decision makers are more apt to experience psychiatrist illness after a 
critical care experience when there is a disconnect between their actual and perceived role in 
decision making.272  Therefore, having open communication between all parties is key to helping 
prevent overtreatment as well as helping lead to a collaborative decision for the patient. 
        At the end-of-life, there are contradictions that can add to the confusion and challenges of 
medical futility, or medically inappropriate treatment.  Following is a discussion of these 
contradictions. 
5.V.B.  How to Manage Contradictions 
        Contradictions are perspectives on an issue, such as end-of-life, which are opposing, even 
though one view assumes the possibility of the other such as benefit versus burden, subjective 
versus objective, or life versus death.273  As these contradictions often occur at end-of-life, the 
ability to communicate becomes a focus.  Communication skills, along with the ability to relate 
well with others at the end-of-life, is critical as it improves patient/family satisfaction and 
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enhances patient outcomes with fewer malpractice claims.274  However, this in-depth 
communication does not occur as often or at the level that is needed due, in part, to physicians 
not having the necessary skills to engage in appropriate end-of-life conversations.275 
        If families or surrogates develop a relationship with providers from the beginning that 
involves an opportunity to discuss the patient’s wishes, plus the medical interventions and what 
they entail, many of the futile treatments would never occur.276  The barriers that seem to get in 
the way of providers having end-of-life conversations include:  1) discomfort with giving bad 
news and causing pain; 2) a knowledge deficit regarding advance directives and what they mean; 
3) death is the enemy to be defeated; 4) an expectation of conflict between families and 
providers; 5) concern that what is said will lead to legal issues later; and 6) the conversations are 
uncomfortable and threatening so are avoided.277  Even when educational opportunities have 
been presented to providers as a means to improve the present end-of-life conversations, they are 
often “undervalued” and “underrepresented”.278 
        There are many contradictions to be found in health care, two that come up more often at 
the end-of-life are killing versus letting die and honoring patient wishes versus following family 
wishes.  Following is a discussion on these contradictions. 
        5.V.B.1.  Killing versus Letting Die 
        At first look the distinction between killing and letting die appears to be distinct and clear.  
However, on closer look this is not the case.  In some cases killing, or taking another’s life in 
murder, is worse than forgoing treatment with a ventilator and letting a person die who is brain 
dead.  Yet, some instances of letting a patient die, such as not doing surgery when it would have 
saved a life, may be worse than mercy killing at the patient’s request, who is in unrelenting 
terminal cancer pain.279  With the passage of time, the clarity between killing and letting die has 
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clouded as withholding and withdrawing treatment has become more common with it being the 
ultimate action that leads to patients’ deaths in critical care units.280 
        For most people, there is a difference between killing and letting die.  Discontinuing a 
ventilator, either because it has become medically inappropriate or because the patient has 
requested it be removed, may indirectly lead to the patient’s death.281  However, the courts have 
historically held that death is due to the underlying disease and not the hand of the provider who 
turned off the ventilator.282 
        Killing has been described as “doing something” that causes death and letting die is seen as 
“doing nothing” and allowing death.283   Another view sees killing as a commission of an act that 
leads to death, whereas, letting die has more often been seen as an omission of action, or what 
was once referred to as “passive euthanasia.284  This omission was not usually seen as a “killing” 
but this is no longer true.  Omissions can kill patients either through negligence or as a malicious 
act, such as failing to order antibiotics for a severe infection.285 
        The concept of assisted suicide, or assisted dying, has caused much speculation as to 
whether this is killing or letting die.  Those states with the assisted suicide statute often prohibit 
“causing” it but not “assisting” it.286  Along with these laws, is most often stipulation of a 
terminal illness with death expected within a year, plus various other safeguards to protect both 
patients and providers.287 
        Despite trying to separate the terms and all the movement to keep killing and letting die 
separate, families are often in a quandary when withdrawing life sustaining treatment as they are 
concerned that they are killing a family member.288  It is best to discourage the use of these terms 
for three reasons.  First, conceptually killing and letting die do overlap with their definitions 
being “vague” and disputable leaving the recommendation to best avoid the terms, if possible.289  
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Second, although there is a tendency to want to place killing and letting die into a rightness or 
wrongness category, there are many contributing factors that apply to both that can make each 
right in certain instances or each wrong in other instances.290  The mere attachment of a label 
such as “killing” or “letting die” to an action or series of events in health care does not determine 
whether the action was “acceptable” or “unacceptable”.291  So much more needs to be known 
about a particular situation before any judgment can be made such as the full circumstances, the 
motive of the players, what the patient desired, and the consequences of the action.292  The third 
and final reason relates to forgoing life sustaining treatment.  Whenever life sustaining treatment 
is withheld or withdrawn, the relevant considerations is related to the validation of the authority 
for the action to determine if acceptable or unacceptable, not whether it was killing or letting die.   
        A second contradiction that is all too common in critical care at the end-of-life is honoring 
patient wishes versus following family wishes. 
        5.V.B.2.  Honoring Patient Wishes versus Following Family Wishes 
        Health care providers make every attempt to comply with the patient’s wishes whether that 
be in the form of an advance directive or verbal communication from the patient, or through a 
surrogate.  Communication with patients at the end-of-life is difficult because most of those in 
critical care are unable to communicate due to either being on a ventilator or incapacitated by 
their illness.  Even if patients are able to communicate those at the end-of-life frequently change 
their views.293 Moreso, if the patients had previously expressed their wishes in writing, they 
often express contradicting forms of these wishes as end-of-life nears.294  
        The more prevalent scenario at the end-of-life is one where family members, or designated 
surrogates, are left to make the decisions since less than 5% of patients in critical care have 
decisional capacity.295  The assumptions are that these decisions will be what the patient had 
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either put in writing or made known to family members or surrogates.  If the patient’s wishes 
were not conveyed to family members, it has been shown that family members and surrogates  
usually fail to express the patient’s true wishes.  Instead they rely on past conversations, family  
dynamics or their own personal values and beliefs.296  
        Whenever there is concern or conflict regarding whether to honor the patient’s wishes or 
follow the family wishes, the most common area concerns the limiting of life support.  Usually it 
presents where the patient wishes to limit life support but the family members preferences are to 
continue it.297  Such cases can be prolonged, especially if there is a living will with explicit 
instructions left by the patient, as well as a medical durable power of attorney who is left with 
the final say.  The basic golden rule, or ethic of reciprocity, of treating others like one would 
want to be treated, works well in many instances, except end-of-life.298  At end-of-life, even with 
advance directives to guide the way, social, cultural and religious values get in the way of doing 
the right thing causing confusion and conflict with health care providers leaving the patient 
caught in the middle.299 
        If the contradictions occur, regarding honoring the patient wishes versus following the 
family wishes, it should always be first and foremost about the patient.  However, it may take 
some time and excellent communication skills to get there.  The end-of-life conversations require 
advance communication skills which are a challenge for the physicians who notoriously have an 
overall lack of communication capabilities.300  To be effective in end-of-life communication, 
there needs to be a commitment to learning the necessary skills and strategies to include decision  
centered and information seeking strategies, plus when best to use each when working with  
families at the end-of-life.301 
        The presence of contradictions often are present or lead to discussions regarding the 
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withholding or withdrawing of treatment.  There is a general consensus among ethicists that 
withholding and withdrawing treatment are ethically and morally the same.302  However, some 
patients, families, as well as providers, struggle more with withdrawing than withholding 
treatment.  The following section explores the withholding and withdrawing of treatment by first 
discussing what role CPR played in the limitation of life sustaining treatment.  Then the role of 
palliative care will be described as a bridge and hope for the future when there is a struggle to 
limit the medically inappropriate treatments. 
 
5.VI.  Withholding versus Withdrawing Treatment 
        Between 35-90% of the deaths in critical care are a result of withholding or withdrawing 
treatment.303  Withholding treatment is the act of not initiating or increasing a life sustaining 
therapy and withdrawing treatment is the act of discontinuing a life sustaining therapy that the 
patient is presently receiving.304   
        Although the action of withholding and withdrawing treatments are equivalent from a 
moral, legal and ethical perspective, it is emotionally easier to withhold than withdraw 
treatments.305  Even though withholding and withdrawing are said to be equivalent, there are 
perceived differences for the following reasons:  1) withholding is passive while withdrawing is 
active and involves doing something that most frequently leads to death within 72 hours; 2) once 
treatment is started, providers take on the patient as a responsibility with a “duty to care” that 
might not have been as acute if no treatment had been started; 3) having the option to withdraw a 
treatment provides an opportunity to “trial” a treatment to see if it benefits a patient, versus never 
trying at all; and 4) there is a perceived difference between the means versus the end.  Both 
withholding and withdrawing may have the same result but the process of getting there are 
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different with some religions, such as Orthodox Jews, being more apt to support withholding 
than withdrawing.306 
        The withholding and withdrawing of treatment involves much more than cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR) but over time this is often where the discussion begins.  Following is a 
description of CPR taking a closer look at its historical development to where it is today, as well 
as a discussion on the recommendations that are present surrounding withholding and 
withdrawing treatment. 
5.VI.A.  More Than CPR 
        When providers are having conversations with families in critical care regarding end-of-life 
and the withholding and withdrawing of treatment, the conversation often begins with the 
withholding of resuscitation measures making the patient a Do Not Resuscitate, or DNR.307  
Because the withholding of resuscitation is something that is done in the future, when a 
cardiopulmonary event occurs, families are often more receptive as the death is a result of a 
medical event versus the withdrawing of life support in the present moment.308  However, the 
media, especially television, has not portrayed CPR in a realistic light with more than 75% of 
those in TV dramas surviving CPR, while in reality it is closer to 16%.309  CPR does save lives, 
but was never intended to be used on the dying who end up with fractured ribs and bruised 
bodies, all to comply with a treatment that could be better utilized.  However, CPR became part 
of a false belief that all deaths could and should be prevented.  Following is the historical 
development of CPR and how it got to be a negotiating point at end-of-life. 
        5.VI.A.1.  Historical Development of CPR 
        Beginning in the 1950’s and 1960’s, CPR was found to be valuable in saving lives, 
especially those in surgery and post operatively, as they suffered from the effects of the surgery, 
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blood loss, plus medications.310  By 1970, the process of CPR was ingrained in all hospitals in 
the United States and one that every patient would experience as a cardiac arrest is the one 
“common pathway” for all deaths.311  During this same time into the 1980’s, ethicists were 
speaking out about this assault at the end-of-life while the patients’ right movement was cheering 
that the patient had a right to self-determination saying CPR was another choice option for 
patients.312 
        From the beginning, resuscitation efforts were to be used for those in generally good health 
before the cardiopulmonary arrest and who would most likely survive, however, today all 
hospital patients will be resuscitated unless there is a specific provider order to not resuscitate.313  
Initially CPR was to save lives, but it has become another means of futile treatment creating a 
burden on resources which, if the resuscitation is successful, at best, return the patients to their 
dying state.314  
        Even after taking the CPR concerns at the end-of-life into consideration, there are some 
reasons why CPR or a “full code” still continues until the moment of death for those who are 
actively dying.  These include:  1) CPR is the one unique medical intervention where lay people 
are taught to perform it, yet, it takes a medical order to not do it.  In some cases families have 
stated to providers that they will initiate CPR on their loved one if the staff do not; 2) there is a 
misguided public about the true benefit of CPR as miracles do not just happen when it is 
performed; 3) there are inappropriate demands for CPR across the socioeconomic continuum 
where there is often concern that, due to a “lesser status”, there is discrimination and a loved one 
is being denied; 4) there are few instances where the opportunity of benefit from CPR is zero, so 
CPR is seen as better than death; and 5) unfortunately once a patient is made a DNR or “no  
code”, studies indicate patients receive less care.  There are less provider visits and less nursing  
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care given to the patient once a DNR has been ordered. 315 
        It is a challenge to remove “full code” from the end-of-life scenario, but there are some 
recommendations that might assist in moving it in the right direction.  These recommendations 
include:  1) removing the DNR, do not resuscitate, from the vocabulary to be replaced by “do not 
attempt resuscitation (DNAR) as CPR is only an attempt at resuscitation; 2) make a routine part 
of every admission to the hospital the discussion regarding code status, not assuming everyone is 
a full code until the discussion occurs at end-of-life.  A follow up conversation needs to occur at 
frequent intervals as the patient’s condition changes; and 3) begin early open discussions with 
family members, so if a later discussion is needed, the stage has been set.  Some states allow 
providers more discretion in making the final decision regarding DNAR, while other states 
require patient/family consent.316 
        Confronting the resuscitation issue early is one way of coming to terms with withholding 
and withdrawing treatment.  There are recommendations that can assist with managing some of 
the ethical debates and conflicts surrounding futility treatments at end-of-life.  Following is a 
discussion of these recommendations. 
        5.VI.A.2.  Recommendations 
          Recommendations that can be a benefit to the patient at the end-of-life is to increase the 
collaboration with the nurse members of the health care team.  Most often physician providers 
are the ones who make the decisions regarding withholding and withdrawing of treatment.317  
Nurse providers rarely take part in this decision making process, even though they spend the  
most time with the patients and their families, which provides an opportunity to know their 
values and beliefs regarding dying and end-of-life.318 
        Research on withholding and withdrawing treatment at end-of-life in adult critical care 
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indicates variant views between nurses, intensivists, and primary care physicians.  A summary of 
some of these results indicate that 1) the reasons treatment is withheld or withdrawn is the same 
for all three groups which are futile treatment and patient’s wishes; 2) regarding collaboration on 
withholding and withdrawing treatment, greater than 80% found it very or extremely satisfied 
with more noted in teaching hospitals.  Of these, 63% were primary care physicians, 36% 
intensivists and 27% nurses; 3)  when asked if decisions to withdraw treatment were postponed 
unnecessarily, nurses responded affirmatively 43%, intensivists 29% and primary care physicians 
2% with the main reasons being fear of making end-of-life decisions, lack of guidelines on 
withdrawing treatment, and different opinions around staff; and 4) almost all nurses believe they 
should be involved in the decision making process, half of intensivists believe nurses should be 
involved and few primary care physicians believe they should be involved.319  The final 
recommendation is that although nurses have no legal responsibility to be at the decision making 
table, these decisions should best be made from a multi-disciplinary perspective.320 
        Overall physicians agree on a daily assessment regarding patient outcomes but as the 
patients got sicker with a longer length of stay, the opinions differed.321  The nurses tend to be 
more realistic regarding poor outcomes and were more apt to recommend withdrawing treatment 
earlier and more frequent than physicians.322  Whereas, the future quality of life for the patients, 
as predicted by both nurses and physicians, was unreliable leading to recommended caution 
regarding using this metric for withholding or withdrawing treatment.323 
        Another recommendation related to withholding and withdrawing life support is in the 
emergency department (ED).  Each year over 200,000 deaths occur in the nation’s emergency 
departments.324  Over 80% of these patients had chronic underlying diseases and/or serious 
functional decline.325  The emergency department is unique in that the physicians have no 
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relationship with the patients or families, or knowledge regarding their state of health or wishes 
regarding end-of-life treatment.326  These circumstance make it difficult to intervene to withhold  
or withdraw treatment when the patient arrives, usually via ambulance, and decisions are needed  
in an emergent timeframe. 
       Palliative care in the emergency department has been found to be inadequate with over 35% 
not receiving any palliative care.327  Education and training is needed, not only for the present 
emergency physicians but for the future physicians, who will see an increasing population of 
elderly declining patients in need of end-of-life palliative care. 
        Just as enhanced palliative care is needed in the emergency departments, there is a need for 
maximizing the potential for quality of life for those suffering from a life limiting illness in the 
form of an integrated palliative care approach.328  Following is a discussion of the benefits and 
opportunities for palliative care as well as those related to euthanasia, physician assisted suicide 
and palliative sedation. 
5.VI.B.  Role of Palliative Care 
        Medicine has traditionally been aimed at the curative which eventually led to a preventable 
aspect leaving palliative medicine to emerge after both curative and preventable medicine had 
failed.329 Palliative care started with a focus of the patient who was dying, which confused it with 
hospice.330  Palliative care then evolved to care for those with a life-limiting illness, for which a 
cure is not possible, and the associated symptom management.331  The ultimate goal of palliative 
care is to improve the patients’ and families’ quality of life.332 
        Palliative care programs are now prevalent in almost all organizations and are closely 
aligned with hospice programs.  They are best developed for the adult populations with 
perceived benefits and opportunities.  Following is a discussion on these benefits and  
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 opportunities.   
        5.VI.B.1.  Benefits and Opportunities 
        The benefits of palliative care are multifactorial.  First, palliative care has an impact on both 
patient outcome and satisfaction.  Studies indicate a length of stay reduction of 25% when 
palliative care is involved with the care of the patient.333   Second, palliative care has a financial 
impact ranging from a 77% cost reduction to a 9% cost increase with a 35% weighted overall 
reduction.334  A third benefit revolves around symptom management, especially pain 
management.  Pain and the associated suffering that accompanies life-limiting illness is the 
number one symptom that is focused on in palliative care programs.335  Pain management 
through palliative care uses pharmacological and non-pharmacological methods to achieve pain 
relief with palliative sedation as a last option.336  A fourth benefit is the multidisciplinary 
approach which uses a medical, physical, psychological, spiritual, occupational, and social 
approach considering the whole patient.337  A fifth and final benefit of palliative care is the 
reduction of futile treatments.  Although the data on this benefit is not as robust as researchers 
would prefer, it is the cost savings from its use that validates that palliative care makes a 
difference in reducing expenses at end of life in critical care.338  Cost savings are never the main 
goal of providing palliative care to patients but its impact cannot be overlooked.  Palliative care 
programs have shown a reduced stay in both critical care, as well as the hospital, plus fewer 
diagnostic tests resulting in a 40% reduction in the cost of end-of-life care.339   
        As there are benefits with palliative care, there are also opportunities.  The first opportunity 
is in the area of continued research in order to generate compelling empirical evidence with a 
focus on quality of life with early intervention.340   A second opportunity is to incorporate 
palliative care into critical care.  Although this is happening more often across the nation, there is 
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still a need for it to occur early in the patient’s illness with the bedside nurse often being the lead 
in getting that referral.341  Therefore, critical care nurses and intensivists need education and 
training regarding the role palliative care plays in patient care and improving the quality of life 
for the patient, as well as family.342  A third opportunity is based on limited resources that 
prevents some organizations from implementing a multi-disciplinary palliative care programs.343   
Although more hospitals offer palliative care, approximately 25% meet the Joint Commission’s 
staffing guidelines for palliative care programs.344 
        Although over 70% of Americans indicate they want to die at home, less than 25% do, with 
fewer than 60% of hospitals in any particular state offering specialized end-of-life services.345  
The fifth and final opportunity is to continue to improve the experience of dying by sharing how 
patients can find meaning in life, experience love, say their farewells, and uncover remaining 
new avenues of hope.346  Death is still a frightening experience that patients and providers, 
especially physicians, try to avoid, as if it is an option, instead of a natural process.347  One of the 
major goals of palliative care is to provide a “good death” which honors the life of the patient, as 
well as ensuring the final days are a time of purpose, meaning and a legacy of a life well lived.348 
        Another goal of palliative care is the avoidance of euthanasia.349  Euthanasia is not legal in 
the United States but it gets confused with physician assisted suicide and palliative sedation.  
Following is a discussion on these concepts. 
        5.VI.B.2.  Euthanasia, Physician Assisted Suicide, and Palliative Sedation 
        Euthanasia involves a person, usually a physician provider, who intentionally ends 
another’s life by a medical intervention, such as an injection of a paralytic agent.350  Euthanasia 
is not legal in any of the 50 states in America, but is legal in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Columbia, and Canada.351  The goal of euthanasia is the patient’s death.352 
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        Physician assisted suicide or physician assisted dying involves the provider prescribing 
drugs for the patients to take to end their own life.353  In order to qualify for the assistance in 
dying in the six states where it is legal, the patients must have a terminal condition.354  The major 
reasons to seek assistance for death relate to pain, depression, being a burden, loss of dignity, and 
being dependent on others.355  The goal of physician assisted suicide or dying is death.356 
        Palliative sedation is an end-of-life treatment used for those who have intractable suffering, 
usually due to pain, but can be for other symptoms such as nausea and vomiting.357  The goal of 
palliative sedation is to relieve the suffering, which often leads to unconsciousness and the 
possibility of precipitous death.358  Since palliative sedation is closely tied to end-of-life, it has 
been referred to as ‘terminal sedation’ a term that has fallen out of favor.  Palliative sedation is 
not only used for intractable symptoms, but is also used in conjunction with withdrawing 
mechanical ventilation when the patient is not expected to survive.359  The sedation prevents 
signs of air hunger, which increases anxiety in both family members and caregivers. 
        There are four factors that need to be present in order to consider a patient for palliative 
sedation.  First, is the patient is terminally ill; the second is that the patient has intractable 
symptoms; third, the patient be a DNAR; and finally that death is expected to occur within hours 
or days.360 
        In the process of administering palliative sedation, the patient may die.  The principle that 
serves to justify the result of the action is the principle of double effect.  In order for this 
principle to apply four conditions must be met.  These include:  1) the end action must be  
morally good; 2) the bad effect must not be the means of causing the good effect; 3) the bad 
effect is not intended and only tolerated; and 4) there must be a grave reason for the action.361 
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5.VII.  Conclusion 
        The topic of medical futility, or medically inappropriate treatment, is most often found in 
the adult population, especially the elderly at the end-of-life.  Knowing when to withhold or  
withdraw these medically inappropriate treatments is a challenge as determining decisional 
capacity of the patient is paramount.  Yet, less than 5% of the adult critical care patients have 
decisional capacity at the end-of-life. 
        Therefore, decisions regarding the continuation of treatment depends on surrogate decision 
making either via an advance directive, which remains limited, or through substituted judgment 
or the best interests standard.  In most cases, an agreed upon plan is able to be determined though 
collaboration between families, surrogates and providers.  For those small numbers that cannot 
reach an agreed upon decision, there is fertile ground for conflict as struggles occur between the 
patients’, families’ and providers’ autonomy.  This struggle can lead to both over and 
undertreatment. 
        There is hope for the future in several arenas.  First, the ability to communicate cannot be 
over stressed.   This must start with the providers who must hone their communication skills with 
patients, families and surrogates that begins the moment the patient enters the critical care unit 
then increases in frequency and intensity as end-of-life nears.  Second, the ability to get 
reimbursed for having 30 minute conversations with Medicare patients regarding advance care 
planning may still have an impact on the development of advance directives so that the patients’ 
voices can be heard.  Finally, the palliative care programs across the nation are making a 
difference, especially those who are partnering with critical care so that interventions can begin 
early in the critical illness.   However, more work must be done with administrative commitment 
to staff the programs appropriately.  Dame Cicely Saunders, who is described as being 
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responsible for establishing the discipline and culture of palliative care,  is quoted as saying, “we 
will do all we can, not only to help you die peacefully, but also to live until you die.”362  Not only  
is this the belief for palliative care, but something all patients would wish for at the end-of-life.    
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Chapter 6:  Futility and Moral Distress 
 
6.1.  Introduction 
        The presence of medically inappropriate treatment, or medical futility, is in all the critical 
care units along the age continuum, to include neonatal intensive care, pediatric intensive care, 
and adult intensive care.  These medically inappropriate treatments have been shown to prolong 
patient suffering, utilize precious resources, and at times, be a source of conflict between 
families, surrogates, and providers.  However, there is a casualty from medical futility that often 
gets overlooked.  This is the moral distress that is found in the nursing population who work in 
these critical care units. 
       Moral distress, a relatively new term, has been evident longer than it has been identified or 
given a name.  Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern nursing, spoke of the moral and 
ethical dilemmas in nursing in her Notes on Nursing and recognized the dilemma when she 
stated “….even the most morally courageous staff may fear to speak up”.1  This is still the case 
today. 
        Although moral distress is found in all health care professions, it is most prevalent in 
nursing, especially critical care nursing, and is one of the major ethical concerns affecting the 
nursing profession.  The intensity of critical care nursing, combined with medically inappropriate 
treatments at the end-of-life, makes critical care an opportune environment for moral distress.  
This moral distress not only threatens the moral integrity of the nurses, but can also have a major 
impact on the quality of care delivered to the patients and their families. 
        Chapter 6 explores the effect of medical futility on moral distress in nursing.  The first part 
of the chapter will describe the historical development of moral distress by defining it and 
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examining the conflicting terms that are often confused with it.  A conceptual framework will 
also be discussed.  The second part of the chapter describes the integrity and intensity of moral 
distress which details the root causes and contributing factors to include medical futility as a 
major cause.  The impact of moral distress on the nurse and nursing profession will be described 
with two examples given to further the description.  The final areas that will be explored relates 
to strategies to confront and prevent moral distress. 
 
6.II.  Historical Development 
        Much has been written on the topic of moral distress as it pertains to nursing.2  Moral 
distress is seen as a concrete clinical occurrence that can be defined with definite themes.  This 
section examines not only the first definition of moral distress by Jameton, but also extends to a 
new broader definition.  A discussion will follow on the manifestations of moral distress and the 
conflicting terms that are often associated with it. 
6.II.A.  The Nature of Moral Distress 
        The role of the nurse is an ethical one that is first and foremost concerned with the essential 
goals of health and life of the patient.3  Since patients are usually unable to do for themselves, 
especially in critical care, the nurse becomes their agent acting in their best interest and as their 
advocate.  When something interferes with this action of doing the right thing for the patient, 
moral distress can result.  Following is a discussion on the definition of moral distress and the 
three types of moral problems. 
        6.II.A.1.  Definitions:  Original to Broader Definition 
               Moral distress was first defined by Jameton in the 1980’s as something nurses feel, 
along with guilt, when they engage in actions and treatments that they believe to be wrong but 
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are unable to avoid due to constraints.4  These constraints can be internal, or personal, in addition 
to external, or institutional.5  Hanna further defines moral distress as recognizing, with 
discomfort and pain, when the good of a living thing or situation is in jeopardy through a 
particular act.6  According to Hanna, the threat to a good can be shown in several ways.  One 
way is as shocked moral distress where there is an intense feeling followed by action such as 
anger, fear, or panic with activation of leaving the situation, calling for help or speaking with 
others involved.7  Another way is as muted moral distress where there is an “interior” response 
but the “exterior” is silent.  A final way is as suppressed moral distress which is difficult to 
assess as “blunting” occurs so the thoughts and feelings are suppressed.8  This suppression can 
lead to chronic distress over time exhibited by symptoms ranging from fatigue to GI upsets to 
depression. 
       A more current way of describing moral distress describes what happens when a person 
perceives a moral problem then accepts moral responsibility by making a moral judgment  
regarding what is the most appropriate action.9  However, because of limitations, real or 
perceived, the person engages in moral “wrongdoing” by either an act of omission or 
commission that is seen as morally wrong.10  Another way to describe moral distress is to view it 
as what happens when a moral situation presents itself with a moral decision regarding the right 
action but a perceived inability to act leading to painful, negative feelings and “psychological 
disequilibrium”.11  Webster and Baylis have proposed their definition which is that moral distress 
occurs when one does not do what one believes to be right due to an error in judgment, a 
personal weakness, or circumstances beyond one’s control, such as not enough staff.  12 
        A newer definition proposed by Campbell, Ulrich, and Grady looks at broadening the 
definition of moral distress.  Since moral distress is seen as a “practical problem” that can affect 
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the welfare and retention of nurses, as well as patient outcomes, there are six types of situations 
where cases can emerge that present a spectrum for moral distress.13  These situations include: 1) 
moral uncertainty where the knowledge as to the right thing to do is not clear because of unclear 
principles, uncertainty, or lack of information; 2) mild distress which is less than the dramatic 
distress usually associated with moral distress and although these can have a cumulative effect, 
each one by themselves is mild; 3) delayed distress which indicates that moral distress may not 
occur at the time of the event but come later; 4) moral dilemma occurs when there is no 
perceived “morally” right thing to do; 5) bad moral luck where an individual performs in a 
morally appropriate manner, yet, the results are morally objectionable; and 6) distress by 
association where distress results from association with another or a group.14  The view of these 
six situation has then led to the definition of moral distress as self-directed negative attitudes or 
emotions that develop when there is involvement in an incident perceived as morally 
undesirable.15  This definition has been criticized as being too broad needing further research.16 
        Jameton not only defined moral distress but identified types of moral problems that affect 
nursing.  Following is a discussion on these problems. 
        6.II.A.2.  Moral Problems 
        The first problem is moral uncertainty.  Moral uncertainty occurs when the nurse is unsure 
what the moral problem is, yet, has a “nagging” feeling or uncertainty that there is something 
wrong.17  An example can be when an elderly patient appears to be in poor health and neglected,  
with the problem getting minimal attention, plus the nurse is not satisfied with the treatment but 
is not able to identify the cause of the dissatisfaction.18 
        All humans, when faced with uncertainty, attempt to reduce it, even though it can either 
present as an exhilarating challenge or that which produces great anxiety and a sense of 
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powerlessness.19  Uncertainty-identity theory is based on the belief that feeling uncertain is 
distressing and intensely motivating.20  If there are perceived resources to assist with the 
uncertainty, then there is powerful action behaviors, if the resources are not sufficient, then there 
can be a feeling of threat and “avoidant” behaviors with increased uncertainty.21  There are two 
cautions regarding the reduction of uncertainty.   These are: 1) that it is possible to feel less 
uncertain, but not fully certain.  Only those who are delusional feel fully certain; and 2) as one 
strives to reduce uncertainty, the process often increases the uncertainty.22  This is seen in 
nursing where the nurse is uncertain as to the adequacy of the care of the patient then approaches 
the physician with the concerns only to be belittled or criticized, often in the presence of 
patients/families and peers.  Therefore, the original concerns are not resolved, plus there is now 
conflict between the nurse and the physician, that may not be resolved, adding to the building 
moral distress. 
        The second moral problem is moral dilemma.  A moral dilemma occurs when two or more 
moral principles apply and can both be ethically justified making the decision difficult as only 
one course of action can be taken.23  To give up either decision can seem daunting with a feeling 
of a loss being inevitable.24 
        For critical care nurses, the occurrence of moral dilemmas most often are reported with 
conflicting goals between the organization and the patient.25  This dilemma is often found when 
there is inadequate staff to accomplish the care the nurse perceives the patient deserves leaving 
them with a guilt-ridden conscience at the end of the shift.26  Repeated shifts of this same pattern 
eventually take their toll leading to moral distress. 
        The third problem is moral distress, which is what occurs when an individual knows the 
appropriate action to take but because of some constraint is unable to take that action.27   The 
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inability to take action can lead to anger, shame, agitation, and frustration.28  
        With moral distress being discussed frequently in the literature, it is among many terms that 
headlines articles, book titles, and media announcements.  Although there may be a fine line that 
differentiates the terms, there is a difference.  Following is an explanation of these conflicting 
terms as well as a discussion on moral distress and moral residue. 
6.II.B.  Manifestations of Moral Distress 
        As moral distress is described as a layered, complex, and relational concept that threatens 
the individual’s identity, as well as integrity, by its manifestations in moral compromise, it can 
be confused with other related concerns or concepts.29  Moral distress is not the normal pressure 
or conflicts of the workplace; it is not PTSD or ‘compassion fatigue” which can occur along with 
moral distress, but it is different and is treated differently.30  Following is an explanation of two 
of the terms most commonly confused with moral distress.  
        6.II.B.1.  Conflicting Terms 
        For moral distress to be fully understood, it is helpful to examine the terms of compassion 
fatigue and burnout as these are the most frequently seen terms in the literature which are used 
alongside moral distress or compared to it.  Compassion fatigue is defined as the product of a 
prolonged and intensive relationship with patients and exposure to stress.31  The result is an 
expenditure of physical, social, emotional, spiritual, and intellectual resources in the individuals 
that exceed their “restorative processes”.32  Compassion fatigue has been describes as the “cost 
of caring” when one is deeply entrenched in another’s care and situation, as is often the case in 
critical care nursing.33 
        Burnout is similar to compassion fatigue and is often closely associated with it as well as 
with moral distress, however, there are differences.  While compassion fatigue occurs more 
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abruptly and is a result of being exposed to someone else’s pain and suffering, burnout occurs 
more gradually when there is a feeling of powerlessness and job dissatisfaction which leads to 
eventual disengagement.  Critical care nurses are especially vulnerable to burnout as they are  
routinely challenged not only by the work routines, but also by the too often lack of staff and   
time to adequately care for the patients.34   
        Over time the three classical symptoms of burnout develop which are exhaustion, 
depersonalization or detachment, and decreased personal accomplishment.35  Exhaustion, 
especially mental exhaustion, seen in 73% of critical care nurses, can be seen when a nurse cares 
for the same patient repeatedly who has no chance of recovery at the end-of life.36  
Depersonalization, seen in 48% of critical care nurses, is a separation from the work environment 
expressed by cynicism and blame where the patient is viewed as less than human.37  Decreased 
personal accomplishment, seen in 60 % of critical care nurses, is a feeling of negative self-worth 
and poor self-esteem.38 
        Risk factors for burnout include personal characteristics, organizational elements, working 
relationships, and end-of-life concerns.39  The concerns related to end-of-life, include caring for 
those who are dying or participating in withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.   40  The best 
treatment for burnout is prevention through self-care and creating a professional environment 
that focuses on teamwork and positive working relationships.41 
        Moral distress and burnout can overlap with one leading to the other, or occurring at the 
same time, which complicates the situation for both nurse and patient.  Following is a description 
of moral distress which can lead to moral residue if it is not addressed. 
        6.II.B.2.  Moral Distress versus Moral Residue 
        Moral distress can be differentiated as initial or reactive.  Initial is that immediate response 
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when an obstacle is encountered and may be exhibited by anger, fear, anxiety, etc.42  Reactive 
distress is the negativity that results when the initial distress is not dealt with and may be caused 
by the individual’s personal obstacles which present no recourse.43  Moral residue is described as 
that which is carried with an individual after compromising values when faced with moral 
distress.44  Moral residue is seen as a form of “betrayal’ when surrendering one’s values without 
defending them, and it correlates with Jameton’s reactive distress.45 
        Moral residue may be a result of the compromised integrity of moral distress where values, 
principles, and beliefs are either violated or dismissed.46   With the passage of time the acute 
symptoms of guilt, despair, and uncertainty may have passed, but the feeling of moral 
compromise can last a lifetime becoming part of the moral residue.47   
        Moral residue can have a positive effect when it becomes a clarifying experience for the 
individual as to personal values as well as identity and strengthen the commitment to do better 
next time.48  Just as experiencing moral residue can bring about positive results, it can also lead 
to wrong thinking.   This thinking most often takes three directions.   These include: 1) denial—
this is where the individuals persuades themselves that their personal and professional roles are 
separate so if the integrity in the professional role is compromised that does not mean the 
personal role was also compromised; 2) minimizing—the inconsistencies are minimized or 
trivialized so that they are really not that important; and 3) unreflective acceptance---this is 
where the inconsistences between the person’s values and beliefs are addressed by changing 
them to fit the situation.49 
        An effect that has been described in the literature is called the crescendo effect.  This effect 
is when there is an interaction between moral distress and moral residue, after repeated episodes  
of both, and even though the morally distressing situation may resolve, the residual distress rises   
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and continues to rise with a building stair step effect.50  Because of this crescendo effect, the 
caregivers, or nurses, may react with enhanced intensity to repeated situations which are often 
taken as “over emotionalism” by nurses.51  Whereas, in reality these “over emotions” are threats 
to the individuals’ moral integrity.   As a result, there needs to be a high alert for the building 
crescendo effect in the critical care units.  Moral distress incidents, with the resulting residue and 
crescendo effects, are usually repeated yielding further implications.  These implications include: 
1) the realization that the issue is usually not about the patient but are deeper problems related to 
communication, collaboration, and powerlessness in the work environment; 2) ethics consults 
need to be alert to see beyond what is stated as the ethical concern because the real issue may be 
moral distress; and 3) moral distress is not confined to only one individual in a unit but affects all 
those who work there.52  
        There has been a struggle to determine a conceptual or theoretical framework from which 
moral distress originates.  The next section will explore some thoughts on the conceptual 
framework for moral distress focusing on professional and personal identification as a place to 
begin, concluding with the role of moral sensitivity and ethical climate. 
 
6.III.  Conceptual Framework 
        Since there has been a lack of a formal conceptual framework for moral distress, this is 
thought to have hindered further research and formulation of directed education and policies.53  
Historically, nursing has been viewed as a moral profession where caring for another is at its 
very core.  The nursing profession has the expressly stated goals to keep patients safe, to prevent 
complications, and to provide a healing environment for both patients and their families.54  When 
these goals are impeded in any way, the individual nurse along with the patient suffer.  It is in 
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this context of the nurses’ professional and personal identification that a conceptual framework is 
presented for moral distress. 
6.III.A.  Professional Identification 
        The professional identification and obligations of nurses cannot be separated from the 
nurses’ personal identification and conscience.55  Along with the goals of the nursing profession 
that nurses are made aware of when they enter the nursing profession, are associated values.  
These values are enduring, as well as being closely aligned with nurses’ professional identity, 
allowing nurses to promote the moral integrity standards of the profession.56  Following is a 
discussion of how nursing as a moral profession contributes to moral distress with the 
identification of four underlying themes that can be found in those who experience moral 
distress. 
        6.III.A.1.  Nursing as a Moral Profession 
        By its very nature, nursing is a moral profession that cares for life from its beginning to end 
and moral concerns are bound to occur along this continuum.  If these moral problems are not 
resolved or are resolved in ways that have a negative effect on the nurse’s moral integrity, then 
moral distress can result.57  This moral distress can be expressed with anger, frustration, guilt, 
and powerlessness to the extent that nurses withdraw from how they care for the patient, 
avoiding contact with the patient, or giving poor or little physical care to the patient.58  This can 
then lead to burnout and the nurse leaving the nursing profession. 
        Moral integrity is seen to be of great value interpreted as reliable, durable, loyal, and 
objective in compliance with moral norms.59  When considering integrity in the professional 
sense, it refers to the conduct as it occurs within the profession.  A profession, like an employer, 
can make never-ending demands on a nurse, especially for someone new to the profession who 
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lacks experience.  These demands can, in turn, lead to confusion, stress, and eventual withdrawal 
in attempts to deny the pain and suffering.60  If these feelings are not addressed, the eventual 
outcome can be moral distress. 
        Within the professional identification of nursing are found two commitments that are 
formed by individual integrity.  First is the commitment to intellectual excellence.  This involves 
clinical knowledge, expertise, a commitment to lifelong learning, and clinical judgment with 
decision making that is evidence based.61  The intellectual excellence includes professional 
autonomy, in whatever role the nurse is in, plus responsibility and accountability for the quality 
of care provided with compliance with all regulatory requirements.62  Included in the intellectual 
commitment is advancing the profession through research, standard development and 
formation.63 
        The second commitment is to moral excellence.  Moral excellence refers to the commitment 
to the patient by practicing with compassion and respect for the fundamental dignity and worth 
of each individual regardless of race, gender, culture, religion, socio-economic status or nature of 
the disease.64  This commitment considers conflicts of interest, as well as creating a moral 
environment in the workplace, plus self-care that promotes optimum personal health taking 
responsibility to seek guidance and intervention, when necessary.65   
        To assist individuals with their professional identity and moral behavior, most professions 
have a code of moral ethics which serves as a reference for moral standards and behavior.66  The 
Code of Ethics for Nurses was revised in 2015 with a focus on “The Year of Ethics” which 
incorporated more ethics terminology and introduced the term “moral distress”.67  Moral distress, 
in the Code of Ethics, is defined in terms of a threat to one’s values and “moral integrity”.68  
However, even with the nursing profession having a strong ethical based code of ethics, findings 
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indicate that ethical beliefs are more determined by experience, values, and religious beliefs than 
from a code of ethics.69    
        The original definition of moral distress by Jameton attributes a great deal to the external 
constraints that limit one from doing the right thing.  There are other underlying considerations 
that reside both in the professional as well as the personal identifications.  Following is a 
discussion on these considerations, as well as situations that give rise to moral distress in the 
workplace.  
        6.III.A.2.  Underlying Considerations 
        There are four underlying considerations that can set the stage for moral distress.  These are 
suffering, truth telling, role morality, and conflict.  The first consideration is suffering which is 
accelerated when nurses are unable to serve the patient as their advocate in the way they believe 
is needed.70  The suffering can be exhibited from the physical sense as a stress response from the 
cerebral cortex of the brain, plus the limbic system to the hypothalamus, which stimulates the 
Autonomic Nervous System activating all body systems.71  This response works well for the 
body in a “fight or flight” mode in the short term, but since moral distress can go on for a long 
period of time, staying in this hyper-response mode wreaks havoc on the body.  This prolonged 
activation can over stress the body leading to many somatic complaints, such as headache, 
diarrhea, heart palpitations etc.  Psychological and emotional suffering include anxiety, 
depression, fatigue, guilt, self-blame, self-doubt, hopelessness, and anger.72  This is especially 
the case at the end-of-life when pain is not being managed or when medically futile treatment is 
being provided to an already suffering patient.73 
        The second consideration is truth telling.  The way truth telling, or the lack of it, contributes 
to moral distress is when there is active deception.  This deception occurs when there is a failure 
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to take needed action or not informing the patients regarding actions or treatments that would be 
in their best interest.74  Other areas related to truth telling are whistle blowing or reporting 
someone who is not following policy, or is practicing inappropriately, and when administration 
consciously misrepresents the truth to employees.75 
        The third consideration is role morality.  Role morality is defined as actions nurses take to 
fulfill the goals of nursing.76   A major action to meet these goals is to be the patient advocate, 
which most all nurses would agree that they went into nursing “for the patient”.  What happens 
when being a patient advocate cannot be achieved, is that the nurse has choices.  These choices 
include to act with anger, decide on a “never again approach” with future patients, withdraw by 
leaving the unit or nursing, all of which only lead to emotional detachment and moral distress.77  
        In role morality, deciding what action to take creates a conflict of moral values.  Moral 
distress can occur when one’s personal values and beliefs are compromised, as well as one’s 
professional values and beliefs.78  While there is discussion as to whether the personal 
identification can be separated from the professional, failure to act as a “good” nurse can signify 
failure as a human being.79  Choice is seen as the single key integrating element of nurses’ 
actions while other actions, such as advocacy, autonomy, and relationships, are integrated with 
choice.80  If a moral situation is present and the nurse responds with shock, as well as anger, it is 
referred to as moral outrage.81    When nurses then act, as a result of this outrage, even if feeling 
fear, they are expressing moral courage.82   Those who have moral courage and are willing to 
dispute or challenge, regardless of the personal threat, are less likely to experience moral 
distress.83     
        The fourth and final consideration is conflict.  Ethical decision making is often based on 
values which act as a frame of reference when there is a morally distressing situation.84  A 
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conflict in values, that cannot be resolved, causes internal discord which can then lead to moral 
distress.  Key sources of conflict that have been identified for nurses working in critical care 
areas include those decisions that surround the patients and their wishes along with informed 
consent and confidentiality.85  Conflict can also occur from providing treatments that are by 
definition futile or are concerned with limiting life-sustaining treatment.86  Conflict can also 
occur in those situations that arise when working in an environment that does not support 
questioning regarding ethical concerns, as well as the lack of nursing being a part of the decision 
making for clinical resolution.87 
        Just as there are considerations that set the stage for moral distress to occur, there are 
situations in the work environment that make it fertile ground for moral distress to appear.  The 
first situation is when the nurses’ judgments are not considered or when nurses disagree with 
decisions that did not put the patient first.88 
        The second situation that can give rise to moral distress is in the area of professional 
autonomy and scope of practice.  This can occur when a nurse’s contribution is underrated by 
peers, physicians, and management making the nurse’s input to patient care, as well as quality 
patient outcomes, appear to have no value.89 
        The third and final situation that can give rise to moral distress occurs when the standard of 
care is not being met to include supporting the patient’s autonomous rights.  It is especially 
troubling to observe a peer or colleague not following the standards of practice, which falls 
below one’s own professional criteria for moral integrity, as confronting the individual can 
produce moral distress, as well as not confronting.90  Such a situation is amplified when patients 
are deceived, either by withholding information, or consciously misinforming them. 
        Just as the professional identity provides a framework that explains moral distress, personal 
347 
 
 identity is also a part of that framework and cannot be separated from the professional 
component.  Following is a further exploration of personal identification with a discussion on 
moral sensitivity as well as moral climate and the role they play in moral distress. 
6.III.B.  Personal Identification 
        The personal identification found in moral distress in nurses starts from the beginning 
during the education process to become a nurse.  It begins when the nurses are indoctrinated with 
the sentiment that they have a “sacred” duty to those in their care, in that the “patient always 
comes first”.91  This preconceived idea regarding the care of the sick and injured stays with 
nurses throughout their practice.   
        Nurses are formed morally, not only by the professional requirements, but also by the 
requirements of personal identity.  The source of personal identity can be found in one’s genetic 
background, environmental influences, and religious beliefs.92  A significant finding has been 
that those with religious or spiritual beliefs have fewer incidences of moral distress, which is 
believed to be due to seeing end-of-life issues differently with more hope than non-believers.93  
        As nursing is a moral endeavor, the theory of moral distress depicts a chain of events that 
occurs from the external work environment that induces an internal or individual response when 
the nurse is unable to advocate for the patient.94  This theory is based not only on the belief that 
nursing is a moral profession, but also that nurses are moral agents.  Whenever moral agency 
cannot be engaged, moral distress is more apt to occur and the presence of moral competency 
can help keep that from happening so that moral action is the result.95 
        Another key in personal identity has to do with empowerment and the belief that one can 
succeed in a particular situation.  This empowerment is based on learnings that include a belief 
that places value on one’s work, a belief that one is skilled to accomplish the action of the work, 
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a belief that one has control over one’s autonomy, and a belief that one’s work makes a 
difference.96  Moral distress is reported less often in those who express that they feel 
empowered.97 
       Recent studies indicate that the severity of moral distress varies according to two influences.  
These are moral sensitivity and moral or ethical climate.   Following is a discussion regarding 
these influences. 
        6.III.B.1.  Moral Sensitivity 
        Moral sensitivity is a skill that individuals can develop which can augment personal 
identity.  Moral sensitivity is defined as a “process” though which a person senses that there is an 
ethical issue or problem, then defines the issue or problem, and decides what the best options 
are.98  Having moral sensitivity compels nurses to be able to interpret behaviors from patients, 
both verbal and non-verbal.99  The concept of having a “moral sense” dates back to the 17th 
century with British philosophers who proposed that making oral decisions, or moral and ethical 
differentiation, was as much a feeling as it was a mental judgment.100  Moral sensitivity is also 
influenced by the nurses’ culture, sexual preference, gender, age, education, religion and 
values.101  
        As moral or ethical problems are identified, one of two directions may be taken.  One 
direction involves moral uncertainty where moral sensitivity is not fully developed so the 
problem is not confronted and no position is taken.102  The second direction involves moral 
deliberation where information is gathered, reviewed, with action taken as appropriate.103  If 
there is an obstruction that occurs in the moral deliberation process, a “chain of moral distress” 
can occur which can also re-stimulate the deliberation and if obstruction continues a sense of 
powerlessness can result.104  
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        Moral sensitivity is also seen as an intuitive skill that allows one to identify the moral 
conflicts while visualizing the proposed consequences of actions taken.  There are four 
generalizations that can be made that show the relation of moral sensitivity to moral distress.  
These are:  1) nurses with a keen moral sensitivity tend to have less moral distress as they are 
more committed to patients with an advanced moral competency; 2) nurses who have moral 
sensitivity, but lack moral competency, are more apt to have moral distress; 3) nurses with moral 
sensitivity that employ various problem solving strategies to solve ethical dilemmas are more apt 
to have moral competency with less moral distress; and 4) gender, education, and experience all 
may have an effect on moral distress that varies between individuals.105 
       Moral sensitivity is more apt to develop in a moral or ethical climate.  Ethical climate is 
defined as the perception of the organization, by the individuals who work there, that affects 
their behaviors and attitudes.106  Following is a discussion on ethical climate and its role in moral 
distress. 
       6.III.B.2.  Ethical Climate 
        The ethical climate within an organization fosters ethical inquiry and discussion, along with 
differing opinions, while valuing the individuals in a trusting relationship.107  The trusting 
relationship for the nurse extends to patients, peers, physician colleagues, managers, and 
administrators with evidence indicating that a positive ethical climate is necessary to support 
professional nursing practice.108  
        The ethical climate of an organization can help mitigate the effects of moral distress in an 
individual.109  The ethical climate can also be modified to improve the work environment which 
is done through interactions, policies, role clarity, and the overall culture to include ethical 
behaviors that are accepted, as well as those that are not.110 
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        The ethical climate does not get as much attention as moral distress, yet, focusing on the 
symptoms, and not the cause, will not lead to any permanent resolution.  Critical care nurses 
have expressed that major concerns in the work environment are the lack of involvement in 
ethical discussions, inadequate support of their practice from administration, and inconsistent 
practice policies.111  Further concerns are differentiated patient care ethics, where nurses wanted 
a voice, and organizational ethics, where nurses often did not see organizational values being 
followed, with more focus on the bottom line than on patient care.112 
        When the  nurses’ concerns are present in a poor ethical climate, even if there is a high level 
of moral sensitivity, there is a “psychological disequilibrium” that occurs.113  This leads to moral 
distress when the decision is made but the correct moral behavior cannot be accomplished as a 
result of the constraints of the climate.  Nurses will respond to the type of climate they work in.  
Therefore, a positive, strong, ethical climate will not only recruit nurses who respond in an 
ethical manner, but will also tend to retain them longer.114  The opposite is also true as nurses 
will tend to not respond in an ethical manner in a negative ethical climate.  Moral agency serves 
to link the concepts of moral sensitivity and ethical climate with moral agency being seen as a 
moral recognition of moral problems and the associated duty to others.115 
        Studies have been done examining ethical climate and its effect on various professions.  
Regardless of the profession, perceptions of a higher ethical climate led to lower moral 
distress.116  Even in the same ethical climate, physicians, overall, scored lower levels of moral 
distress than nurses and other allied professionals.117 
        Moral distress has received much attention because it is so compelling, as well as 
detrimental to the integrity of those affected by it.  The intensity of moral distress can vary 
between nurses in the same unit and between separate nursing units.  The next section examines 
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the integrity and intensity of moral distress by exploring its root causes and contributing factors 
identifying the nurse-physician relationship as a major factor.  Medical futility will be discussed 
as the number one reason for moral distress in nurses, as it is for physicians and other allied 
health professionals. 
 
6.IV.  Integrity and Intensity of Moral Distress 
        Continued exposure to moral distress, which can lead to moral residue, can affect one’s core 
values and sense of duty which are integral to integrity.118  Integrity is defined as the feeling of 
“wholeness” and self-worth that is a result of congruency between one’s values and actions.119   
With a loss of integrity, in the presence of moral distress, there is a fear that it will lead to a 
subsequent loss of one’s personal and professional identity which would be devastating.120  
Based on the situation and the individual nurse, the intensity of the moral distress can vary from 
low to high.  It order to address the integrity and intensity of moral distress, getting to the root 
causes, plus the contributing factors, is the best approach to minimizing its presence.  Following 
is a discussion of the root causes and contributing factors of moral distress with an in-depth 
explanation on medical futility, the number one reason for moral distress in critical care nurses. 
6.IV.A.    Root Causes and Contributing Factors 
        Common root causes and contributing factors have been identified for moral distress 
through nursing research, however, not every nurses who is exposed to these situations will 
experience moral distress.121  Even if moral distress is experienced when these causes or 
contributing factors are present, the intensity of that moral distress many also vary depending on 
the nurse and the situation.   
        The root causes for moral distress have changed little over the past 10-12 years.  The top 
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seven root causes, or sources, in rank order, of moral distress found in critical care  nurses 
include: 1) lack of continuity of care which contributes to suffering for the patient; 2) adhering to 
family wishes for life-sustaining treatment when it is not in the best interest of the patient; 3) 
poor communication which affects care; 4) prolonging death with life-sustaining treatment; 5) 
staffing levels which are deemed “unsafe”; 6) feeling obligated to follow orders seen as 
“unnecessary”; and 7) focusing on cost reduction which affects optimal care.122  Of these seven 
root causes, all can be present as a source or result of futile treatments leading to moral 
distress.123  Other root causes that have been identified include working with nurses or 
physicians who do not measure up to competency standards, giving false hope to both patients 
and families, and failure to provide adequate pain management out of fear of hastening death.124 
The major root causes for moral distress are similar with both adult and neonatal/pediatric 
critical nurses with the exception of following the family wishes being the number one root 
cause for the distress in the neonatal/pediatric population.125 
        The contributing factors for moral distress can be viewed from three perspectives, the 
individual, institution specific and external factors.  An additional contributing factor that is a 
main source of moral distress in the nurse-physician relationship.  Following is a discussion on 
these contributing factors.     
        6.IV.A.1.  Individual, Institution Specific and External Factors 
        The contributing factor related to the individual, includes personal character traits, or who 
they are, and their comprehension of the incident, especially related to autonomy and taking 
authority.126  It can also include a worldly view of expectations, moral sensitivity, and the 
perspective of one’s values.127  The role of the nurse, the nurse’s confidence, along with the 
nurse’s knowledge and skill all shape the experience of the moral distress event.128   
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        Another area that rests with the individual is the value of experience.  Some studies indicate 
the more experience the nurse has, the less moral distress, which may be a factor of more 
exposure, increased ability to resolve issues, or a dulling of one’s “psyche” from the prolonged 
exposure to stressful situations.129  Other studies show the more experience, the more moral 
distress due to the increased exposure to situations.130 
        For individual nurses to avoid moral distress, they must be able to communicate the ethical 
dilemmas in language that is both understandable to medical staff and administration.131  It is 
then necessary to have authority and capability to be able to take the necessary action required as 
a result of this dilemma.132  The courage and risk needed to take moral action may be the 
“greatest challenge” in avoiding moral distress for nurses.133 
        The second source of contributing factors to moral distress is institution specific, however, 
many of the same issues are found in multiple institutions.  In addressing institutional specific 
factors, it comes down to limited resources.  The two limited resources that are prominent 
include time and money.  These are operationalized into cost reduction initiatives, 
reimbursement concerns, or being unable to complete the tasks necessary to care for patients 
adequately.134  However, the one institutional factor that gets named most frequently in both the 
United States and other countries is related to staffing.  Staffing contributes to moral distress 
when there are insufficient numbers to adequately care for the patients, or if the staff training has 
been inadequate to care for the patients or to manage new equipment and procedures.135 
        Another institutional specific factor relates to a lack of beds with the constant triaging of 
patients to be able to care for the most immediately critically ill, which can mean transferring 
patients out of critical care who may still need a great deal of care.136  Added to this daily 
“musical beds” routine is the inadequate or insufficient palliative care services to meet the 
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patient needs, especially in the neonatal and pediatric population.137  Other work related sources 
of contributing factors include such things as organizational structure, poor management, inferior 
communication, inadequate policies, lack of support from management or administration, and 
insufficient recognition.138     
        A third and final contributing factor source for moral distress can be found in external 
factors. These sources are broad, but are found in the health care of today and include the 
professional responsibilities, the regulatory requirements, and compliance expectations.139  
Overall, the patient focused concerns are major sources of moral distress for nurses.  These 
include actions to the patient that produce pain and suffering; prolonging the dying process 
without informing the patient or family about treatment options, such as palliative care/hospice; 
and the treatment of patients as “objects” for personal or organizational reasons.140  In addition, 
the factors can include restrictive policies and procedures, legal constraints, and third party 
expectations.141 
        In the critical care environment, nurses and physicians must have a close collegial 
relationship in order to provide quality patient care.  This does not always happen in every 
instance and the relationships that exist between nurses and physicians have been identified as an 
underlying root cause or contributing factor for nurses’ moral distress.  Following is an 
exploration of this relationship as a cause of moral distress. 
        6.IV.A.2.  Nurse-Physician Relationships 
        In an ideal world, the nurse-physician relationship would be both cooperative and 
collaborative where differences are confronted and openly discussed.142  However, this is not 
always the case because of various factors.  One factor is the difference in the responsibilities of 
the two roles---the nurses focus on the “care” and the physicians focus more on the “cure” of the 
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patient.143  A second factor is the disparity in status and authority between the two positions.144   
A third factor is the gender differences between the nurse and physician.  Even with more men 
entering nursing and women becoming physicians, there are still male-female concerns.145  The 
final factor is the enculturation of each profession through the training and education process that 
perpetuates the “physician gives orders” to the nurse and the “nurse follows them” hierarchical 
culture.146 
        When addressing nurse-physician relationships, nurse autonomy and its connection between 
job satisfaction and moral distress are well known.  Nurse autonomy is referred to frequently in 
the literature.  This connection can be to professional or personal identity and integrity or to the 
nurses’ professional code and the ability to make autonomous decisions as one of the criteria to 
be a profession.147 
        As nurse-physician relationships can be a major source of moral distress, so can “incivility” 
among and between all health care professionals.148  This incivility is often demonstrated by 
bullying, refusing to assist co-workers or provide needed information, humiliating co-workers in 
public, and circulating gossip.149 
        Critical care nurses make an average care decision every three seconds with a total of 18 
clinical decisions every two hours.150  These clinical decisions are further subdivided into 
intervention decisions, communication decisions and evaluation decisions, with not all requiring 
communication with the physician.151  For those that do require physician communication, when 
there is a collaborative approach between the nurse and physician, there is an enhanced level of 
autonomy, job satisfaction, and less moral distress.152 
       In being the patient advocate, when the nurse believes the patient is receiving inappropriate 
medical treatment, there are several paths the nurse can take.  Which path is taken and which one 
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will produce positive results is dependent on the nurse-physician relationship with variance noted 
between individual nurses and individual physicians.  The first path is to do nothing which 
results in no confrontation with the physician and, therefore, no risk of retaliation, however, the 
nurse can be left with feelings of not being the patient advocate leading to moral distress.153  A 
second path is more underhanded involving communication strategies that may be through others 
so as to achieve the goal without using the direct approach, reinforcing the “doctor-nurse 
games”.154  The last approach, and the one that would confront the issues, is to talk with the 
physician directly.  For many nurses this approach has not been successful resulting in 
intimidation, anger, and fear with poor results for the patients, as well as the nurses, ranging from 
discipline to blame, leading to moral distress.155  Disruptive physician behavior continues to be a 
problem in health care and can intimidate the nurse leading to moral distress with impaired 
communication between the physician and nurse eventually putting the patient at risk.156 
        The issue of moral distress in the nurse-physician relationship is not just about nurses, even 
though nurses tend to experience moral distress differently than physicians due to their lack of 
authority in making decisions along with the stress of daily patient care.157  Physicians also 
experience moral distress.  For both key professionals, moral distress can permanently threaten 
moral integrity.158  It is time to not only re-think the culture that nurses and physicians practice 
in, but to also change the longstanding hierarchical way of life that has led to the present moral 
climate.159 
        Several studies indicate that medical futility is the most common source of moral distress, 
not only for nurses, but also for physicians and respiratory therapists.160  Following is a 
discussion of how medical futility, or medically inappropriate treatment, contributes to the moral 
distress in critical care nurses. 
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6.IV.B.  Medical Futility at End-of-Life 
        There are many definitions to be found on medical futility.  It is an act or treatment where 
the predetermined goals cannot be achieved and the possibility of success is practically 
impossible.161  In other words, medical futility at the end-of-life is the treatments or interventions 
that are not likely to lead to a successful outcome.162  Each individual clinical situation must be 
examined individually for medical futility as no one definition fits all situations.  Reasons found 
for treatments to be seen as futile include those in which the patient would not survive beyond 
the stay in critical care, the patient was permanently comatose, the patient’s goals were not 
achievable, and the patient’s death was imminent.163 
        Critical care nurses have reported moral distress surrounding medical futility at the end-of-
life, especially when their thoughts regarding the end-of-life decisions are not sought or 
valued.164  Furthermore, there is some question regarding whether nurses’ concerns with some of 
the end-of-life decisions are appropriately within the nurses’ domain, which leads to the feeling 
of helplessness and powerlessness.165   
        Studies have not only shown medical futility to be the  most common source of moral 
distress, but also that futile treatment situations lead to the highest levels of moral distress.166 
Following is a discussion on the situations surrounding futility that lead to moral distress. 
        6.IV.B.1.  Futility Situations Leading to Moral Distress 
        Research has linked futile treatments to moral distress, as well as job satisfaction and nurse 
turnover, with futile treatments being experienced by 66-89% of the nurses in critical care.167  
Other studies examined the frequency of futile treatment.  Over 30% of nurses provided futile 
treatment once a month and approximately 17% provided futile treatment daily with 78.3% being  
provided on the physician’s order, 47.1% based on family’s demand, and 33.3% was because of 
358 
 
hospital administration’s request to do so.168 
        Futile treatment situations that can lead to moral distress include unnecessary end-of-life 
treatments; the prolonging of death by performing extensive life-saving treatments; failing to 
determine patient/family wishes regarding life-saving treatments; and general failure to 
communicate by the physicians to the patient/family as well as the health care team.169   
        Moral distress has been found to be associated with two perceptions frequently felt at the 
end-of-life.  The first is a feeling of being “distrusted” by the family, especially if the nurses 
have expressed an openness regarding the patient suffering with continued futile treatment.170  
The second is the perception that the patient is being “abused” during the dying process by the 
infliction of additional treatment procedures.171 
        Additional situations that have been identified under the umbrella of futile treatment include 
those which are perceived to induce suffering in patients with “complex life threatening” 
diseases.172  Nurse specific situations include:  1) following physician orders for unnecessary 
tests and treatments when death is imminent; 2) caring for a patient who is sustained on a 
ventilator and no one will make a decision to withdraw the machine; 3) giving intravenous life-
sustaining medication during cardiopulmonary resuscitation without doing the necessary 
circulatory support as in a “meds only code”; 4) lacking communication between nurses and 
physicians that would lead to shared decisions on what is the best care for the patient; and 5) 
continuing to follow the family’s wishes when they are not in the best interest of the patient.173 
        Critical care nurses experience pain and suffering when they care for patients for weeks or 
months who are burdened by the excessive treatment that the nurses see as being of no benefit or 
futile.174  Just as the patients are suffering, they are being cared for by nurses who are, likewise, 
suffering.  Although critical care nurses and physicians have similar definitions for futile 
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treatment, physician assessments are more closely aligned to patient mortality, plus they also 
control the treatment withdrawal.175  When nurses assessed patients to be receiving futile 
treatment, the patients died in the hospital 58% of the time and within six months 68% of the 
time raising the questions as to whether nurses focus more on suffering than survival.176  When 
the assessments were done by physicians and nurses collaboratively, the predictions were 
improved, which not only stresses the value of collaboration, but also opens up the opportunity 
for earlier palliative care referral.177  Other studies indicate that both critical care nurses and 
physicians care for patients who are receiving treatment that they do not agree with which they 
find in violation of their moral conscience.  This occurs in 50% of critical care nurses, 30% of 
attending physicians, and 70% of house physicians.178 
        Further futile situations that can lead to moral distress include being unable to relieve or 
treat the perceived physical suffering, especially the pain.179  Inadequate pain management is a 
result of either patient/family preference so patients are more alert for their dying moments or the 
providers fear of overmedicating the patient leading to a hastened death.180  It either situation, it 
is the patients who suffer. 
        In many instances, the moral distress related to futility has been focused with strategies 
being developed to address preventing and treating this moral distress.  However, this approach 
has not been sustaining for the long term.  Therefore, it has been recommended that in 
confronting the moral distress associated with futility, the best recourse is to focus on mitigating 
the presence of futile treatment, instead of preventing moral distress and its effects, which will 
lessen if futility is addressed.181 
        Nurses play varied roles in the cycle of futility and moral distress.  Following is a 
discussion of these roles. 
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        6.IV.B.2.  Nursing’s Role 
        In critical care, when patients are perceived as receiving medically inappropriate treatment, 
or futile treatment, it is nurses who are more often the first to challenge the effectiveness of 
 continued treatment, as well as to encourage communication and decision making.182  However, 
often the nurses’ input does not extend beyond the first alert to a more collaborative role in the  
final decision making regarding withdrawing life sustaining treatment.   
        Three areas of concern have been identified regarding the decision making process for futile 
treatment for nurses, all of which contribute to the environment that leads to moral distress.  
These include: 1) nurses input is marginalized and often not seen as being of value; 2) varying 
opinions with resulting orders between and among the different physician consults that may also 
confuse the family where one gives hope and another takes it away; and 3) when the final life 
and death decision is made by only one individual versus a collaborative team effort.183  To 
lessen these concerns, it requires nurses to become sufficiently trained in order to be active 
participants seeking to offer input to decision making, whenever it is in the best interest of the 
patient.184  
       Nurses function in several roles and these roles are especially needed at the end-of-life when 
medically inappropriate treatments are a point of concern.  The nurses’ major role at the bedside 
is to be the patient advocate, the “go between” for not only the patient/family to the providers, 
but also for the providers to the patient/family with the goal of addressing the patient’s needs.185  
As being an advocate or voice for the patient is the nurses major function, there are other roles 
the nurse fills that become more prominent in critical care at the end-of-life.  These roles include 
the following:  1) mediator—in this role the nurse brings the family and providers together to 
discuss concerns as well as proceed with end-of-life decision making when the time is right; 2) 
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educator—the nurse explains as well as interprets information and procedures to the families 
who are under prolonged stress which makes processing information difficult; 3) facilitator—the 
nurse can help facilitate the time of death due to treatment withdrawal so that the appropriate 
family member can have their “good-byes” or be present, if desired; and 4) comforter—the 
nurses uses knowledge of grief and loss in providing comfort to family members, as well as 
providers, who also experience loss when a patient dies.186  Whenever nurses are performing  
these various roles in critical care units surrounding the end-of-life and medical futility, it has 
been found that when their role is seen as valuable, collaborative, and consultative there is less 
evidence of moral distress.187 
        If there is an absence of palliative care at the end-of-life in critical care, the burden of 
providing quality end-of-life care or a “good death” falls to the critical care nurse.  There are four 
major domains for this end-of-life care which most critical care nurses are involved with on a 
routine basis.  These involve providing adequate symptom management which includes pain as 
the number one concern, but also includes breathlessness, nausea and vomiting; avoiding the 
prolongation of the dying process with better communication between patients, families and 
providers; helping the patient have a sense of control at the end, even if they are no longer 
conscious, in which case the proxy decision maker takes over and also has the need for a say in 
seeing that the patient’s wishes are followed; and strengthening relationships with loved ones as 
dying offers opportunities for reconciliation and closure.188 
        The various root causes and contributing factors that can lead to moral distress take their 
toll not only on the individual nurse, but also on the entire nursing profession.  The next section 
illustrates the impact moral distress has on the critical care nurses as well as the nursing 
profession with organ donation seen as a subject critical care nurses often struggle with which  
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causes moral distress.  Neonatal intensive care nursing will be presented as an area with a high  
incidence of moral distress. 
 
6.V.  Impact on Nurse and Nursing Profession 
        The impact of moral distress on the individual nurse can be profound in the short term and 
in the long term, not only personally, but also professionally.  The immediate impact most often 
starts with physical symptoms, psychological responses, attitude changes toward patients, job 
dissatisfaction, and feeling a lack of support.189  As moral distress continues, there is  more 
negativity as it relates to patients, other staff, physicians, and the organization, especially where 
there is perceived medical futility in the treatment of the critically ill patient.190  Following is a 
discussion on the consequences that moral distress has on the outcomes of the nurse and the 
profession of nursing. 
6.V.A.  Consequences 
        The consequences or impact that moral distress brings to nurses and the nursing profession 
are multi-faceted.  Not only are they multi-faceted, but they are also unfavorable to both nurses, 
as well as the patients and families the nurses care for in the critical care unit.  Although nurses 
are first and foremost obligated to their patients, they have a responsibility to address their own 
suffering.   It is only through addressing their own suffering that they will be able to be present 
for the patients and families in their time of need.   Following is an examination of the impact of 
moral distress on the nurse. 
        6.V.A.1.  Nurse Impact 
        The consequences of moral distress can impact many areas.  The first impact causes a range 
of physical, emotional, behavioral, and spiritual responses with the resulting problems often 
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lasting for years.191  These responses include:  1) physical responses which include headaches, 
insomnia,  heart rhythm disturbances, gastro-intestinal abnormalities, unplanned weight loss or 
gain, and a range of ailments from any of the body’s systems; 2) emotional responses to include 
depression, anxiety, fear, guilt, powerlessness, and grief, all of which may lead to emotion 
exhaustion and burnout; 3) behavioral responses such as addiction to drugs or alcohol, anger, 
agitation, violence, avoidance, and forgetfulness; and 4) spiritual responses which include a 
“crisis of faith”, a separation from work or family, loss of self-worth, and a loss of purpose.192  If 
moral distress goes unresolved with a failure to act, the nurses’ personal integrity may be 
jeopardized.  When integrity is compromised, the person is altered causing a detachment from 
others.193 
        The second impact concerns the detachment from others with these others, in one case, 
being patients so that care suffers.  Nurses who experience this impact may ignore the patient’s 
needs or only meet the basic physical needs leaving the patient with untreated pain, unforeseen 
complications, longer hospital stays, and untoward outcomes.194  These nurses may end up in 
disciplinary action or leave a position, or the profession, for a different occupation.195  In other 
cases, moral distress can cause nurses to detach from personal relationships to include family and 
friends, with some reporting they have substituted other substances, such as drugs and alcohol.196 
        The third impact of moral distress relates to the accountability of nurses in a hospital 
environment.  In the presence of moral distress, the power imbalances in the workplace can seem 
to be exaggerated.197  This exaggeration comes from the triad of accountability that nurses are 
held to which is the accountability to the patients/families, the bureaucratic health care system in 
which they are employed, and the physicians who care for the patients.198  Even as leadership  
opportunities present themselves in a health care institution, moral distress may prevent nurses  
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from actively seeking them.199 
        A fourth and final impact that moral distress has on nurses is that it causes them to leave the 
 critical care unit, the institution, or the profession.200  Three different studies indicated that 
because of moral distress 46.2%, 45%, and 10% of the nurses left or considered leaving a job.201 
Other studies indicate that between 15-43% of nurses leave their jobs due to moral distress.202  
Whether the nurse is struggling with the decision to leave or planning on leaving, this contributes 
to the moral distress of the nurse and adds to the overall stress of the critical care unit. 
        Moral distress, usually seen in a negative light, can have some positive benefits.  Moral 
distress can help open communication, re-channel the image of the passive powerless nurse, 
employ acts of courage plus advocacy, and educate on how to confront barriers.203  The presence 
of moral distress has been shown to lead to both personal and professional growth which, in turn, 
leads to more compassionate care to patients.204  The experience of moral distress can also teach 
better self-care with an increased awareness on one’s own beliefs, values, and ideals for the 
betterment of the patient. 
        When moral distress takes its toll on individual nurses, this eventually has consequences for 
the nursing profession.  From the beginning of nursing with Florence Nightingale there have 
been ethical dilemmas as there are challenges found in “caring work”, such as nursing.205  This 
caring work is magnified when placed in a stress filled critical care environment making it a 
difficult place to recruit and retain nurses.  When moral distress enters the scene, it can add to the 
already stressful environment of critical care which eventually impacts the nursing profession.  
Following is a discussion of the effect moral distress has on the nursing profession.   
        6.V.A.2.  Nursing Profession Impact 
        The 2013 Critical Care Nurse Work Environment Survey revealed data that had worsened 
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since the previous survey done in 2008.  This survey was from 84,444 nurses across the nation 
and identified the following results:  1) those very satisfied with their present position decreased 
from 32% to 25.5% in five years: 2) those who would recommend nursing as a career was 54.7% 
in 2008 and  50.6% in 2013; 3) of those nurses dissatisfied with their present position, 35.7% are 
willing to stay and assist with changes, 32.3% plan to leave the organization and 16% plan to 
leave the unit but stay in the organization; and 4) the incidence of moral distress increased form 
2008 with it now being that 23.3% of the nurses say they experience it frequently and 9.4% 
experience it very frequently.206  With these results, there is an imperative for change if 
improvements are to be seen.  Other findings indicate that both health care organizations and 
nurse leaders fail to recognize the needs of the nurses, to support them adequately, or to provide 
the necessary education and training for their growth and collaboration.207 
        Historically, health care executives have not always given nurse turnover the attention it 
needs ranking it seventh in importance when compared with such things as reimbursement 
concerns, regulatory issues, quality of patient care, and physician matters.208  Nursing turnover is 
expensive at a cost of approximately $300,000 for every 1% increase in turnover.209  It has been 
estimated to cost between $92,000 and $145,000 to replace a nurse, depending on specialty, with 
a higher cost to replace a critical care nurse.210  However, turnover creates costs in many ways as 
it affects quality of care to patients, which affects reimbursement, leading to an immense 
resource expenditure to correct concerns that often do not address the root cause of the 
problem.211 
        In the present cycle of nursing shortage which plagues the nursing profession throughout 
history, the health care system cannot afford or tolerate loss of valuable critically skilled nurses.  
Therefore, leaders and administrators of health care systems must assure that their environments 
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are designed, as well as managed, so that each health care professional’s “moral agency” is 
strengthened and not weakened.212  A way to assist in maintaining moral agency and minimize 
moral distress in the professional work environment is to encourage nurses to have a voice, 
develop structured debriefings, foster problem solving, and support relationship building.213 
        The profession of nursing, although originally created by men over 2000 years ago, is today 
predominantly female.214  Of the approximately 3.5 million nurses, only 9.6% are male 
compared to 2.7% in 1970.215  Studies indicate that moral distress is statistically significantly 
higher in female nurses than males.216  The reason for this gender difference is not clear, but it is 
speculated to be similar to the differences between the male and female psychology with the 
females showing more sensitivity than males, as well as females scoring higher on moral 
sensitivity than males.217  Future studies on the gender differences, as they relate to moral 
distress, are needed with hopes of gaining knowledge that can benefit both genders. 
        Moral distress has consequences for the nurse, the profession, and the organization with 
action needed by all three for change to occur.  When taking a closer look at moral distress, there 
are situations and areas that can lead to a higher incidence of moral distress.  Following is a 
discussion on examples when and where moral distress has a tendency to be high. 
6.V.B.  Moral Distress Examples 
        There is one medical procedure that takes place in critical care units that over half of the 
critical care nurses have reported moral distress when caring for these patients, which is the 
process of organ donation.218  A critical care nursing unit where moral distress is high is in the 
neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) in caring for the extremely low birthweight neonates.219  
Organ donation and NICU nursing will now be discussed as two examples where moral distress 
is seen frequently. 
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        6.V.B.1.  Organ Donations:  Universal Problem 
        The majority of clinical situations that create moral distress are associated with end-of-life 
experiences.220  One such experience is organ donation.  The demand for organs far exceeds the 
supply.  Approximately 30 parts of the human body can be transplanted either by regenerative 
cells, such as blood, or non-regenerative cells found in organs such as the heart, lungs, liver, 
pancreas and kidneys.221  For organs to be harvested, they need blood perfusion as close to the 
recovery as possible which means that almost all patients are sent from a critical care unit to the 
operating room for organ recovery.  Therefore, critical care nurses are key in getting the donation 
process started, yet, with over half of critical care nurses reporting distress from the organ 
donation process, the distress might serve as a barrier to the donations that are so desperately 
needed. 
        When organ donation occurs after brain death, the critical care nurse can no longer focus on 
quality end-of-life care or a “good death”.  The focus is now on keeping the organs perfused until 
they are ready for retrieval.222  The pathophysiology of brain stem death sets off a chain reaction 
in many of the body’s systems that must be managed as these patients are prone to physiological 
instability.223  This management takes the most highly skilled critical care nurse who may have 
been focusing on end-of-life care with this patient and family up until the moment of brain death 
declaration.  This shift in focus is what leads to the moral distress as well as not allowing for a 
“good death” that allows the machines to be discontinued with the family at the bedside, all of 
which allow for the final farewell process for family and staff.224 
        Although organ donation is voluntary, it is required as a condition for Medicare 
reimbursement that all health care institutions have “request” policies regarding organ   
donation.225   The donor’s decision, which is usually made by the family or surrogate decision 
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maker, must be free from coercion, it must align with the doctrine of informed consent, and it 
must be obtained without financial incentives.226 
       The majority of organ donations occur after the patient has been declared brain dead but 
remains connected to life-sustaining treatment in order to keep the organs perfused.  The 
contributing factor to moral distress has two components.  The first is setting the stage with the 
family for organ donation, early in the patient’s care, even though the nurse does not seek 
consent, as this is done by the organ procurement organization.227  The nurse can be very 
convincing by either supporting organ donation or not and can influence the family by their 
verbal or non-verbal support, or lack of support, of the process.  This pressure places the nurse in 
the middle where they can feel the need to protect the family from “overzealous” transplant 
coordinators.228  First and foremost, the nurses’ responsibility is to advocate for the patient under 
their care and not be pressured or influenced by another patient who is awaiting the organs in 
order to continue living.229 
        The second component that adds to the moral distress is the initiation and continuation of 
active treatment to preserve the organs as well as the need for invasive procedures, such as heart 
catheterization, which can seem to prolong the dying and suffering.230  When all the pre-donation 
work has been completed, along with recipients found for the various organs, the patient is 
moved to the operating room for organ retrieval.  
        The addition of donation after cardiac death (DCD) or the non-heart-beating donor, has 
added to the moral distress.  Some of this distress is due to a lack of knowledge with only 11% of 
nurses reporting being confident in their knowledge of DCD, 20% could accurately describe the 
process, but 29% were in error regarding their understanding of the process.231  Another part of  
the distress is the fear that death will be promoted in order to obtain viable organs for waiting  
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recipients.232  To provide quality end-of-life care and provide a “good death” when treatments  
are being withdrawn, as happens in the non-heart-beating organ donor, is still the highest priority 
and the organ donation process should not interfere with this.233  
        Organ donation is a procedure that causes moral distress in all of the critical care areas to 
include neonatal, pediatric and adult.   However, there is one critical care arena where moral 
distress is higher than any of the others.  This in is the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) where 
nurses care for the extremely low birthweight neonates.234   Following is a discussion on the 
moral distress that is unique to the NICU. 
        6.V.B.2.  Neonatal Intensive Care Nursing 
        There have been many technological advances and pharmaceuticals in the care of neonates 
making it possible for smaller, plus earlier gestational age neonates, to survive.  Although the 
changes of survival for premature neonates is improving, to survive without some disability or 
complication is exceptional.235  What makes it even more challenging is that the disability may 
not be evidenced at birth or show until the child is six years of age or older.236   
        To predict neonatal mortality, the birthweight and/or gestational age have been used.  
Gestational age is a more accurate indicator of mortality, even though it is not always easy to 
determine as it is based on the menstrual cycle which can be unpredictable.  Survival rates are 
predicted at 15% for 23 week gestational age infants; 56% at 24 weeks, and 79% at 25 weeks.237  
Lung maturity is also a factor for survival with the Apgar score being a quick reference at birth 
to determine how the baby is doing.  A neonate at <24 week gestation, weighing <750 grams, 
with an Apgar score of <3 has a 30% chance of survival.238 
        Even though the survival rates are low for neonates less than 23 weeks gestation, parents 
and physicians still agree, in many instances, to attempt a trial resuscitation to see how the 
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neonate will respond.  Neonatal intensive care nurses describe these infants as a very special 
group of patients who are not only very tiny, but also vulnerable needing their protection.239  As 
a result, these nurses consider themselves the infants’ protector and become very attached to 
them so that inflicting pain to the infant causes the nurses to experience great moral pain.240  
Therefore, when death occurs, it is often accompanied with guilt for nurses who see death as a 
release from the suffering and depression due to the repeated deaths and unresolved grief.241 
        It is no surprise that moral distress is common in NICU nurses given the circumstances 
under which nurses caring for the extremely low birth weight neonates work.  The major 
concerns that contribute to moral distress in the NICU include:  1) uncertainty related to whether 
to resuscitate a premature neonate and when to withdraw treatment; 2) the best interest of the 
patient and whether the parents are emotionally able to decide what that is; 3) varying 
perspectives between physicians, parents, and nurses.  Nurses are often not involved in any of the 
decision-making but are left to deal with the decisions that have been made which causes conflict 
and moral distress; 4) pain and suffering—the nurses often relate that the neonate is suffering 
and wonder when will it be stopped as nurses are the ones spending the most time with the 
neonate; and 5) supporting the family and the constant need to “be there” for the family through 
the many ups and downs, supporting them, providing them with accurate information, while 
trying to keep an emotional distance for self-preservation.242  As premature neonates require 
more surgeries or experience more complications, the NICU nurses’ moral distress is more apt to 
increase as they question the appropriateness of the aggressive treatment.243 
        One hope for moral distress in the NICU is for palliative care to find its place.  It has had a 
slow start compared to the adult.  With the large number of critical care nurses, in all of the 
various critical care units, reporting moral distress which has impacted job satisfaction, turnover, 
371 
 
and ultimately patient care, steps must be taken to resolve the previous moral distress as well as 
prevent it from reoccurring.  The next section discusses strategies to confront moral distress 
which includes the call to moral action that is needed now as well as the constraints that prevent 
that moral action from occurring. 
 
6.VI.  Strategies to Confront Moral Distress 
        When health care providers, which includes nurses as well as physicians and all other allied 
professionals, recognize ethical concerns that they can do nothing about, an open discussion 
among all parties is a first approach.  If this were to be the approach by all parties, with each 
dilemma, moral distress could be minimized.  As simple as this may sound, it does not always 
happen.  With open discussions as one approach, there are other calls to moral action that are 
needed, including the 4 A’s proposed by the American Association of Critical Care Nurses 
(AACN).  However, there are also constraints to action that are at play which are making it a 
challenge to act.  Following is a discussion on both the call to moral action and the constraints to 
that action. 
6.VI.A.  Call to Moral Action 
        With the incidence and prevalence of moral distress being recognized in critical care nurses, 
there has been a moral imperative identified for a call to action.  This call to action goes beyond 
nurses to the physicians and other allied health professionals who are, likewise, suffering from 
moral distress.244  This call to action also goes beyond the individual nurse and beyond the 
individual unit, affecting the entire organization. 
        In responding to moral distress, there are situational concerns that must be addressed before 
strategies or action plans can be implemented.  The first is to acknowledge that moral distress is 
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a dilemma for health care organizations at all levels and must be challenged.245   The second is to 
understand that, although moral distress affects nursing, especially in critical care, it also affects 
all members of the health care organization.246  The third concern is that response is needed in an 
organized manner acknowledging the moral hardship that it causes for those who work in a 
morally demanding environment.247   In other words, support is needed for those who are 
experiencing moral distress.  
        Since the call to action is not about a one way approach, there are roles for the organization, 
the patient care unit, the individual and the profession.   Following is a discussion on these roles 
in confronting moral distress. 
        6.VI.A.1.  Role for Organization and Patient Care Unit 
        For action to have impact on moral distress, there are roles for the organization and the 
patient care unit.  First of all, the organization must implement interdisciplinary strategies to not 
only recognize as well as name moral distress, but also establish forums where patient care goals 
and diverse opinions can be freely expressed.248  Second, the organization must establish 
mechanisms to determine what situations lead to moral distress with a systematic process to 
review, as well as analyze these situations so corrective action can take place with a plan to 
address futile treatments.249  
        A third role for the organization is to develop educational programs for staff, as well as 
physicians, which includes topics such as communication skills, self-inquiry, conflict 
management, negotiation, and ethics training.250  Fourth, the organization must develop policies 
which addresses ethical dilemmas with representation of staff on ethics committees, as well as 
a culture of zero tolerance for disrespectful behavior in the workplace.251  Finally, the 
organization needs to assure that support systems are in place that include employee assistance 
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programs, critical stress debriefing, grief counseling, policies regarding end-of-life care, and 
access to palliative care.252 
        It is up to the organization to create the culture that is needed to address moral distress 
through policy, ethics education and practices.253  Other efforts that come from the organization 
to the individual include daily ethics rounds, workshops on the topics, and an emphasis on nurse-
physician collaboration that begins in schools and continues in the workplace.254 
        The leaders of critical care units are key in recognizing moral distress and confronting it in a 
kind and compassionate manner.  Nurse leaders can take the lead in addressing moral distress in 
these ways:  1) enlist interdisciplinary colleagues to help create an ethical environment; 2) utilize 
facilitators to explore symptoms and behaviors of moral distress; 3) establish focus for the unit, 
such as care conferences, unit meetings, etc.; 4) monitor data regarding moral distress to help 
establish needed programs and monitor progress; 5) utilize root cause analysis to monitor trends; 
6) use support systems appropriately, such as ethics consults, employee assistance, bereavement 
support etc.; 7) enlist staff to develop health work space focusing on self-renewal; and 8) develop 
policies and interventions as needed.255 
        Just as the organization and the leadership of the patient care unit have roles in moral 
distress, so do the individual and the nursing profession.  Following is a discussion on these 
roles. 
        6.VI.A.2.  Role for Individual and Profession 
         The role of the individual in moral distress is multi-faceted.  For those individuals who are 
experiencing moral distress, it is difficult to take on a proactive role as many are actively 
suffering.  Studies indicate that individuals experiencing moral distress respond in one of three 
ways.  They may withdraw from situations that are ethically challenging; they may change their 
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views, which may compromise them morally; or they may let their voices be heard by raising 
objections and concerns when situations are ethically challenged.256 
        For those who can respond in a more proactive manner in relation to moral distress, there is 
 a role for these individuals.  First, nurses need to recognize, as well as promote discourse in an 
organized and appropriate manner about the moral problems at all levels of the organization.257   
The conditions associated with moral distress cannot go unchallenged if they are to change for 
the future.   
        A second role for individual nurses is that they must seek the necessary education so they 
are informed and prepared to address the ethical challenges awaiting in the workplace.258  One 
study found that only 57% of nurses had any ethics education in their basic or advanced nursing 
programs and that 23% of the nurses reported having no education at all to include in-service or 
continuing education.259  Those who have had ethics education found that it influenced both the 
ability to make ethical decisions and take moral action.260 
        A third and final role for the individual nurse is to support other nurse peers and health care 
colleagues.261  This support may take the form of debriefing following difficult cases or deaths, 
creating a safe place for experiencing grief or moral distress, or seeking outside support, such as 
ethics consultation or spiritual care.262  The individual responsibility for the ethical work 
environment is to encourage open communication with colleagues, to utilize ethical principles in 
daily practice, and to enhance skills in ethical reasoning.263 
        The nursing profession has been delayed in addressing moral distress in research, education, 
and policy.264  In the past, nurses too often reported a lack of support from nursing management 
to the point of being reprimanded when seeking help or being “scapegoated”, both of which 
discourages the request for assistance.265  However, all that is changing now as moral distress has 
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been recognized, not only in the United States, but also internationally, and the nursing 
profession has begun to take action.  Work has begun to target nurses who work in high risk 
areas where the patient’s outcomes are uncertain with intense needs and prolonged suffering that 
often leads to death, since these often contribute to moral distress.266  AACN has developed a 
model to be used to address ethical dilemmas and to support nurses through moral courage when 
confronting ethical conflicts.267   This model, called the 4 A’s to Rise Above Moral Distress uses  
Ask, Affirm, Assess, and Act as a process to assist in combating moral distress.268 
        Ask, as the first of the 4 A’s, begins with ascertaining if the nurse is experiencing moral 
distress or if it is the stress of the work or other conflicts.269  With this first step, questions are 
asked to also determine if the individual’s personal or professional integrity are being 
compromised.  Affirm, as the second of the 4 A’s, looks at the nurse’s feelings realizing that 
these must first be addressed before the nurse can acknowledge the suffering of others.270  It is 
associated with a commitment to address the feelings.  Assess, the third of the 4 A’s, begins to 
put issues and facts together with a thorough self-assessment to determine if one has the skills 
and ability to facilitate change.271  It is during this phase that it is determined whether the 
situation is urgent or severe enough to necessitate immediate action.  Act is the final of the 4 A’s.  
This is where an action plan is completed and implemented with built in pitfalls which are apt to 
occur.272  A process must be associated with the action so as the change can be maintained. 
        In the process of confronting moral distress, moral actions are often met with constraints.  
Many of these constraints to moral action are thought to be some of the same factors that lead to 
moral distress.  Following is a discussion of some of these constraints as well as strategies and 
best practices to counteract them. 
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6.VI.B.  Constraints to Moral Action and Strategies to Overcome 
        A constraint is seen as that which limits or prevents resolution of a moral conflict in 
agreement with one’s moral judgment.273  Constraints to moral action can be described as  
internal or external with both often occurring at the same time.  Following is a discussion on the  
constraints to moral action in moral distress. 
        6.VI.B.1.  Internal and External Constraints 
        Internal constraints include such things as the inability to take moral action, as well as make 
moral judgments, and are usually due to a lack of moral awareness, skills, knowledge, and 
perspective.274  It is another way of saying that the nurse lacks “moral competency” or knowing 
what the appropriate actions are to take and then to take them which, therefore, limits moral 
action.275  Other internal constraints relate to one’s self image and abilities to act in a situation 
such as assertiveness and the feeling of powerlessness.276  With internal constraints, it is not easy 
to know what the right thing to do is with all the multiple possibilities that can be conflicting 
leading to confusion as to what is a true moral dilemma versus moral distress.277 
        External constraints are clearer than internal constraints in that the nurses usually know the 
right thing to do but are unable to do it because of the constraints.  Examples of external 
constraints, which seem beyond the nurses’ control, include a lack of adequate staffing, time 
constraints, poor leadership, a lack of resources, obstructive medical structure, and 
organizational policies.278  Other external constraints that have been identified and are relevant in 
today’s health care are the impact of technology, cost containment pressures, and consumer 
demands plus expectations on how health care should be delivered.279  These latter constraints 
are not unique to nursing as they are experienced by all members of the health care team.  The 
fact that nurses see them as major constraints, leaving them powerless, may help perpetuate the  
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perception of nurses as “powerless victims” instead of experienced professionals who can 
challenge and change the situation as well as the system.280 
        Other ways nurses have described constraints for moral action have been in terms of 
barriers.  These barriers are categorized as human barriers, communication barriers, emotional 
barriers, and cultural barriers.  Of these barriers, the ones that were cited most often related to 
human barriers and were the disparity between the physician and the family regarding 
expectations of the nurses related to the patient’s goals.281  Nurses often see the physicians’ goals 
being to keep the patients alive at all costs, whereas, the nurses see their own goals as realizing 
that everyone eventually dies so they attempt to make each death be a “death with dignity”.282 
        The second barrier that is most commonly related to is related to communication.  These 
communication barriers include ineffective nurse-patient/family communication, physician 
communication to patient/family that is incomplete, inaccurate, or deceptive, and inadequate 
communication between nurse-physician that could also be demeaning and threatening.283 
        One of the internal constraints that bears more discussion relates to knowledge via ethics 
education.  This knowledge can be in the form of education and training in both content as well 
as context that varies from a theoretical approach to a case-based approach.  Those who receive 
education, plus continuing education, are more apt to ask for help and use the available 
resources, such as ethics committees along with ethics consultations.284  Too often ethics 
committees or consultations are used as a last resort and not as the resource they are in helping 
with moral decisions early in the process. 
        Inadequate nursing staff has been identified as a major root cause or contributing factor to 
moral distress, but it is also a major constraint to moral action.  The real or perceived problem of 
insufficient staff, whether in adequate numbers or insufficient skills, has been identified as a  
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concern for years in critical care units resulting in nationwide and international recruitment and  
retention efforts.285  Staffing as a cause of moral distress, as well as a constraint to action, can set  
off a cascade of events that influence one another.  This cascade begins with inadequate staffing  
which leads to decreased communication and collaboration which leads to poor patient  
outcomes, more errors and complications, leading to nurse turnover with the resulting staff  
shortages and inexperienced staff with the process repeating itself.286 
        A final, yet, major concern in the constraints to moral action is that some nurses may have 
lived with and experienced moral distress for such a lengthy period that they have “normalized” 
it.287  This normalization has made moral distress the accepted and expected norm. 
        Despite the many constraints to moral action, there are three additional strategies and best 
practices that are worthy of further discussion related to moral distress.  Following is a 
discussion on these three strategies and best practices. 
        6.VI.B.2.  Strategies and Best Practices to Overcome Moral Distress 
        One of the strategies and best practices that has not been fully stressed in the workplace, is 
based on studies that implicate that moral distress leading to burnout can be seen as contagious in 
a critical care unit.  This study stressed that critical care nurses needed to support each other and 
not “tear each other down”, which is too often the environment of a critical care unit.288  
Included in this support of each other is living a healthy lifestyle, which includes caring for 
oneself outside work such as taking vacations, limiting alcohol, nicotine as well as caffeine, 
eating healthy, exercising, and getting sufficient rest.289   It also involves caring for oneself inside 
the workplace and includes such things as taking breaks, asking for help, and saying “no” when 
unable to take on one more task.290 
        A second strategy or best practice that has not been fully recognized revolves around further 
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research on the topic of moral distress.  A lack of research and the resulting data explains why 
education and policies regarding moral distress have been so slow in coming so that change can 
occur in nursing practice.291   Further research is needed on the impact moral distress has on  
patient outcomes in all areas of critical care, but especially in the neonatal intensive care unit  
where the incidence of moral distress is so high.292  There are many articles written in regards to 
moral distress with many focusing on its incidence, sources, and consequences but more work is 
needed on its prevention plus the long term effects on nurses, patients, as well as families.293 
        A third and final strategy, or best practice, is the employment of a clinical or nurse ethicist.  
The specific role of the nurse ethicist, or clinical ethicist, as both titles are used, is fairly new in 
the United States.  The clinical ethicist’s primary role is to work from an interdisciplinary 
approach with the sole purpose of providing the highest quality patient care possible.294  This 
includes communication and collaboration with all members of the health care team, as well as 
patients/families so there is sound and effective decision making.295  A clinical ethicist usually 
has an advanced degree and/or experience in clinical ethics who participates in ethics 
consultations, education, research, policy development, and is instrumental in addressing futility 
in critical care.296 
       Evidence is beginning to indicate that the role that the clinical ethicist fills, where 
communication and conversations are increasing related to ethically challenging situations, is 
decreasing the incidence of moral distress.297  An additional benefit of clinical ethicists is 
creating a more positive ethical climate which is also associated with a reduction in moral 
distress.298 
 
6.VII.  Conclusion 
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        The literature is bountiful on the topic of moral distress, especially in critical care nurses. 
What is known is that moral distress is one of the major ethical concerns affecting nursing and 
that the nurses are suffering.  This suffering, in turn, has led to turnover from positions as well as 
from the nursing profession.  The suffering and turnover have led to an ethical crisis in the care 
of critically ill patients who are in desperate need of qualified and compassionate care givers 
committed to their care.  Unfortunately, the patients often reap the results of moral distress in the 
form of errors, complications, untoward outcomes, pain, and unnecessary suffering. 
        Moral distress in nurses also takes its toll affecting their physical, psychological, spiritual, 
and behavioral beings.   Because moral distress is so powerful as well as destructive, prolonged 
and unresolved moral distress can negatively affect one’s integrity and moral agency. 
     Although the literature on moral distress in abundant, the recommended actions to solve the 
problem of moral distress, or resolve its presence, are not as ample.  When the focus in only on 
the nurse, the results will only be short term.  These short term results will be because the 
problem encompasses all players in the health care organization—the patients, the families, 
peers, physician colleagues, leaders, and administrators.  The nursing profession is now paying 
attention to moral distress and taking action to help prevent it, but more is needed. 
        The actions must focus on the root causes.  This focus will take an organized effort that 
needs to begin in nursing, as well as medical schools, and continue throughout all health care 
organizations addressing all providers of health care.  Two of the major contributors to moral 
distress in critical care nurses need special attention.  These are nurse-physician relationships and 
medical futility at the end-of-life as these have been identified as common threads in all critical 
care units.   
              A quote from Martin Luther King says that, “Our lives begin to end the day we become 
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  silent about things that matter”.299   The first step is giving moral distress a voice---this has been 
 done and it is beginning to be heard.  The tough work now begins with discussions on the  
difficult ethical decisions and dilemmas all care givers are facing that need to be done with a 
commitment to find common ground through mutual respect.   There is no room for silence. 
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Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
        This dissertation has presented the ethics of medical futility found in end-of-life treatment in 
the care of the critically ill neonatal, pediatric, and adult patients.  Futility has been around since 
medicine’s beginning and continues today for a myriad of reasons.  The first part of this chapter 
will summarize the findings as to the presence of futility across the age continuum identifying 
the nuances that are particular to the different age groups.  The last part of the chapter 
summarizes the findings related to moral distress and futility with a look to what is most hopeful 
for the future. 
 
7.I.  Ethics of Futility 
        Medical futility at the end-of-life, whether that be in the neonatal, pediatric, or adult critical 
care unit, is not ethically justified.  Yet, it continues.  The first reason is because there continues 
to be no standard, accepted definition of medical futility.  It has been called medical futility, 
futile treatment, futile care, or the new accepted term, inappropriate medical treatment.  Even 
though there is no one definition, there is acceptance that it relates to treatment that does not 
produce a physiologic effect, treatment which produces a burden instead of a benefit, or 
treatment that is useless when applied to a specific patient.  However, when applied to patients, it 
has been found that futile treatment varies from patient to patient and situation to situation with 
providers saying they know it when they see it. 
        A second reason futility continues is because death is not accepted as a natural process of 
life.  It is also often seen as a failure by the medical profession and is associated with fear of the 
unknown as well as concerns with one’s own mortality.   
         A third reason that inappropriate medical treatment continues relates to the aging  
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population and the switch from a paternalistic physician decision making model to a patient or 
surrogate autonomous decision making model.  This change has, too often, resulted in the 
demands to have “everything” done for the patient.  This “everything” demand for inappropriate 
and ineffective treatment intensifies into a continuance of more of the same until ethical 
principles become subordinated to demands of the patient and a surrogate decision maker.1 
        A fourth reason that inappropriate medical treatment continues is due to personal reasons of 
the provider and patient/family.  Providers may continue treatment because of conflict 
avoidance, fear of confronting death, a need to feel that they are doing “something”, the path of 
“least resistance”, the inability to confront personal emotions, or the failure of medicine to 
master disease.2  Whereas, patients/families continue treatment because of lack of knowledge 
regarding end-of-life, poor communication with providers, emotional conflict that deals with 
guilt as well as loss surrounding the patient relationship, and cultural/religious beliefs.3. 
        A final reason inappropriate medical treatment continues focuses on the organizational 
ethics where the clinical, professional, and business ethics are in conflict.  This can occur when 
the patient care decision of whether to continue or withdraw treatment collides with the 
administration’s recommendation to continue or withdraw treatment which is based on financial, 
legal or social concerns.  Although these conflicts can usually be resolved with the passage of 
time and negotiation, they do present an impasse in the care of the patient. 
        With all these varied reasons that play out at the bedside in critical care, the key player is 
and will always be the patient.  By the time patients reach the end-of-life, they are usually unable 
to communicate so decisions are left to both the providers as well as the families.  Their role is to  
focus and frequently re-focus their purpose on whether their actions are prolonging the living or  
prolonging the dying by creating unnecessary suffering. 
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        The ethics of futility and the reasons inappropriate medical treatments continue today 
applying to all ages across the continuum.   However, there are nuances that are peculiar to each 
age group in the neonatal, pediatric, and adult population that present their own challenges. 
 
7.II.  Futility in Neonates, Pediatrics, and Adults  
       Medical technological advances, plus pharmaceutical availability, have made for numerous 
choices in the way care is delivered to the smallest members of society.  As a result, neonates are 
“surviving” at smaller weights and younger gestational ages than ever before, but not without a 
cost.  This cost is in the form of blindness, deafness, cerebral palsy, and various other disabilities 
that can occur in the neonate as well as develop later in life with various degrees of disabilities 
occurring in 40% of those less than 26 weeks gestation.4 
        The major ethical decisions regarding medical futility at end-of-life for neonates occurs at 
two points.  One is at the time of birth and the other is later in the neonatal intensive care unit 
(NICU) when treatment is withheld or withdrawn.  The decision at the time of birth relates to 
whether to resuscitate or not to resuscitate.  The decision making struggle calls into play the best 
interest standard in making decisions for the neonate, keeping in mind whose best interest it is—
the neonate’s, the parent’s, the provider’s or society’s.  Although it is most often a collaborative 
decision between parents and providers, the new parents are often unable to grasp the magnitude 
of the decision while blinded from the shock of parenthood gone wrong.  Therefore, the decision 
falls to the provider who may recommend a resuscitation trial to see how the neonate responds to 
aggressive treatment.  As gestational age is used to help determine what decision is made, 22-25 
weeks gestational age is considered a “grey zone” for discretionary resuscitation, greater than 25 
weeks is a trial resuscitation and less than 22 weeks is to not attempt a resuscitation, except in 
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rare circumstances.5  These “rare circumstances” are now becoming more commonplace in some 
medical centers with the survival of 19-21 week gestational age neonates. 
        From the delivery room, the decisions move to the NICU where withholding and 
withdrawing treatment is decided when the burden seems to exceed the benefit of continued 
treatment.  Here the concerns of futile treatment are a main consideration and an increasing issue 
with neonates as they are being resuscitated at earlier gestational ages, leaving much uncertainty 
for what difficulties the infant may face in the future.  
        Between the two decisional points of the delivery room and the NICU, work is focused on 
keeping the neonate from becoming a victim of the treatment by minimizing suffering, without 
hastening death.  The questions that remain unanswered producing ethical concerns relate to the 
price of survival and if it has led to a path of suffering that cannot be determined at birth. 
        The pediatric population, ranging from 1-18 years of age, present with diseases and 
conditions that make them unique.  Infants who once died from childbirth, prematurity, or 
congenital anomalies now survive.  Children who used to perish from a variety of childhood 
illnesses, cancer and infections now live due to immunizations, disease prevention, cancer 
therapies, and antibiotics.  However, this age group continues to be afflicted by intentional and 
unintentional injuries, AIDS, congenital anomalies, and malignancies which provide immense 
challenges. 
        The death of a child has a lasting effect on the family as well as caregivers.  Although many 
of the deaths have been prevented, death still continues to have the last word.  Because death is 
so difficult in a child, the topic of medical futility is often avoided which can lead to prolonged 
suffering in the child, family and health care providers.  Death is compounded in the pediatric  
patient in that the patterns of death are different than for the adult making the need for end-of-life 
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discussions more difficult to predict. 
        The biggest challenge in the pediatric populations at the time of end-of-life and the 
decisions that are needed when further treatment becomes futile, is focused on the rights of the 
child and the rights of the parents.  Parents, as the decision makers for the children, utilize the 
best interest standard.  By legal definition, children do not have the right to consent until the age 
of 18.  However, children younger than 18, but usually not less than 7, are able to assent to 
treatment and should be encouraged to be part of the decision making process, whenever 
possible, after all factors are considered.6  This also includes the right to dissent to treatment 
which can be a source of conflict for parents and the health care providers.   
        When caring for pediatric patients, all care givers must realize that there are two patients---
the child and the child’s family.  Therefore, the care, communications, decisions, and emotional 
needs must be directed to both realizing that these may be different for the two patients. 
        When referring to the adult population, it is the elderly who are most apt to be receiving the 
inappropriate medical treatments at the end-of-life.  The elderly is an ever-growing population 
that often have no advance directives and either they, or their surrogates, want “everything” done 
which may seem to prolong the dying versus prolong the living.  This elderly population has a 
longer length of stay, higher mortality rate, and a higher cost of care than those younger.7   
        A challenge that is found in the adult population is determining whether they have 
decisional capacity.  This decisional capacity can be determined by health care providers, 
however, the majority of patients are on mechanical ventilation when in critical care at the end-
of-life so communication is difficult.  In addition, studies have shown that only 5% of the  
patients have capacity at the end-of-life in critical care.8   This leaves the decisions to be made  
with the family or surrogates and the providers. 
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        The decisions that are made for the adult patient are based on substituted judgment or the 
best interest standard.  Substituted judgment is based on the known preferences of the patients 
and the best interest standard is used when the preferences are not known and choices are based 
on what a “reasonable person” in a similar situation would choose.9  In this decision making 
process the autonomy of the patient, the autonomy of the family, the autonomy of the provider 
and the autonomy of the community are subject to review as who is best served by the decision. 
        Despite there being much written and discussed on the topic of medical futility, or 
inappropriate medical treatments at the end-of-life for adults, no one best solution has been 
found.  Attempts have been made to minimize the concerns that have taken the form of improved 
advance care planning and advance directives with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
(CMS) having instituted a payment for voluntary 30 minute discussions with Medicare patients 
on end-of-life planning.   Policies and practice guidelines have been written with minimal effect.  
Legislation has been passed with Texas enacting the Texas Advance Directive Act of 1999 
which has had mixed results.  All of this is occurring in an environment where more and more 
states are passing legislation legalizing physician assisted dying of which its effects are yet to be 
fully known.   
        Each of these three age populations has looked at the issue of futility within their own 
boundaries with little concern for those of other age groups.  It is time for all health care 
providers from every age group to join efforts in an attempt to address the ethics of medically 
inappropriate treatments as a health care dilemma that crosses all boundaries.  Such an approach 
is more apt to lead to improved strategies that places the patient first minimizing suffering and 
enhancing end-of-life care. 
        The persistence of the medical futility, or medically inappropriate treatments, along the age 
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continuum, has gotten media attention as resources are consumed and ethical dilemmas are made 
visible in the social, legal, as well as ethical realms.  Limited awareness has been in relation to 
the human effect of these inappropriate medical treatments on those who care for the patients, 
especially the nurses.  This is changing as more and more is written about the incidence of moral 
conflict as well as moral distress in the workplace.   Moral distress also has a relationship with 
medical futility which makes it imperative that strategies be implemented to address futility 
because in doing so, moral distress is, likewise, addressed. 
 
7.III.  Futility and Moral Distress 
        Although the term of moral distress is relatively new, having originated in the 1980’s, the 
suffering of moral distress has been around since the time of Florence Nightingale.  Nightingale 
attended soldiers in the Crimean War working in horrifying conditions, with incompetent 
physicians who wanted her and her nurses to go home.10    Just as medical futility is found across 
the age continuum, so is moral distress.  Moral distress is particularly prevalent in nursing, 
especially critical care nursing, but is found in all members of the health care profession.   The 
impact of moral distress is that it not only threatens the moral integrity of nurses, but can also 
have a major effect on the quality of care delivered to the patients and their families. 
        The facts that are known regarding moral distress are that nurses are suffering, they are 
leaving their jobs as well as leaving nursing.  Patients are suffering in the form of errors, 
complications, and unmet needs.  All of this is creating a crisis in the care of the critically ill 
where the need for skilled, knowledgeable, and compassionate care is the highest.  In addition, 
the cost of turnover is great in both dollars and human suffering. 
        Although moral distress is found in all critical care units across the age continuum, it  
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especially affects those nurses who care for the extremely low birthweight neonates.  The high 
prevalence found in caring for the neonates is due to the uncertainty related to whether to 
resuscitate a premature neonate, as well as when to withdraw treatment; the best interest of the 
patient and whether the new parents are emotionally able to determine what that is; the varying 
views that are found between the family, the providers, and the nurses who are, too often, not 
valued for their opinions; the pain and suffering the nurses see the neonates enduring; and the 
never-ending responsibility to be there for the parents, not only to serve as a source of 
information, but also as support in times of grief and anxiety.11  All of this takes its toll on the 
nurses leaving them with physical, psychological, behavioral as well as spiritual signs and 
symptoms. 
        In addition to futility as a root cause of moral distress, the nurse-physician relationship is a 
major factor.  This relationship can be a factor when it becomes negative to the point of bullying, 
intimidating, ignoring, humiliating and reinforcing the “doctor-nurse” games that have been 
around for centuries.   
        The strategies and actions for moral distress must focus on the root causes of which the top 
two are medical futility and nurse-physician relationships.  This needs an organized effort that 
begins in both the nursing as well as medical schools and continues into the clinical environment 
with support from the professional organizations and the administration of the organizations. 
        There is no easy answer to the ethical concerns of medical futility, or inappropriate medical 
treatment.   However, there is hope for the future in the form of strategies and initiatives that are 
believed to be making an impact. 
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7.IV.  Hope for the Future 
        Medical futility at the end-of-life in critical care is not ethically justified whether that be for 
neonates, pediatrics, or adults.  However, it continues and will undoubtedly continue for a variety 
of reasons.  Therefore, the best strategies are those that focus on a proactive approach to prevent 
or at least minimize medical futility before it presents as an ethical dilemma or leads to conflict 
between and among all players. 
        First and foremost, the strategy that cannot be overemphasized is communication.  Since 
almost all misunderstandings and conflicts are a result of poor or inadequate communication, it  
is vital that providers are available, approachable and compassionate providing frequent, honest 
communication that can help counteract these problems.  Decisions are best made when they are 
collaborative efforts between the patient/family and providers plus a solid communication 
framework can help facilitate that happening.  Included in this communication is avoidance of 
the term “futility” utilizing potentially inappropriate medical treatment as an alternate. 
        A second strategy utilizes policies and procedures regarding inappropriate medical 
treatment.  Even though the policies and procedures have not always been effective, especially 
when attempting to define what constitutes medically inappropriate treatment, they can have 
merit when defining an approach for action when there is inappropriate treatment. 
        A third strategy that offers hope for the future of medical futility is to include nurses in the 
discussions and decision process with patients/families and physicians.  Nurses spend more time 
with patients than other providers and can be influential and helpful by their advocacy for the 
needs of the patients as well as families. 
        A fourth hope for the future is to continue to advocate for advance care planning with the 
completion of an advance directive.  It has been over a year since the implementation of 
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reimbursement for providers having end-of-life discussions with Medicare eligible patients.  The 
initial data reports that the utilization of this reimbursement code has not been as widely used as 
was hoped for with this additional reimbursement.  However, it is still too soon to tell if there 
will be any impact over time as providers are encouraged to promote end-of-life planning. 
        The fifth and final hope for the future is one that is believed to be already making a 
difference, this is the utilization of palliative care programs.  The palliative care programs are 
especially beneficial when they are begun in the critical care unit and when critical care with its 
curative focus is partnered with palliative care with its caring focus, as well as symptom 
management.  Adult palliative care programs have been established in the United States for 
approximately 40 years.  Palliative care programs for neonates and children have been slow to 
develop and are just now beginning to gain favor across the country.  Despite perceived barriers 
against developing neonatal/pediatric palliative care, there are benefits that make it a worthwhile 
endeavor for this special population. 
        Health care providers enter their particular professions in order to provide care that benefits 
as well as improves the patients’ quality of life, whether that be in living or in dying.  The call to 
action for each provider stems from Hippocrates, “to cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort 
always”.12  For it is in the environment of the critical care unit of all ages that the concerns of 
medical futility will be on-going, but the take away message is that even if curing seems to be 
futile, caring will never be futile.13 
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